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ABSTRACT 
There is a gap between the theoretical literature which almost unanimously advocates 
privatisation of banks and enterprises as a part of the solution for the commitment 
problem in economies in transition, and empirical evidence on how best to design a 
privatisation programme in order to secure an efficient use of resources. This thesis 
contributes to this debate by focusing on privatisation programmes and the financial 
performance of privatised enterprises in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
This is the first comprehensive comparative study on the short and long run financial 
performance of privatisation share issues in these countries. The thesis builds on 
privatisation theories formulated in Perotti (1995) and Perotti and Biais (1997), and the 
empirical evidence on performance of privatisation share issues presented in Perotti and 
Guney (1993), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and Megginson et al. (1998a). 
Alternative privatisation schemes are assessed not only on the grounds of speed and 
effect on the state budget, but also with regard to the benefits they bring to domestic and 
foreign shareholders in privatised companies. The results provide support for the 
underlying political and economic theories on privatisation and reveal the importance of 
a choice of privatisation methods to enhance the financial performance of newly 
privatised enterprises in transition economies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental problem in command economies is inability, or unwillingness, of the 
government to create and adhere to an optimal plan (commitment problem). As a result, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) repeatedly tend to spend in excess of their budget. 1 
Since budgets are adjusted to reflect this repeated overspending and residual profits are 
taken by the centre, enterprises have an incentive to maximise costs, and minimise 
profits. According to property rights theory, the possession of residual rights of control, 
including the allocation of profits may provide stronger incentives within enterprises. 
Although there is a broad agreement at the theoretical level that privatisation plays a 
crucial role in solving commitment problems, the existing empirical evidence provides 
only a weak support for this hypothesis. Furthermore, there is a paucity of empirical 
research on the choice between privatisation methods and the design of privatisation 
programmes. 
In a rather narrow sense, privatisation could be defined as a transfer of the residual 
rights of control (Hemming and Mansor, 1988) or a transfer of the rights to residual 
income (Yarrow, 1986). Milanovic (1990), however, defines privatisation as a transfer 
of ownership from the state to private owners in such a way that private individuals 
become the identifiable ultimate owners. Even this broader definition seems somewhat 
limited for post-communist countries where apart from de novo domestic and foreign 
private owners, the new owners are often insiders (employees and managers) and 
sometimes foreign companies partially owned by a foreign state. 2 We, therefore, adopt 
the broadest definition of privatisation as `the act of reducing the role of government, or 
increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets' 
(Savas, 1987: p3). 
This thesis focuses on various privatisation strategies and the financial performance of 
newly privatised enterprises in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These 
1 State owned enterprises are defined as government owned or government-controlled economic entities 
that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services (see Boardman and Vining 
(1989), and The World Bank (1995p. 26)). For more on the definition of state-owned enterprises see 
Boardman and Vining, 1989. With regard to problems with the definition of state vs. private in Central 
and East European Countries (CEECs) see Earle and Estrin (1996) and Stark (1996). 
2 For example, the Bank of Austria and Volkswagen participated in Hungarian and Czech privatisation 
and both have mixed ownership. The Bank of Austria is partially owned by the Austrian government, 
while the German government has a stake in Volkswagen. 
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countries, together with Bulgaria, Romania, and countries from what used to be the 
Soviet Union, were part of the political region called Eastern Europe. Since the demise 
of communism in Europe in the early nineties, the countries from Eastern Europe have 
often been referred to as transition economies, emphasising their transition from central 
planning towards market based economies. In more recent years, the European Bank 
for Restructuring and Development (EBRD) and some authors have described these 
countries as Central and Eastern European Countries and Baltic States, avoiding the 
political connotation of the Eastern European block. Under this classification, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary are part of Central Europe and are sometimes referred 
to as the `Visegrad group' because of their historical background and geographical 
proximity. 3 For the purpose of this study, the terms Central and East European 
Countries, Eastern Europe, post-communist countries and transition economies are used 
interchangeably. 
We adopt the EBRD's definition of the process of transition towards a market economy: 
" The transition is the movement towards a new system for the generation and 
allocation of resources, and it involves changing and creating institutions particularly 
private enterprises. " (EBRD, 1994; p3). The process of transition towards a market 
economy is, therefore, different from the processes of economic development and 
macro-economic stabilisation. Economic development, defined as an advancement of 
the standard of living of individuals, can be achieved without transition towards a 
market economy. S In other words, although transition may contribute to economic 
development, it is not a necessary part of economic development and could be an 
ultimate objective in itself. Similarly, macroeconomics stabilisation programmes which 
aim to stabilise macro-economic variables (e. g. prices, balance of payments), although 
an important part of the transition, may be objectives for any government regardless of 
the economic system in question. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly examine the privatisation 
strategies, in the spirit of reviewed theoretical papers, and financial performance of 
3 The Visegrad group also includes Slovakia. 
4 By a market economy we mean an economy with a co-ordination mechanism which relies on `Smith's 
invisible hand' as opposed to bureaucratic co-ordination based on central planning. 
S We would not analyse how alternative economic systems contribute to the economic development. 
Although economic theory still does not have a complete theoretical answer of why command economy 
fails, we would accept a dominant view that a market economy is more efficient than a command system. 
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privatised enterprises in transition economies. The empirical analysis of privatisation 
strategies is based upon data on around 400 privatisation transactions in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary over the period 1988-1999. Since these countries 
adopted different privatisation strategies we are able to test for the effect of various 
privatisation strategies on the performance of newly privatised enterprises. The 
financial performance of around 150 such companies was compared with the 
performance of their private counterparts. The lack of a reasonable large sample of 
privatised companies and/or the concentration of privatised companies in highly 
regulated industries were the main reasons why much previous work on the 
performance of privatised enterprises has been preliminary and has lacked formal 
statistical inference. The use of Eastern European data provides us with a greater 
number of observations and enables us to compare the financial performance of private 
and state-owned enterprises in both regulated and competitive environments. 
In terms of methodology our general orientation is empirical. We develop and 
formulate hypotheses utilising the above-mentioned theoretical literature. Single 
country or single industry studies tend to provide more detailed description of 
institutional aspects and related data, but their statistical inferences seem to be rather 
limited due to the data selection process. On the other hand, multi-national and/or 
multi-industry studies should provide better statistical inferences but they normally 
settle for lowest-common-denominator data that is universally available (Dewenter and 
Malatesta 1997, Megginson et al. 1998a). In order to overcome this trade-off between 
depth and breadth of coverage we start with country analysis and then combine 
countries from the region into an international sample. However, biases are still 
possible because of the limitations of privatisation data in general and more specifically 
in the context of CEEC. 
Firstly, data on privatisation is less precise than that for stock markets, due to the lack of 
a central `clearing house' for data in many countries and to the different types of 
privatisation that exist (McLindon, 1996) 6 Secondly, enterprise level data in transition 
economies should be treated with caution due partly to general problems with 
quantitative performance data (e. g. inflation, method of aggregation, etc. ) and partly to 
features peculiar to transition economies. For example, accounting systems in 
6A rare exception is the case of countries with mass privatisation programmes (e. g. The Czech Republic). 
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communist countries were aimed not at providing information to potential investors but 
at collecting data for central planners. Accounting function in transition economies, 
therefore, is in embryonic stage and need to be developed both to act as an effective 
provider of economic information to assist investor decisions, and to ensure reasonable 
control through an audit process. Thirdly, there is a high degree of secrecy at all levels 
due to the rigorous system of monitoring operated by the Communist party in the past 
(Ellman, 1989). Fourthly, managers in both the private and state sectors frequently 
provide false data in order to preserve their controlling positions and/or to seek 
government subsidies in various forms. Qualitative data from case studies and surveys 
may serve to explain the patterns of adjustments, but it is often difficult to obtain due to 
confidentiality issues and/or lack of transparency. Even when available, the qualitative 
data tends to come from managers who are less secretive and are willing to provide 
information and are, therefore, less likely to distort data in first place (Carlin et al., 
1994). Finally, all CEEC countries are developing countries with emerging capital 
markets. 7 The most important qualitative features of emerging markets are related to 
areas such as stock market operational efficiency, quality of market regulation and 
enforcement, and disclosure and transparency. The relative importance of these 
features, however, varies across the markets. 
Due to above mentioned limitations several methods of performance measurement are 
used in our analysis, and whenever possible we checked the robustness of our results 
applying alternative methods of analysis. For example, the long-term financial 
performance of newly privatised enterprises was measured using cumulative abnormal 
returns and market adjusted buy-and-hold returns for both domestic and international 
investors. Nevertheless, one of the limitations of our analysis of financial performance 
of enterprises, as in any other emerging market, may be related to the degree of the 
7 Throughout the thesis we use The World Bank definition of a developing country as a country where 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capital is $8,625 per annum in 1993. According to the definition 
Hungary is an upper middle income developing country and Poland and the Czech Republic are classified 
as lower middle income developing countries. An emerging capital market is a phrase coined by the IFC 
in 1981. At that time it categorised the stock markets of developing countries, though some of them have 
existed for a hundred years. Although the current categorisation remains quite subjective, a stock market 
is defined as emerging if it meets at least one of two criteria: i) an emerging (developing) economy 
criterion, and ii) an emerging (developing) stock market criterion. `Emerging' refers to a potential to 
economic development in the former and to a process of change with stock markets growing in size and 
sophistication in the later case. CEEC countries satisfy both criteria and are, therefore, included in the 
IFC Emerging Stock Market Indexes and in the IFC's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (IFC, February 
1998: p3). 
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market efficiency due to information disclosure problems and the dominance of 
uninformed investors in these countries. 
The thesis is organised as follows. Theoretical background for privatisation together 
with a review of relevant literature on privatisation strategies and performance of 
privatised enterprises is provided in chapter one. Privatisation strategies in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary are examined in the spirit of the reviewed theories in 
chapter two, and the short and long term performance of privatisation share issues is 
analysed in chapters three and four, respectively. Finally, concluding remarks are set 
out in chapter five. 
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Chapter 1 
FROM CENTRAL PLANNING TO A MARKET ECONOMY 
1.1 Does ownership matter? 
The key question addressed in the literature on property rights is whether ownership of 
the means of production matters? In other words, how and when the possession of 
residual rights of control and/or the power to allocate residual income influences 
incentives within an organisation. The authors adopt different approaches, from 
philosophical arguments to empirical analysis. Our main purpose in classifying these 
contributions was to understand how they analyse the costs and benefits of integration 
and the different forms of ownership. ' 
Demsetz (1967), for example, adopts a philosophical approach to property rights and 
explains how the allocation of ownership may prevent abuse of various assets in society 
('externality problem'). Externalities are defined as the costs and benefits associated 
with social interdependencies. For example, all people hunting in a territory would 
enjoy benefits and share some costs. However, each individual's personal benefits and 
costs may not be well specified, and eventually marginal costs may become higher than 
marginal benefits. This may lead to over-hunting, and an abuse of the asset. According 
to Demsetz, property rights are an instrument of society with a primary function to 
guide incentives towards a greater internalisation of externalities. For example, an 
allocation of property rights (owners) to the hunting territory would specify who should 
monitor the territory and who must pay whom to modify certain actions. 
The second group of studies focuses on `internal incentive problems' within an 
enterprise. Alchian and Demsetz (1972), defined an enterprise as a team use of inputs 
with a centralised position of a particular party (employer) based upon contractual 
arrangements. Necessary conditions for the emergence of an enterprise are the 
possibility of increasing productivity through team-oriented production and an 
' Consequently, this classification of theoretical contributions differs from better known classifications 
within the theory of the firm. For example, following the theory of the firm perspective, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) would be classified under agency theory, while Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and 
7 
economic estimate of marginal productivity by observing input behaviour. These 
conditions are satisfied when better allocation of resources and more effective 
monitoring of performance are more likely to be achieved within than outside an 
enterprise. Managers are needed to examine the ways in which inputs are used and to 
measure the marginal productivity of the team's members. They would monitor other 
workers, and receive residual rewards. The managers themselves would be monitored 
by the owners. Hence, the allocation of residual income and property rights is important 
for incentives within the enterprise and leads to better efficiency. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), extended this approach to relations with suppliers, investors and customers. 
They developed the `nexus of contracts' approach to the theory of the firm and 
concluded that different forms of moral hazard affect various forms of outside finance 
differently. Equity finance, for example, would be more affected than debt finance in 
terms of the entrepreneur's incentives, but debt would be more affected in respect of the 
level of the project's riskiness. 
The third group emphasises the importance of ownership rights for the regulation of 
`opportunistic behaviour' by enterprises. According to Williamson (1975), Grosman 
and Hart (1986), and Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) ownership is important because of 
the difficulties involved in writing complete contracts, which are either too costly, too 
difficult to write, or in some cases non-verifiable. " With complete contracts (i. e. when 
all items are verifiable and penalties and rewards specified for all states of the world) 
there will be no difference in efficiency between centralised and market economies. A 
Pareto optimum in centralised economies would be achieved by central planning, and in 
a market economy by trading in the market. With incomplete contracts, however, 
opportunistic behaviour is possible due to unspecified contingencies. 
Williamson (1975; 1988) postulates that high transaction costs of operating in a market 
may create an incentive for economic agents to come together and reduce costs. He 
identified some relationship-specific investments (e. g. an electricity plant located in 
between two mines), where at least one party makes investments which are specific to 
Williamson (1975) would be classified under transaction costs theory. For an alternative classification 
within the theory of the firm, see Hart (1989). 
'The summary of this paper is based on Hellwig (1989). 
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this particular contract. Since it is impossible to write a long-term contract that will 
specify usage of every physical asset in each state of the world, and prevent possible 
opportunistic behaviour of one of the mines, the plant may wish to settle between the 
two mines. However, this problem could be solved if the plant merges with one of the 
mines. In this case, ownership can solve the opportunistic behaviour problem. " 
Grossman and Hart (1986) offer an alternative approach to this issue. They assume 
relation-specific investments by two enterprises which are more valuable within their 
relationship than outside the relationship. Enterprises can observe each other's 
investment, but the investments are initially non-verifiable, so that it is impossible to 
write a contract contingent upon the outcomes of the investments. After completion of 
the initial investment, further enterprise-specific investments by two firms are needed. 
These investments are ex-ante non-contractible, but once the outcome of the initial 
investments are known they become contractible. The authors demonstrate that when 
initial investments are non-contractible and additional investments are contractible only 
ex post, both parties will underinvest in the firm-specific investment, leading ultimately 
to an inefficient outcome. However, an ex-post efficient solution can be achieved if 
enterprises negotiate, indicating that different ownership structures might have an 
impact where contracts are not complete. An allocation of residual rights of control can 
thus cover unspecified contingencies. " It was, therefore, suggested that ownership is 
relevant and that complementary assets should be owned together. 
1.2 Motives for Privatisation in Transition Economies 
There are two distinct views in neo-classical economics as how to reform command 
economies. 13 The first view emphasises the importance of competition for improvement 
in efficiency and suggests that improvement in efficiency is possible without 
1° Non-verifiable in this context means that some elements cannot be verified in court. Consequently, the 
contracts cannot be enforced. 
" Williamson explains the potential benefits of ownership, but does not deal with countervailing costs. 
Furthermore, he does not consider why it is not efficient to concentrate all activities in one large fium. 
'Z This involves an implicit assumption that residual rights of control incorporate residual income. 
This classification is adopted from Earle (1991). 
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privatisation, providing that markets are competitive (Lange, 1964). This view was 
supported by market socialist experiments in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland during 
which the state, in principle, withdrew from operational management, allowing the 
transformation of SOEs into joint stock companies. The experiments failed, for states 
continued to interfere in SOEs' management through manipulation of the financial 
system rather than direct orders from the planners (Estrin, 1991: p. 5). 
Under the second view, both privatisation and competition are necessary for efficient 
capital markets without which a market economy cannot function (von Mises, 
1922; 1951). The literature that followed identified the main areas in which clearly 
defined property rights may contribute to the transition towards a market-based 
economy such as soft budgeting, corporate governance, and the role of the state in the 
economy. 14 Together with the above-mentioned failure of market socialism, this 
intellectual argument provided a platform for the reformers in CEECs in the early 
nineties. In the discussion below we concentrate on the importance of privatisation in 
the imposition of a hard budget constraint. 
Contrary to the expectations of socialist classics, money circulation has never died away 
in socialist countries. Classical socialism remained a semi-monetized system in which 
financial, pricing and fiscal systems were aiming to attempting to accommodate central 
plan directives. " SOEs repeatedly tended to receive various subsidies and to spend in 
excess of their budget. The amount and form of subsidies were normally subject to 
bargaining which resulted in either direct subsidies or `hidden' subsidies, e. g. reduced 
taxation, administrative pricing, and revolved bank loans. This phenomenon was 
defined as a `soft budget constraint' with the following forms: soft subsidy, soft 
taxation, soft administrative pricing and soft credit, where softness refers to the 
credibility of the commitment to the plan. 16 
" For other areas such as aims of the system, international trade, means of allocation of resources, labour, 
and capital, see Estrin et al. (1991). 
IS Perotti (1994) for example, describes financial systems in command economies as 'outside-money' 
systems in which central bank refinancing dominates, as opposed to `inside-money' systems where 
decentralised credit decisions prevail. 
16 Kornai (1992). 
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Continuous adjustments to the repeated overspending and confiscation of residual profit 
by the state resulted in low efficiency and perverse incentives adopted by enterprises. 
For example, they would try to maximise costs and reduce profits, otherwise they would 
jeopardise future rents simply because the state might infer that cost savings are easy to 
achieve. This perverse effect is known as the `ratchet effect' and is well documented in 
planned economies (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Other perverse effects of the lack of 
commitment documented in the literature are the reluctance of enterprises to invest 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993), lack of innovation by enterprises (Qian and Xu, 1991), and 
shortages of various products in planned economies (Qian, 1992). " Echoing results 
mentioned above on the lack of innovation in SOEs, Hart et al. (1997) show that private 
ownership is preferred whenever innovation is important, reputation mechanisms and 
competition are strong, and non-contractible costs are significant. 
There are two interpretations of soft budgeting in the literature. The first adopts the 
enterprise's perspective (Gomulka, 1985), while the second refers to the credibility of 
commitment of the state to stop persistent loss-making (Kornai, 1992; Schaffer, 1989; 
Qian, 1992). Taking soft credit as an example, the first interpretation would emphasise 
the collective expectations of external assistance by state-owned firms. The higher the 
subjective probability of receiving refinancing as perceived by management, the softer 
the budget constraint is. On the other hand, soft credit can be explained by the lack of 
credible commitment on the part of the state to extend external assistance. According to 
Kornai the lack of commitment is a consequence of the state's paternalistic behaviour 
towards enterprises. Regardless of the interpretation, soft budgeting is deeply rooted in 
the socialist system and leads to a lack of discipline in state enterprises and in efficiency 
of the state sector. 
Dewantripont and Maskin (1990) make a case for privatisation using an example of 
centralisation in the financial system. They analyse a two-period credit market with 
adverse selection in which unprofitable enterprises are able to survive. They contrast a 
centralised financial system with a decentralised market economy. In a centralised 
" For more on the ratchet effect and reluctance to invest in regulated industries and planned economies 
see Laffont and Tirole (1993; chapters 9 and 10). For an explanation as how soft budgeting leads to 
shortages and lack of innovation in socialist countries see Qian and Xu (1991) and Qian (1992) 
respectively. 
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socialist economy a State bank plays both the central bank's role and the role of 
commercial banks, while a decentralised financial system is one with many creditors, 
each with only one unit of asset available for lending. The authors show that adverse 
selection, due to the lack of an ex ante commitment not to refinance projects ex post, 
may occur because creditors see previous capital contributions as sunk costs at the time 
of the refinancing decision, so that ex post both creditor and entrepreneur can be better 
off refinancing. Because of the dispersion of information, banks in decentralised credit 
markets will have an informational disadvantage in the form of the rent that subsequent 
creditors need to pay to the initial creditor. The informational disadvantage discourages 
refinancing and serves as a commitment device to terminate unprofitable projects in 
decentralised markets. Systems with diffused ownership, therefore, would have a built- 
in commitment device towards the termination of poor projects, that would ensure hard 
budget constraints. This conclusion contrasts sharply with arguments that central 
planning can always mimic the functioning of a market economy (Lange, 1964). It also 
suggests that a centralised system may suffer because of too much information. This is 
a surprising result, because it was believed that a centralised system may experience 
some problems in collecting and processing information (Hayek, 1945). In the paper, 
centralised ownership is the only cause of soft budget constraint. The implication of 
that may be that diffusion of ownership through privatisation may be a sufficient 
condition for the elimination of soft credit. " 
Boycko et al. (1994) offer an alternative explanation of ill-defined incentives of 
politicians and managers of SOEs which is applicable to Eastern European countries. 
According to the authors, nomenclature (communist party appointees) control SOEs and 
use them to provide economic benefits for their supporters through excessive 
employment, allocation of investments, and favouring selected suppliers. In their 
model, this is possible by bribing managers of SOEs by giving them promotions. The 
only way to break the endogenous corruption and to make a distinction between the 
revenues of the state and of enterprises is to privatise SOEs. By transferring the firms to 
outside shareholders any subsidies would come directly from the treasury, making them 
more costly and transparent (Boycko et al., 1996). 
'$ However, it is worthwhile mentioning that private ownership is not the only form of diffused 
ownership. For example, Weitzman and Xu (1993), and Bolton (1995) discuss some alternatives to 
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Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) have proposed an interesting extension of 
Williamson's (1975) theory for transition economies. The high levels of both horizontal 
and vertical integration limited opportunistic behaviour in socialist economies. With 
market reforms, the same firms are encouraged to separate and to negotiate the terms of 
their new relationship within a market environment. The authors postulate that the 
transaction costs of their co-operation may become a serious obstacle to further 
development. Bargaining costs may be particularly high in the presence of soft 
budgeting. This would mean a reverse process from that which Williamson describes 
for market economies, which would eventually result in the creation of inefficient 
duopolies or a return to the undesirable previous position. This suggests that 
privatisation should be accompanied by better financial discipline in the form of hard 
budget constraints and the creation of institutional arrangements between decision 
agents and residual claimants to ensure the good performance of large privatised 
enterprises. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain the failure of state ownership, with concentrated 
control in the hands of bureaucrats who have complete power over state firms but are 
only indirectly concerned about profits, because profits flow into the government's 
budget. They see state ownership as an example of concentrated control with no cash 
flow rights and with objectives that are very different from the social interest. 
In socialist economies assets are theoretically owned by all the people, and controlled 
by the state. In effect, the owner of enterprises was the communist party, which also 
controlled the state (Estrin , 1998: p. 5). The commitment problem in socialism is related 
to state ownership and the state's paternalistic behaviour towards enterprises. In spite of 
some well-documented market failures, it is believed that a system based on a private 
ownership provides better incentives for efficient decision-making than systems based 
on central planning. It has, however, been noted that privatisation in the transition 
economies are different from those in the OECD countries. Estrin (1991: p. 7) observes 
`... Though there are parallels between the arguments for privatisation in West and East 
the institutional context and economic history make the issues in the policy debate 
rather different. ' Firstly, the size of privatisation programmes is much bigger. The scale 
private ownership, such as communal ownership. 
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of privatisations in Eastern Europe, started in the late eighties, is unparalleled in 
economic history. The average percentage of the state sector's contribution to the gross 
national product in these countries was around 81 percent (Milanovic, 1989; own 
calculation). Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, for example, planned to 
privatise about 30-60% of SOEs within a 3-5 year period. " Secondly, privatisations 
are to be offered simultaneously with the development of capital markets and effective 
financial institutions. Finally, privatisations are seen as a part of wide political and 
economic reform, with a changing role of the state in economic life. Mono-party 
political systems and central planning are to be replaced by democratic, multi-party 
systems and market mechanisms. Laban and Wolf (1993) explain the difference 
between privatisation programmes in transition economies and the OECD by reference 
to a `critical mass' effect in transitional economies which is due to a positive spill-over 
effect of mass privatisation. In other words, returns from individual sales are positively 
correlated with the overall success of privatisation programmes. The effect of 
privatisations, therefore, should be much stronger when they are quicker than gradual. 
On the other hand, a gradualist approach might be less socially disruptive. 
The situation described above is different from a choice between public and private 
provision of products in a limited number of cases or industrial sectors (mostly natural 
monopolies) in the developed and some developing countries. " The Western literature, 
therefore, tends to analyse privatisation from a regulatory perspective (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988; Lafont and Tirole, 1993). Consequently, the experience of developed 
countries with various privatisation methods and debates regarding policy alternatives to 
market reforms and privatisation are of somewhat limited use in transition economies. 
Partial or so-called `cosmetic' reforms, without improving the allocation of property 
rights and incentives, failed in all East European countries in the past. Z' Due to the 
social and economic damage inflicted by central planning the question in Eastern 
Europe seems to be not whether or not to privatise but how to privatise within a 
relatively short period of time and with which methods. 
19 In Britain, for a comparison, it took ten years for the privatisation of less than 10% of the economy. 
zo The term 'West' will be used as a synonym for developed market economies. 
21 For more on failures of partial reforms in CEEC see Kornai (1986) and Estrin (1994). For more recent 
evidence of problems related to partial reforms of SOEs in China see Lin et al. (1988). 
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1.3 Design of privatisation programmes and choice of privatisation methods: 
theory and empirical evidence 
The theories reviewed in section 1.1 provide a theoretical justification for privatisation 
both in developed market economies and in economies in transition. This section 
contains a summary of major theoretical and empirical contributions on privatisation 
strategies and the choice of privatisation methods in transition economies. Brada (1996) 
gives a taxonomy of privatisation methods in the context of transition economies. He 
lists four privatisation methods: privatisation through restitution, privatisation through 
sale of state property via direct sales and/or share issues, voucher privatisation and 
privatisation initiated by employees (privatisation from below). The first method was of 
limited use, mostly for agricultural lands. Privatisation from below was inevitable in 
Eastern Europe in order to get support from workers, but was always seen as a 
supplementary method. The main debate was about which was going to be the main 
method of privatisation, voucher privatisation or privatisation through sale of state 
property. The choice seems to be mostly influenced by two issues: what is the optimal 
sequencing of sales, and should priority be given to long term improvement in 
efficiency or to short term maximisation in privatisation proceeds. 
1.3.1 Optimal sequencing of sales 
The main argument in favour of mass give-away privatisation programmes seems to be 
its speed and fairness (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1991). No market 
economy can function without private ownership and quick mass privatisation is 
necessary to get firms responding to market signals. In addition, a quick mass 
privatisation programme would remove the state from further intervention in enterprise 
activities. According to the authors large scale privatisations are inevitably slow and 
characterised by low prices due to lack of private wealth and the valuation problems in 
the absence of capital markets regardless of the privatisation method adopted. As a 
result speed of privatisation should be the main criterion in the choice of privatisation 
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method. Sachs (1992) argues that in Russia authorities should commercialise larger 
firms by transforming them into joint-stock companies prior to giving shares away to 
workers and outsiders. Small shops should be auctioned off and for medium size firms 
insider buy-outs should be allowed. Sachs feels that banks should be privatised first so 
that they can play a monitoring role and impose financial discipline. 
A gradual approach was advocated by Dewatripont and Roland (1992a; 1992b), and 
Roland (1994) who argue that a quick privatisation may lead to `premature' 
restructuring and partial re-nationalisation, which could ultimately lead to a 
continuation of soft budget constraints. Carlin and Mayer (1992) argue that a 
privatisation strategy of piece meal sales is superior to other methods in identifying 
better managerial teams to manage productive assets in economies in transition. In 
addition, voucher schemes may lead to either diffused ownership or the concentration of 
shares in the hands of insiders which may further create problems with corporate 
governance in privatised enterprises. This view was echoed in Boycko et al. 
(1994; 1996) and Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) who argue that both cash flow rights 
and control rights should be passed to private hands for privatisation to be a success. 
Bolton and Roland (1992) argue that privatisation through sales have been dismissed 
too soon in some of economies in transition. They propose a policy of auctioning off 
state assets in exchange for cash and non-cash bids. This policy would enable the 
transfer of control into private hands much faster than auctions with cash-bids only. At 
the same time it would be much more effective in matching managerial teams with 
productive assets than give-away privatisation schemes. 
Katz and Owen (1993; 1995) offer a theoretical model for the maximisation of sale 
proceeds by sequencing sales of state property by government and they derive a lower 
bound of a buyer's ownership share as a function of the offered percentage of 
ownership, the required payment, and the number of individual firms the government 
wishes to create in the industry. 
Cornelli and Lie (1997) suggest that long-run oriented investors wish to purchase as 
many shares as possible, while short-run oriented investors try to obtain only the 
minimum number of shares required to control the firm. The policy implication of the 
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model is that a government should not commit itself to the sale of a fixed number of 
shares. Instead a larger ownership stake should be given to the winning bidder who 
wants to obtain as many shares as possible. 
Fluck et al (1995) make a distinction between partial and gradual privatisation. Some 
governments, for example, see partial privatisation as the final stage of privatisation 
programmes ZZ The authors characterised this as `hesitation' and argue that these 
privatisation programmes should not be assisted by international financial institutions. 
Other governments want to fully privatise the economy but may choose to do this 
gradually. According to the authors this approach can be characterised as 
`experimentation' and deserves the help of international financial institutions. 
Opinions about whether microeconomic restructuring or privatisation should come first 
are divided. Nellis and Kikeri (1989), Kikeri et al. (1992) are of the opinion that 
governments should restructure SOEs prior to sales. Price liberalisation and free trade 
are often mentioned as ways to motivate microeconomic restructuring before 
privatisation. Once the restructuring is initiated and the stock of domestic saving 
increased, auction-based privatisation would lead to both the efficient allocation of 
state assets and the maximisation of revenues. On the other hand, Estrin (1994), 
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), Boycko et al. (1996), and Barberis et al. (1996) 
question a benevolent government attitude towards restructuring prior to privatisation 
and suggest that privatisation and the replacement of incumbent managers are more 
likely to induce genuine restructuring and ultimately to improve efficiency. " Rapid 
privatisation, therefore, was the only way to prevent a return to state domination. This 
view, together with failures of previous attempts to restructure without privatisation, 
won the argument and `depoliticisation' of the enterprise sector became the most 
significant motivation for rapid and mass privatisation in CEEC (Estrin, 1998: p. 76). 24 
' China for example, sees SOEs as the backbone of their economy and total privatisation are not the 
final objective. 
' Barberis et al. (1996) surveyed 452 Russian shops sold during the early nineties. They did not find 
evidence that equity incentives improve performance. However, they did find that new human capital 
seems to be of crucial importance in restructuring. 
Z` By depoliticization we mean the development of a politically independent and market-oriented 
enterprises sector (Estrin, 1998, p. 85). 
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1.3.2 Long run efficiency vs. maximisation of privatisation proceeds 
Apart from improvement in efficiency suggested by the property rights theory, other 
objectives of privatisation suggested in the literature on transition economies are 
maximisation of sale proceeds by the government, fair distribution of wealth, reduction 
of government interference in the economy, enhancement of competition, exposure of 
SOEs to market discipline and promotion of national capital markets ZS Megginson et 
al. (1998b) and Moore (1992) emphasise the `educational' role of privatisation in 
educating citizens about the virtues of capitalism in countries where `socialism has a 
deeply ingrained history'. Rapaczynski (1996) emphasises the role of repeated fair 
issues and related market transactions in the establishment of well-defined property 
rights and national stock markets in transition economies. 2' There is, however, no 
agreement as to what should be the most important objective of privatisation, whether 
long term improvement in efficiency or maximisation of privatisation proceeds. 
Maskin (1992) and Kornai (1993) both see maximisation of efficiency as the ultimate 
goal of privatisation. Conversely, Bolton and Roland (1992) favour revenue 
maximisation because of budgetary problems in transition economies. An additional 
factor in favour of revenue maximisation is public opinion, which is normally, against 
selling assets abroad. The government must, therefore, insist on revenue maximisation 
in order to do well in public polls (Comelli, 1993). 
Cornelli and Li (1997) see `revenue' and `efficiency' objectives as mutually exclusive 
because of large private benefits of control obtained by large foreign shareholders, 
which cannot be shared by domestic shareholders. These benefits are a consequence of 
the imperfect market environment in transition economies. For example, strategic 
benefits from an early entry may be the only motive for investments by foreign 
investors. In extreme cases, foreign investors may buy a potential future competitor just 
2s The similarity between the objectives of privatisation put forward in different countries is striking. For 
example, the above-mentioned objectives were listed as objectives for privatisation in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the early sixties and British privatisation in the late nineties (Price Waterhouse 
1989, as cited in Megginson 1998: p. 5) and in most transition economies. For some other privatisation 
objectives see Vickers and Yarrow (1988), and Giarraputo, (1994). 
26 This is consistent with the findings of LaPorta et al. (1997) who demonstrated a strong link between 
legal protection and the growth of financial investments in general. Although logical, it is not clear how 
this prediction can be tested empirically. 
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to close it down. " Governments normally address this problem by requiring a certain 
level of future investment in privatised companies by foreign investors. However, once 
they have taken control over the domestic company the foreign investors can find 
excuses and `dilute' previously made commitments. Because of these problems, 
governments must try to find the right balance between `revenue' and `efficiency' 
objectives by screening potential buyers with different plans. The authors develop a 
scheme in which the government does not commit to the sale of a fixed number of 
shares of the firm. Instead, it grants a greater number of shares to the highest bidder. 
An `efficient' oriented investor is planning to maximise the future value of shares by 
means of the transfer of technology, managerial skills, and access to product and 
financial markets in developed economies and, therefore, would seek to obtain as many 
shares as possible. A `revenue' oriented investor is interested in private benefits of 
control and would prefer only the minimum number of shares required to control the 
firm. A testable hypothesis is that enterprises in which foreign investors obtained the 
higher percentage of shares should have higher efficiency and better financial 
performance than firms in which foreign investors obtained just a limited number of 
shares. 
Bulow and Kemperer (1996) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997) examine the revenue 
impact of the pricing decisions of SOE directs sales at a theoretical level. Bulow and 
Kemperer are in favour of maximising the number of bidders in an open auction as 
against a structured direct negotiation with a bidder, while Schmidt and Schnitzer focus 
on the properties of various types of auctions in differing environments finding that 
when there are more than two serious bidders, English auctions are more efficient and 
yield higher revenues than bargaining with a pre-selected buyer. However, in some 
circumstances the auctions may not always lead to an efficient allocation of property 
rights. 
Branco and Mello (1991), Perotti and Guney (1993), and Perotti (1995) model 
government's dual role as regulator and seller of SOEs as an asymmetric information 
problem in which investors are not sure about government's real intentions. In the 
21 An attempt by an American brewer to obtain control of the Czech state brewer Budvar and to close it 
down afterwards is a popular example. 
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privatisation signalling model there are two types of governments: one committed to 
privatisation and a populist government which views privatisation as a revenue 
generating activity and is likely to reverse its policy in the future. The authors show 
that a committed government may seek to signal its identity by choosing to privatise 
gradually over time via partial sales. However, partial sales alone may not be sufficient 
to reduce the uncertainty regarding a government's commitment to privatisation. Partial 
sales may be seen by some investors as an indication of the government's intention to 
retain control after the sale. In this case, the government may signal its commitment by 
underpricing PIPOs, indicating that improvement in efficiency is preferred to short run 
revenue maximisation. The remaining shares can subsequently be sold at a higher price 
after the government has revealed its commitment. The higher sale proceeds for the 
remaining shares would provide compensation for the signalling costs (underpricing). 
On the other hand, populist governments are short run oriented and prefer complete and 
rapid sales since they are expected to extract rents from private shareholders by 
changing its policies after the sale. These policy changes might be changes in taxation, 
price regulation, or even re-nationalisations. By changing its policies the government 
will reveal its lack of commitment and, would not be able to sell the remaining tranches 
of shares at higher prices. This explains their reluctance to use underpricing as a 
signalling device. Consequently, committed governments should have higher average 
underpricing than populist governments. This hypothesis could be tested by an 
examination of the relationship between underpricing and the percentage sold. As the 
percentage of shares sold increases, the likelihood that a government uses underpricing 
to signal its commitment to the privatisation decreases. A negative and statistically 
significant relationship between underpricing and percentage sold would, therefore, 
imply rejection of `signalling' hypothesis (Menyah et al. 1995). 
Vickers and Yarrow (1998) and Perotti (1995) also favour partial sales. Vickers and 
Yarrow argue that partial sales can help governments in reducing the risk of mispricing 
which is common to all PIPOs. Small initial sales, according to the authors, can provide 
a test valuation by establishing traded security prices. Perotti proposes a reputation 
building hypothesis according to which governments may initially underprice 
deliberately in order to attract investors to subsequent sales. 
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Biais and Perotti (1997) examine what should be an optimal level of underpricing for a 
market-oriented government. They argue that the political value of shares should be 
taken into account when designing an optimal privatisation strategy, and that such a 
strategy requires sufficient underpricing to attract median class voters as bidders in 
fixed-price offerings. This strategy would reduce the likelihood of re-nationalisation 
policy reversal and increase the popularity of the government. Countries with higher 
income inequality, however, must underprice to a greater extent and allocate more 
shares to the median class voters. Evidence that governments recognise the political 
value of underpricing has been found in the UK, where the government intentionally 
underpriced and allocated shares to as many voters as possible during privatisation 
campaign in the eighties. Consequently the number of shareholders in Britain increased 
from 3 million in 1979 to 11 million in 1990 (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). 28 
1.3.3 Empirical studies on the design of privatisation programmes 
Perotti and Guney (1993) examine the structure of privatisation plans in the UK, France, 
Spain, Chile, Nigeria, Turkey, Malaysia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
They document the following characteristics: a predominance of partial sales, 
underpricing greater in privatisation sales than in IPOs of private firms, firms in policy 
sensitive sectors tend to be privatised with smaller initial sales and larger underpricing, 
manufacturing companies in competitive markets are more likely to be 100% sales, 
stakes in several firms are often sold simultaneously, privatisation proceeds increase 
over time, and, as policy credibility increases, larger initial sales become more frequent. 
Jones at al. (1999) examine the pricing and share and control allocation decisions made 
by governments with respect to the privatisation of SOEs using a sample of 630 firms 
from 59 countries over the period 1977 to 1997. The authors find strong support for key 
predictions of the Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1997) models: PIPOs are 
significantly underpriced, governments rely on fixed price offerings more than on any 
' Sometimes, however, the underpricing was used to increase the private wealth of politicians. In the 
IPO of Recruit Cosmos in Japan in 1989, for example, many of the shares were allocated to politicians. 
These irregularities lead to a change in regulations and the resignation of several politicians (Ibbotson 
and Ritter, 1995). 
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other method, governments allocate shares in a politically inspired manner favouring 
employees, and a majority of governments give up day-to-day control of the SOEs, but 
retain some form of effective veto power. Furthermore, the results of regression 
analysis show that underpricing is significantly positively related to the percentage of 
shares sold and to the degree of income inequality, thus supporting the predictions of 
Biais and Perotti 29 
Megginson et al. (1998b) analysed data on 1389 privatisations from 80 countries 
including countries from Eastern Europe. They find that PIPOs are substantially larger 
transactions than asset sales and that governments, on average, privatise smaller 
proportions in PIPOs than in direct sales. " They explain the higher average percentage 
sold via sales by government's willingness to sell more when they can select the new 
owner. The higher percentage may also be a result of the immense size of some PIPOs, 
which may preclude a larger sale. They also show that PIPOs are more likely in 
countries with a more developed stock market and for larger firms, whereas countries 
with lower per capita national income and higher budget deficit prefer asset sales. 
There are also some industry differences; for example, telecommunications companies 
are more likely to be privatised through share issues. 
There is a paucity of comparative empirical research on the characteristics of 
privatisation programmes and the initial valuation of privatisation share issues. Some 
empirical studies on privatisation in the UK show that the risk of mispricing might be 
reduced by gradual sales which would establish traded security prices (Jenkinson and 
Mayer, 1988; Menyah and Paudyal, 1996). These findings were confirmed by a House 
of Commons Public Accounts Committee report on the UK privatisation programme 
giving evidence that selling shares in government-owned businesses in stages has 
achieved much better prices than a 100 % disposal. Consequently, the report concludes 
that sales should be made in stages to ensure the taxpayer receives full value for money. 
Other recommendations based on the UK experience were that firms should always be 
valued ahead of sales negotiations and that the government should consider a clawback 
Gini coefficient was used as a proxy for the income inequality in a country. 
The average percentage sold for PIPOs was 44%, whereas the average percentage sold for direct sales 
was 71%. 
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arrangement is case the profits from the newly privatised firms proved much higher than 
expected. 31 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) gives evidence that open auctions are the best way to 
maximise revenues using data on Mexican privatisation. Hingorani et al. (1997) find 
that the level of demand for shares in the Czech mass privatisation programme was a 
good predictor of the actual level of stock prices in the secondary market. They also 
document that share demand is positively related to the level of past enterprise 
profitability, the level of insider shareholdings, the extent of foreign ownership in a 
company, and inversely related to the company's market risk. This finding is echoed in 
Svejnar and Singer (1994), who also report that when the pattern of the demand for 
shares in the Czech voucher privatisation became apparent this replaced background 
financial information as the principal determinant of demand. 
" Getting Value for Money in Privatisation, 61st report of the PAC Session 1997-98, The Stationary 
Office, 1998 as cited in Financial Times, 3 September 1998. 
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1.4 Relative performance of state-owned and privatised enterprises: theory and 
empirical evidence 
1.4.1 Theory and empirical evidence on the operating performance of newly 
privatised enterprises 
The debate on a desirable role of the state in a national economy and on the choice of 
industrial sectors to be privatised is very extensive. Not all authors are convinced of 
the supremacy of private enterprises (PEs) over state ownership and the necessity to 
privatise SOEs. The main opposition to privatisation seems to be concentrated either 
around dissatisfaction with the rigour of theoretical arguments put forward by property 
rights theory or around the inconclusiveness of empirical results relating to the relative 
performance of state-owned and privately owned enterprises. At the theoretical level, 
the major criticism of property rights theory is provided by Grossman and Hart (1980) 
who refer to the take-over market's role in reducing managerial inefficiency. In a take- 
over bid, according to the authors, a rise in the share price can be anticipated and 
shareholders may be reluctant to sell their shares. Due to this `free riding' on the value 
created by the take-over activity, take-overs may not deter non-profit-maximising 
behaviour by managers in privately owned firms as predicted by property rights theory. 
Frech (1980) questions the extent to which attenuated property rights create perverse 
incentives for managers of SOEs. He argues that the attenuation of property rights 
increases nonpecuniary benefits but also reduces the income of the managers. The net 
effect of the attenuated property rights on efficiency, therefore, will depend on both 
income and substitution effects. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) conclude that there is 
no unambiguously superior form of ownership. According to the authors, the 
government's promise not to intervene is less credible under state ownership, but 
government intervention is more costly under private ownership. Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) utilising an agency theory approach demonstrate that state ownership in certain 
industrial sectors might be more desirable than private ownership. 
The studies on operating performance focus on stakeholders and measure performance 
utilising accounting data such as profitability, sales, operating efficiency, and leverage, 
and certain additional indicators such as employment, dividends and level of 
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investments. Results of early empirical studies on the relative efficiency of SOEs and 
PEs are inconclusive and provide weak support for the expected supremacy of PEs in 
terms of efficiency and profitability that would be expected according to property rights 
theory. Results in Neuberg (1977), Bruggink (1982), Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) 
suggest better performance of SOEs relative to PEs, while De Alessi (1977), Stevens 
(1978), Frech (1980) and Davies (1981) report higher efficiency in PEs. Finally, Fare et 
al. (1985), Becker and Sloan (1985) and Lewin (1982) find no substantial difference in 
the relative efficiency of SOEs and PEs32 However, most early studies are based on 
North American enterprises which have either a natural monopoly, or operate as a 
regulated duopoly, or whose output is not priced by market (competitive) forces 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989, p: 1). 
Results of early empirical studies on privatisation in Great Britain (Yarrow, 1986; 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) suggest that privatisation is more successful when 
accompanied by deregulation and other competition-enhancing measures. It was 
therefore concluded that it is deregulation rather than change in ownership, which 
improves efficiency. This, however, has been challenged at both the theoretical and the 
empirical level. At the theoretical level it was argued that privatisation works better 
than liberalisation (Fridman, 1997), and that privatisation in itself increases competition 
(Euromoney, March 1999) while at the empirical level, it was shown that efficiency 
gains require private ownership, and that even partial privatisations improve efficiency 
(Vining and Boardman 1992). 
Examples of successful enterprises with mixed ownership and enterprises with 
collective ownership were also discussed in the debate" These enterprises cannot be 
classified as either state or privately owned and they therefore pose problems for 
property rights theory. While there is a paucity of theoretical work on mixed and 
collectively owned enterprises, empirical evidence suggests that these enterprises 
perform less well than PEs but better than SOEs. For example, Boardman and Vining 
(1989) analyse a sample of the 500 largest non-US industrial firms to demonstrate, that 
PEs outperform both SOEs and mixed enterprises. They explain this result by the 
32 This summary is based on Boardman and Vining (1989). 
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conflict between private and public shareholders in mixed enterprises, which inhibits the 
monitoring of management. Consequently, partial privatisations where government 
retains some percentage of ownership may be less efficient than either continued state 
ownership or complete privatisation. 
The common denominator in all of the above-mentioned studies is that they seem to 
focus on questions related to which industrial sectors should be regulated and which 
should be privatised. None of the authors seem to suggest that state ownership of the 
means of production should be the predominant form of ownership or that market 
mechanisms should be replaced by central planning. On the contrary, at both the 
practical and the theoretical level, privatisation has gained a strong support during the 
past decade. 34 Recent empirical studies provide mounting evidence in favour of 
privately-owned firms (Kikeri et al. 1992; Megginson et al., 1994), and the support for 
privatisation is particularly evident in the growing literature on developing countries, 
and market reforms in economies in transition. 35 
In Table 1.1 we summarise results of recent empirical studies on the operating 
performance of newly privatised enterprises in developing countries. Megginson et al. 
(1994) examined six developing countries within their international sample of 61 
privatisation from 18 countries and 32 industries during the period from 1961 to 1990. 
The study shows an improvement in profitability, operating efficiency, increase in sales 
and investment spendings in real terms, and reduction in gearing ratios after 
privatisation. A surprising result was an increase in employment after the privatisation. 
Table 1.1 about here 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) analyse 79 privatisations from 21 developing countries 
during the period 1980 to 1992. They consider both unadjusted and market-adjusted 
accounting performance measures. They reveal a decline in leverage and an increase in 
` Chinese township and village enterprises (TVEs) are an example of collectively owned enterprises. See 
also Weitzman and Xu (1993) and Bolton (1995). 
' Nowadays, privatisation is a global phenomenon and almost every government plans to contract out 
and sell some `traditional' state operations. In 1997 proceeds from selling st - ses 
worldwide hit a record $162 billion (Euromoney, March 1999; p. 36). 
ÜtliVerilty 
's For an excellent survey of the most recent studies see Megginson (1998). Libra, 
Hull 
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profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, real sales, employment 
level, and dividends. Greater benefits from privatisation were found in companies 
operating in countries with high income per capita and for privatisation where 
government relinquished both ownership and control to the private sector. 
LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) examine a sample of 218 Mexican privatised 
companies. They find an increase in profitability but a reduction in employment by half 
of the pre-privatisation levels. They estimated that 52% of the profitability gains were 
due to higher productivity and 28% to lower employment costs. The rest of the gains 
were linked to the removal of price and quantity controls and trade barriers. 
Galal et al. (1994) examine 12 privatisations from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and the 
United Kingdom using an approach which considers costs and benefits not only for 
stakeholders in enterprises but also for consumers. 36 The results indicate that 
privatisation improved performance in both competitive and non-competitive industries, 
while the benefits in the form of higher investment, higher productivity, and more 
efficient prices, outweigh costs both in the cases of partial sales (Malaysia) and 
complete sales (Chile31 Mexico, UK). 
Empirical studies, which explicitly examine whether the change in ownership has 
improved the operating performance of newly privatised enterprises in transition 
economies, are rapidly growing (Table 1.2). Belka et al. (1994) analyse the performance 
of four types of Polish enterprises: traditional state-owned, de novo private enterprises, 
commercialised state-owned enterprises, and privatised enterprises. The study shows 
higher investment and profitability in de novo private firms, and finds little difference in 
profitability between privatised and commercialised enterprises. Similarly, there is little 
evidence in excess employment between privatised and state-owned enterprises. 
Overall, the performance of privatised firms seems to lie between de novo private and 
state-owned enterprises. The authors also find very little difference in terms of 
restructuring between privatised, state-owned, and commercialised enterprises. A 
possible explanation for this similar behaviour is that tough budget constraint was a 
36 The welfare approach adopted in this study is developed in Jones et al. (1990). 
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dominant factor that affected the whole former state sector, whether privatised or not 
(Estrin, 1998: p. 92). 
Table 1.2 about here 
Estrin et al. (1995) study the performance of 15 firms in Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia during 1990-92 period. The enterprises are of similar size, industry and 
market competitiveness. Changes in employment, product lines, and quality, together 
with some other indicators, were used to evaluate the extent of restructuring. It was 
found that 40 percent of enterprises reacted actively whereas only 17 percent responded 
passively to changed economic conditions. They also find a strong relationship between 
viability and privatisation. Almost all viable enterprises were privatised and these 
received far more restructuring than other enterprises. 
Earle and Estrin (1996) use the same data on Polish enterprises as in Belka et al. (1994) 
but they categorise enterprises according to the dominant owner. They again find no 
evidence that privatisation encourages restructuring. Employee owners, however, 
perform much better than outside owners, which is rather different from the empirical 
evidence from Western economies. The authors explain this by institutional 
arrangements that favour insiders who could have chosen to buy only viable enterprises. 
Another explanation could be the lack of outsiders' control over decision-making in 
these enterprises. 
Barberis et al. (1996) examine the performance of 452 Russian retail shops privatised in 
the early nineties. They find that restructuring is more likely in the presence of new 
owners and managers. Surprisingly, employees' share incentives do not increase the 
likelihood of restructuring. Pohl et al. (1997) compare the achievements in restructuring 
of 6,300 privatised and state-owned firms in seven Eastern European countries. The 
results suggest that privatised firms outperformed comparable SOEs in terms of 
productivity during 1992-95. The method of privatisation seems to have little effect on 
performance, though financing method and ownership play a significant role with 
"The sample consists of 4 enterprises in telecommunications, 4 in the airline industry, 2 in the electricity 
sector, a trucking enterprise, a port and a lottery enterprise. 
From Central Planning to a Market Economy 28 
regard to restructuring. Frydman et al. (1997) examine the operating performance of a 
sample of about 150 Czech, Hungarian, and Polish privatised companies during 1990- 
93. They report that privatised firms increased revenue and productivity and reduced 
costs by comparison with 93 SOEs in these countries and laid off fewer workers than 
their SOEs counterparts. Among private firms, outsider-owned firms out-performed 
those owned by insiders and employee-owned firms did not perform better than SOEs. 
Hingorani et al. (1997) report that the equity values of Czech firms, privatised via a 
voucher scheme, are positively and significantly related to the size of insider and 
foreign ownership. In addition, the size of insider and foreign ownership are also 
positively related. Further evidence is provided by Claessens et al. (1997), who 
examine the profitability and market valuation of 706 Czech privatised firms during 
1992-95. They find a positive relationship between ownership concentration and a 
firm's performance, particularly in firms with strategic investors and bank-sponsored 
funds as large stakeholders. These results suggest that voucher schemes, which allow 
the creation of block holders and give an ownership stake to insiders, may lead to the 
mitigation of agency problems in privatised enterprises. 
Anderson et al. (1997) study foreign participation in the Czech mass privatisation 
programme and find that foreigners prefer profitable firms in which they can obtain 
major shareholdings and can have undisputed control. The authors suggest that this can 
be explained by lower agency costs and better control of political risks. 
Frydman et al. (1996) and Pistor and Spicer (1996) link the relatively poor performance 
of mass privatisation programmes in Russia and the Czech Republic to insider control, 
arguing that insider control of privatised firms was the most important obstacle to 
effective restructuring. In both countries the best companies fell under insider control, 
while citizens become owners of the worst performing companies. Blanchard and 
Aghion (1996) analyse whether the allocation of property rights to insiders could lead to 
increased efficiency. The main argument in favour of insider privatisation seems to be 
the alignment of control and property rights, while the arguments against are related to 
the dominance of insiders and the trade-off between the private value of the firm to 
insiders and its value to outside investors. 
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Overall, the results of studies on transition economies seem to accord with those of 
similar studies on developed countries which investigate the performance improvements 
as a result of privatisation (Eckel, et al. 1997; LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; 
Ramamurti, 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997). 
1.4.2 Theory and empirical evidence on the short run financial performance of 
PIPOs 
Studies on the financial performance of privately and state-owned enterprises measure 
the benefits of privatisations and performance of newly privatised enterprises by 
utilising data on share prices. The extensive literature on the short run performance of 
private sector initial public offerings (IPOs) reveals short term excess returns 
internationally (Ritter, 1991; Tinic, 1988; Aggarwal et al., 1993; Levis, 1993). 
Theoretical explanations for the observed initial premiums mostly concentrate on the 
information asymmetry between the various parties involved with IPOs (e. g., the 
winner's curse hypothesis, the signalling hypothesis, the cascade hypothesis, costly 
information acquisition, and the investment banker's monopsony power hypothesis), 
regulatory issues (e. g. the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, the regulatory constraint 
hypothesis) ownership issues (e. g. the ownership dispersion hypothesis), and market- 
related issues (e. g. the stabilisation hypothesis, incompleteness market hypothesis). " 
Rock (1986) explains the documented underpricing in IPOs in the context of the 
`winner's curse' model, in which `bad' issues are more likely to be subscribed by 
uninformed investors only whereas `good' issues are subscribed by both informed and 
uninformed investors. A testable hypothesis is that riskier issues should be more 
heavily underpriced (Beaty and Ritter, 1986). Welch (1992) argues that issuers 
underprice in order to induce a cascade in which the majority of investors would follow 
the first investors. Similarly, underpricing could be used to attract investors to 
subsequent issues by signalling companies' high intrinsic value (Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989; Welch, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). 
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According to the costly information acquisition hypothesis, investment bankers use 
underpricing to induce informed investors to reveal information during the pre-selling 
period. It is conjectured that those IPOs for which favourable information is revealed 
will be underpriced more than those for which unfavourable information is revealed. 
The underpricing is therefore the price companies are paying for a more accurate 
valuation (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Another explanation hypothesises that 
investment bankers have superior knowledge (power) which enables them to underprice 
in order to reduce their effort and costs in marketing the issue (Baron and Holmstrom, 
1980). 
The regulatory constraint and the lawsuit avoidance hypotheses regard underpricing as a 
response to regulatory pressure and/or the danger of a lawsuit in regard to the accuracy 
of information in prospectuses (Tinic, 1988). Ownership issues and underpricing are 
discussed by Booth and Chua (1995) and Brennan and Franks (1995), who argue that 
managers of firms may want to underprice in order to achieve diffuse ownership. This, 
however, may weaken monitoring by shareholders and may not be in the shareholders' 
best interest. 
The market incompleteness hypothesis assumes segmentation between the market for 
IPOs and other segments of the capital market. Maur and Senbet (1992) show how 
underpricing compensates investors for the IPO's `market incompleteness'. Finally, 
Ruud (1993) suggests that initial returns are overstated due to price stabilisation by 
investment bankers during a short period after listing. 
The pricing of PIPOs has been researched to a lesser extent than that of other IPOs but 
evidence on underpricing seems to be conclusive (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Jenkinson 
and Mayer, 1988; Husson and Jacquillat, 1989; Levis 1993; 1995; Aggarwal et al. 1993). 
In one of the most comprehensive international studies on PIPOs, Jones et al. (1999) 
find significantly positive initial PIPO returns which are much higher in countries with 
governments committed to privatisation. " The authors report a positive correlation 
between PIPOs initial returns and foreign allocation, but find that issue size does not 
Our survey of IPO literature is based on Ibbotson and Ritter (1995). 
J9 The level of government's spending as a fraction of GDP is used as a proxy of how socialistic it is. 
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significantly affect underpricing. The negative correlation between initial returns and 
the size is interpreted as an indication that initial returns for PIPOs are not affected by 
asymmetric information between issuers and investors with regard to firm asset quality 
and growth prospects. 40 The study also shows that underpricing in PIPOs is 
significantly positively related to the percentage of shares sold and to the degree of 
income inequality in a country. 4' 
Comparisons of PIPOs and IPOs of privately owned companies are scarce (Table 1.3). 
Early studies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Perotti and 
Guney, 1993; and Levis, 1993) suggest higher returns for PIPOs in several countries 
including the UK, France, Spain, Turkey, Malaysia and Nigeria. Results of more recent 
studies are inconclusive. Menyah and Paudyal (1996) report an average underpricing of 
38.7 percent for PIPOs as compared to 3.48 percent for private IPOs in the UK, while 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) suggest significantly lower returns for PIPOs in Canada 
and Malaysia than for their private company counterparts. For the UK, however, they 
report the opposite. They found no evidence to suggest that governments underprice 
IPOs more than private issuers, controlling for size and length of time between setting 
the offer price and the offer date. Paudyal et al. (1998) report average premiums of 
103.5 and 52.5 percent for Malaysian PIPOs and other IPOs respectively. 
Table 1.3 about here 
Ma (1998) uses Dewenter and Malatesta's data and reports positive and significant 
initial returns for PIPOs in the UK, France, Poland, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, 
with only Canadian PIPOs showing negative average initial returns. These returns are 
significantly higher than those for private IPOs after controlling for relevant factors. 
However, no difference was found between PIPOs and private IPOs in either 
uncertainty or information asymmetry. The initial returns for PIPOs are primarily 
determined by market pressure and the signal that investors observed from special 
classes of investors. 
4° Larger companies are better known to investors and tend to spend more on disclosure of relevant 
information. 
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1.4.3 Theory and empirical evidence on the long run financial performance of 
PIPOs 
Empirical studies suggest that negative long run returns on private companies IPOs are 
a world-wide phenomenon (Ritter, 1991; Levis, 1993; Loughran et al. 1994; Aggarwal 
et al, 1993; Lee et al. 1996; etc. ) (Table 1.4). Theoretical explanations concentrate on 
irrational strategies by buyers and information asymmetry. For example, the 
divergence of opinion and impresario hypotheses imply that the initial premiums should 
be followed by negative long-term returns for IPOs. According to the divergence of 
opinion hypothesis initial differences between optimists and pessimists would disappear 
with the release of more timely information about the company. Eventually this would 
lead to a drop in market price and IPOs underperformance in the long-run (Miller, 1977; 
Levis, 1993). The impresario hypothesis has been introduced by Shiller (1990) who 
suggests that underwriters (acting as impresarios) deliberately underprice offerings in 
order to create excess demand. Consequently, when the excess demand is absorbed, the 
market price will be reduced and the companies with the biggest underpricing would 
have the lowest long-run returns. Ritter (1991) presents the `windows of opportunities' 
hypothesis according to which large cycles in volume (hot periods) indicate companies' 
attempts to `time' their IPOs. The hypothesis predicts low long-run returns for IPOs 
and seasoned issues. Finally, signalling theories see initial underpricing as a signalling 
device which serves to maximise the offer price of subsequent issues (Welch 1989). 
Signalling costs (underpricing) will be prohibitively high for low quality firms. A 
testable implication of the Welch model is that firms with higher underpricing will have 
higher market value, and will make subsequent issues more quickly. 
Table 1.4 about here 
There are fewer studies on the long term than on the short term performance of PIPOs 
and evidence based on single country data seems to be inconclusive (Table 1.4). Levis 
(1993), Menyah et al. (1995), Menyah and Paudyal (1996), and Huang (1997) find that 
PIPOs yield statistically significant positive long-run returns to UK investors, while 
Davidson and Rosgen (1996), Davidson et al. (1997), and Davidson (1998) find 
" The Gini coefficient was used as a proxy for a country's income inequality. 
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negative one year net returns for France and Italy but positive returns for Austria and the 
UK during 1990-96 42 Positive long-term returns are also reported for German PIPOs 
(Huang, 1997). Finally, Aggarwal et al. (1993) show negative one year returns for 
Chilean PIPOs. 
Boardman and Laurin (1998) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) present positive and 
statistically significant long-run returns for their international samples of 87 and 102 
PIPOs respectively, " while Huang (1997) finds positive returns for PIPOs from most of 
the nine countries in his sample, though only German, Turkish, Singapore, and British 
PIPOs have significant returns. Megginson et al. (1998a), examine the long-run buy- 
and-hold returns for 264 share issue privatisations from 36 countries during the period 
1981-1997. They compute one, three, and five-year local currency and US dollar 
returns using domestic, international, and US market indices as benchmarks. They also 
calculate wealth relatives with respect to companies in matching samples, controlling 
for currency, size, and industry and find strong evidence for positive long term returns 
regardless of the benchmark used for computation. Also, abnormal returns of 
companies in the sample are on average higher than the returns for the firms in the 
matching sample (between 61 and 74 percent of all the PIPOs sample outperform the 
matching firm samples). Huibers and Perotti (1998) suggest that the positive long-term 
returns may reflect `a period of resolution of policy risk in emerging markets during the 
late eighties and early nineties'. 
Megginson et al. (1998a) identify differences between private companies IPOs and 
PIPOs which may help explain the difference in their performance. Firstly, PIPOs are 
offerings where the proceeds do not usually go to the firm. Consequently, the 
information conveyed in the issue is likely to be different from that conveyed in other 
IPOs. Secondly, PIPOs inevitably lead to a change in the ownership, financial 
objectives and operating philosophy of the firms concerned. This particularly holds true 
in transition economies where freedom is given to managers to respond to market 
signals rather than to follow targets set by central planners. The shift from the targets 
based on quotas to maximisation of shareholders wealth requires significant changes in 
`2 They do however, find positive one-year returns for the majority of European countries after March 
1996, as cited in Megginson (1998). 
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all aspects of management. Finally, managers in private companies IPOs might have 
different performance objectives from PIPOs. For example, governments would prefer 
privatised firms to have positive long term returns in order to attract investors to further 
issues, while the managers of private sector companies may be less concerned about 
whether investors would earn abnormally high positive long-term returns by investing 
in their company's shares. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers may not 
be willing to sell shares if this would lead to abnormal returns to new investors. This is 
supported by empirical evidence which suggests that managers appear to time issues 
after temporarily abnormally large stock price increases (Ritter, 1991). 
1.5 Conclusions 
The reviewed literature is classified into three different levels (Figure 1.1). The starting 
point is the theoretical literature that defines terms such as property rights and the 
commitment problem. The property rights theory of the firm suggests that PEs should be 
more efficient and more profitable than SOEs. According to the theory, the main 
advantage of private ownership seems to be transferability of ownership, which enables 
specialisation in ownership, leading to better owner incentives to monitor managerial 
behaviour. 44 In transition economies, privatisation is seen as a necessary ingredient of 
market and political reforms. 
Figure 1.1 about here 
The second level comprises theoretical and empirical literature on the operating and 
financial performance of privatised enterprises and privatisation strategies in transition 
economies. Early empirical evidence on the relative operating performance of privately 
and state-owned enterprises in developed countries up to 1989, was inconclusive. 
During the past decade, however, the empirical evidence has been moving in favour of 
"As cited in Megginson (1998). 
"De Alessi (1980). 
35 
privately owned enterprises, particularly in the case of developing countries. The 
empirical evidence on financial performance, based on country and multi-national data, 
suggests positive short and long-term performance of PIPOs in the majority of 
developed and developing countries. The empirical evidence on the relative 
performance of PIPOs and private companies IPOs, and choice between various 
privatisation methods seem to be inconclusive. In addition, data on transition 
economies in the above mentioned studies is limited. Overall, the literature available in 
the late eighties and early nineties seems to offer little guidance to Eastern European 
countries on design of privatisation strategies. 
Finally, the third level comprises empirical research on operating performance of newly 
privatised enterprises in transition economies. At this level, we identify two research 
areas with a paucity of research: a comparative analysis of privatisation strategies in 
the spirit of reviewed theoretical models, and the financial performance of newly 
privatised enterprises in the transition economies. These two areas will be examined in 
chapters two, three, and four. 
In the next chapter, we focus on the choice of privatisation methods and the structure of 
privatisation plans in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These countries were 
selected for two reasons. Firstly, their privatisation programmes are different which 
provides an opportunity to examine the underlying factors that determined their success 
or failure. Secondly, relevant data is available in these countries since they started their 
programmes in the early 1990s and are often described as the most advanced with 
respect to market reforms among all Eastern European countries. 
The Financial Performance of Privatised Firms 36 
Chapter 2 
PRIVATISATION STRATEGIES AND THE CHOICE OF PRIVATISATION 
METHODS IN POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY 
Privatisation in developing countries are usually incorporated into development 
programmes and are often required by international financial institutions as a part of a 
structural adjustment programme. 45 Embryonic financial markets, weak regulatory 
capacity, lack of domestic savings, and incompetent managers seem to be the main 
factors that operate against privatisation in such countries (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998 
and Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989). On the other hand, their economic potentials 
and fast rate of economic growth make them attractive to foreign investors and 
contribute to the success of their privatisation programmes (Galal et al., 1994). Because 
of the limited capital market capacity, partial direct sales seems to be the predominant 
privatisation method. Sader (1994), for example, reports that direct sales accounted for 
58% of value and 80% by the number of transactions in developing countries. 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are all developing countries and they face 
similar factors that work in favour and against privatisation in other developing 
countries. They are also countries in transition from command to a market type 
economy, and require swift privatisation of a significant part of their economies. 
Urgency and scale of privatisation, however, separates these countries from other 
developing countries and calls for an analysis of their privatisation strategies and choice 
of privatisation methods. An additional reason to study privatisation strategies in these 
countries is that they have chosen very different privatisation strategies and methods. A 
voucher scheme was the first and most important privatisation method in the Czech 
Republic. Poland started with public offers and sales and introduced a voucher scheme 
much later. Hungary opted for case by case privatisation with the emphasis on sales to 
strategic partners. This contradicts sharply to similar macroeconomics' policies these 
countries adopted in early nineties and enable us to compare success of different 
privatisation strategies and methods. 
's For an excellent survey of empirical studies on performance of privatised companies in developing 
countries see Megginson (1998) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998). 
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2.1 Legal framework and strategies 
2.1.1 Polish privatisation, 1990-98 
The Privatisation law of 1990 provided a legal framework for privatisation in Poland. 
The law was a compromise between various conflicting groups, which is probably why 
none of the privatisation methods was strongly favoured. 46 The Polish authorities 
allowed for a variety of privatisation methods such as: privatisation through liquidation 
(also called `direct' method), privatisation through commercialisation (also called 
`capital' or `indirect' method), share issue privatisations (PIPOs), restitution (re- 
privatisation), and small-scale privatisation. The government has also pursued a mass 
privatisation programme for small and medium companies since 1995. Restitution, 
small-scale privatisation and so-called `spontaneous privatisation', which includes 
setting up new private enterprises and selling and leasing out parts of state enterprises' 
assets, although very important are not analysed in this thesis. "' We focus on the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises controlled by the government. 
The liquidation method, applied for small and medium size enterprises, has taken one of 
three forms: asset sale, joint venture, or employee buyout. Asset sales have been 
organised as public auctions where investors choose to purchase any part of the 
enterprise. "' Under the joint venture method, the enterprise became part of a new 
foreign company and the State became a shareholder in the new company with a stake 
equal to the going concern of the liquidated enterprise. The state stake could than be 
sold to employees and/or other investors. Finally, employee buyouts have involved the 
46 The debate was complicated by the fact that approximately 20 percent of Polish enterprises were 
managed by workers' councils (Milanovic, 1990). For example, the Solidarity movement strongly 
objected to privatisation through commercialisation (Bolton and Roland, 1992: p. 13). 
" The Polish government, for example, has been concerned with the fairness of the privatisation 
programme and has also tried to compensate those citizens who suffered loss of property or persecution 
under the communist regime between 1944 and 1962. Under the Law of Compensation, compensation 
vouchers are distributed to individuals with valid claims. The vouchers can then be exchanged for shares 
in state-owned enterprises, which are reserved for these purposes according to the Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers, No 86 of October 4,1993. The number of reserved shares is equivalent to a stake 
of 5% of shares in the share capital of all companies offered for sale. Some 200,000 people qualified, 
receiving vouchers worth US$ 2.3 billion (Privatisation International Yearbook 1997: p. 98). 
" The title `privatisation through liquidation' is misleading because majority SOEs privatised in this way 
were in a relatively sound financial position (Gomulka and Jasinski, 1993: p. 4, as cited in Jermakowicz, 
1995: p. 79). In cases of enterprises in financial distress and when it is believed that enterprises will be 
better managed after privatisation this method actually led to liquidation through bankruptcy. 
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purchase or lease of the assets by the employees. Because of its preferential treatment of 
employees, the leasing method has proved to be the most popular. "' Privatisation 
through the liquidation of small and medium businesses had a successful start in the 
early nineties, with about 556 privatisation of small businesses through liquidation by 
the end of August 1991.5° The trend continued throughout the nineties, and the 
liquidation method has proven to be very successful. By the end of 1996,1,243 
enterprises had been privatised via this methods' 
Privatisation through commercialisation has been applied to larger and more valuable 
enterprises. It is carried out in two stages. First the enterprise would be transformed 
into a joint stock (or a limited liability) company, and then the shares would be sold 
through competitive public tenders, direct sales, initial public offerings, or mass 
privatisation. Strategic investors would normally be required to give commitments 
regarding further investments in the company and in preserving employment. "Z For 
example, some of the commitments most often made by investors were to preserve 
employment in the first 3 years, to spend more on environmental protection, to reinvest 
profits in the first 3 years, to provide new technology, to preserve existing social 
facilities, etc. 
Privatisation of larger enterprises through commercialisation started rather slowly due to 
the more complicated nature and higher value of these transactions. Privatisation of 
some of the biggest companies was delayed because of problems with valuation. For 
example, managers in some enterprises tried to reduce the value of a company just 
before privatisation in order to obtain shares at a lower price. S3 An additional problem 
was a lack of co-ordination between various parts of central and local governments 
involved in the privatisation programme. For example, the Privatisation Ministry was 
Employees had better access to assets and had an option to eventually purchase the leased asset 
(Jarmekowicz, 1995. p. 81). 
S0 278 of them were leased to employees, 241 involved the direct sale of assets, 12 have been included in 
joint stock companies and the remaining businesses adopted a combination of the three procedures. 
Dynamica Prywatyzacji, no. 1,1991, as cited in Bolton and Roland (1992: p. 14). 
This equates to a 94% completion rate; Privatisation International Yearbook (1998: p. 93). 
sz Some authors see these and other similar commitments as a way to reduce investors' private benefits 
(Comelli and Li, 1997). During the first three years of the privatisation programme the future investment 
commitments exceeded all revenues from direct sales (Jermakowiz, 1995: p. 72). 
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in charge of privatisation, the Ministry of Industry was in charge of enterprises, while 
provincial and municipal bodies owned some of the enterprises to be privatised. This 
situation sometimes created confusion among potential investors, resulting in delay in 
privatisation of some of the biggest companies. These problems were tackled by 
reinforcing the roles of the Ministry of Privatisation and the State Agency for Foreign 
Investment (PAIZ) and by introducing strict regulation of the privatisation process and 
related transactions at the stock exchange. By the end of 1996 there were 184 completed 
capital privatisation projects involving medium and large enterprises which require the 
organisation of competitive public tenders and PIPOs (Privatisation Yearbook, 1998: 
p. 93). 
A well-regulated stock market soon provided the government with a medium for PIPOs, 
a transparent way of privatising state assets and raising funds for the treasury without 
raising taxes. 54 PIPOs also increased the attractiveness of privatisation to workers and 
managers who would normally get shares in their companies free of charge or on 
preferential terms. Prices at Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), in dollar terms, soared by 
more than 700 percent in 1993. The surge continued in 1994, when P/E ratios for 
Polish companies averaged in the thirties. This was mostly due to limited supply and a 
high demand for Polish PIPOs. In 1994 Poles were literally queuing to buy shares in 
some of the numerous PIPOs which raised $ 600 million, with the majority of sales 
coming from the trading and banking sectors. 
The popularity of the PIPOs helped the government with the re-activation of a 
controversial mass privatisation programme. The programme was originally prepared 
in 1991 as result of the slow pace of privatisation and a mounting government budget 
deficit at that time ss Initially, the programme involved 400 enterprises to be allocated 
to one of 5 to 20 "national investment funds"(NIFs). The funds would normally 
receive 60% of the enterprises' shares, 10% would go to workers and the remaining 
' This, however, is not an exclusive feature of Polish privatisation. For example, similar cases have been 
reported in the UK; See Getting Value for Money in Privatisation, 61st report of the PAC Session 1997- 
98, The Stationary Office (1998), as cited in Financial Times, 3 September 1998. 
' For example, the government organised a joint flotation of Tonsil, Krosno, Prochnik, Exbud, and 
Silesian Cable in 1990. 
ss The deficit of 20 trillion zloty was attributed partly to the shortfall of 14 trillion zlotys expected from 
the sale of state enterprises (Slay, 1991, as cited in Bolton and Roland, 1992: p. 14). 
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30% would remain with the state. The funds were to be managed by Western fund 
managers and each of them would have a controlling interest in some of the enterprises. 
Following criticism of the programme in Parliament it was postponed for mid 1993. 
During 1991-94 Poland had five governments and five ministers of privatisation, 
although one of them held the job in two different governments. 56 During that time the 
mass privatisation programme was abandoned and reinstated several times. Finally, in 
December 1994, the privatisation minister signed legislation to create fifteen NIFs 
designed to privatise 512 small and medium sized state enterprises. " According to the 
legislation, each of the funds would manage controlling stakes (33%) in over 30 
companies and about 2% in others. Companies were to be allocated to funds 
randomly. " Employees of privatised companies were entitled to 15% of the shares in 
their companies and were not allowed to trade them on the WSE. The funds were 
obliged to keep their holdings for at least three years and would also be paid running 
costs, and would receive the cash equivalent of 1% of the value of their portfolios 
annually during a ten year period, and 6% at the end of the tenth year. The fund 
managers who run the funds were to be monitored by supervisory boards who were 
drawn from the Polish population. 59 The programme actually started in November 
1995. Under the programme, each adult Pole could buy one unit for PZ 20 ($6.79) and 
exchange it for 15 shares, one in each of the 15 NIFs. Almost 95% of eligible Poles 
actually exercised their option and bought the units which resulted in $100 million 
profit for the Polish Treasury. The units (NIF certificates of Mass Privatisation 
Programme vouchers) started trading on the WSE on 1 July 1996, fetching a price of PZ 
140 each. Since 12 August 1996 they have been traded in both single price and 
continuous trading systems, and NIF shares have been listed on the WSE since July 
1997. 
S6 This is in sharp contrast with the situation in the Czech Republic, where Vaclav Klaus provided strong 
political leadership and ensured the continuity of reforms. In addition, neither Hungary, nor the Czech 
Republic had an equivalent to the Solidarity movement and a transition of workers representation. 
Privatisation has often been delayed because of a need to involve the workforce. 
" The companies were estimated to be worth $2.8 billion and accounted for 8% of total industrial output 
in 1994. Euromoney, April, 1995: p. 101. 
S8 The allocation is based on the system used to arrange matches in the US football league. 
s9 Advertisements for the boards of the 15 supervisory boards were placed in the Polish press, the 
Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal. According to the rules of the programme the supervisory 
boards can sack the fund managers after 180 day's notice. 
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Despite some problems and delays with the mass privatisation programme, the Polish 
privatisation programme achieved good results. EBRD describes Poland as the success 
story of the transition economies 60 In contrast to most other CEECs, there has been a 
continuity of the reform effort under shifting coalitions and the privatisation revenue 
flow has been more than $ 600m a year since privatisation started in early 1991. A 
significant change in ownership structure has occurred, resulting in the private sector's 
share of GDP reaching 65% in 1997. As a result of the privatisation programme, 
foreign direct investment in Poland amounted to $8,442m representing, 13.8% of 
cumulative foreign direct investment in all Eastern European and Baltic countries in 
1989-97 61 The government finalised the majority of planned sales of the trading, 
tobacco, cement, paper, banking and brewing sectors. 62 The sale of a 25% stake in 
Telekomunikacija Polska, in spite of a downturn of WSE due to a crisis in Russia, was 
one of the biggest IPOs in Europe in 1998. Almost a quarter of the 1998 privatisation 
proceeds will be directed to financing pension reforms, and another PZ8 bn will be paid 
to pensioners and public employees as compensation for past benefit cuts, found by 
courts to have been unjustified. 63 In 1999 Poland plans to privatise assets worth PZ15 
billion ($ 3.9 bn) and PZ75 bn ($20.9bn) by 2001.64 This should be achieved through 
flotation or sales to strategic investors of 70 companies from the steel, distilleries, sugar 
refineries and coal-mining sectors. 
60 EBRD, Transition Report (1998). 
61 Only Hungary attracted more investment amongst CEECs during the same period; Financial Times, 
Supplement: Investing in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 May 1998. 
62About 90% of the retail sector is privately owned. 
63 Financial Times, 20 August 1998. 
Financial Times, Beginning to feel the pinch, 16 October 1998; Expected income from privatisation 
for 1999 was revised to $ 3.9billion (Euromoney, April 1999: p. 4). 
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2.1.2 Czech Privatisation programme, 1990-98 
The Czech Republic did not have a long history of structural and/or ownership changes 
and had a much larger percentage of state ownership in GDP than Poland and Hungary. 
Changes in legislation (e. g. a legal code and bankruptcy law) also lagged behind similar 
changes in Poland and Hungary in the late eighties and early nineties. 
The main methods of privatisation in the Czech Republic have been: mass privatisation 
via a voucher scheme, direct sales, auctions for small companies, and transfers at no 
charge to local authorities. The direct sale and voucher scheme are, according to the 
Law of April 1991, parts of the so-called "large" privatisation, whereas other methods 
comprise the so-called "small" privatisation. The voucher scheme is a distinctive 
feature of Czech privatisation and has attracted the most attention in the literature. " 
In 1992,943 Czech and about 700 Slovak joint-stock companies were selected to 
prepare privatisation plans in which one of the following privatisation methods should 
be proposed: voucher method, direct sale, auction, or tender. The structure of the plans 
was laid down, and included a business plan, valuation of the property to be privatised, 
and other relevant information about the business activities. There were on average 
more than 2 plans per enterprise from which the ministries had to choose one. " The 
assets of the enterprises were than transferred to the Czech and Slovak National 
Property Funds. All Czech citizens over 18 were eligible to buy a booklet of vouchers 
and subsequently to participate in the bidding process, either directly or indirectly by 
selling vouchers to investment privatisation funds (IPFs). The latter method proved to 
be the most popular and investment funds ended up with about 73% of vouchers after 
the first mass privatisation round. The remainder of the vouchers, 30%, was owned by 
other investors (Euromoney, 1997: p. 4). 67 
6$ The following description of the voucher scheme is based on Voucher Privatisation in Facts and 
Figures, Centre for Voucher Privatisation, the Czech Ministry of Finance, Majstrik, (1995) and Hingorani 
et al. (1997). 
66 According to some sources there were, on average, three competing projects in addition to the projects 
proposed by the enterprise management during the first privatisation wave (Jermakowitz, 1995: p. 44). 
67 The resulting distribution of share ownership among various categories of share owners after the first 
wave is given as the mean ownership for the sample of 988 firms: 7% government, 4% direct sales to 
insiders, 2% sales to foreign investors, 1.5% direct sales to banks, 33.5% small investors participated in 
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The participation of employees, foreigners, and the government in ownership was pre- 
determined. For example, the government claimed 3% of the equity of the firm as a 
contribution to restitution payments to the original owners whose property had been 
nationalised. Ownership by employees was limited to 5% of the equity and stakes 
previously obtained by foreigners were recognised in the privatisation plans. 68 The 
relatively low percentage allocated to employees compared to the percentages in Poland 
and Hungary was a result of the absence of worker's councils in the Czech Republic 
after 1990. In addition, the Czech government consciously discouraged equity 
ownership by managers (who were usually former Communist officials) and foreigners 
on the grounds that both groups would `cannibalise' companies with valuable assets 
(Hingorani, 1997: p. 367). The final argument against `internal privatisation' related to 
equality, on which the Czech government insisted from the very start of the programme, 
for the workers and managers in profitable enterprises would gain from privatisation 
while employees in loss-making enterprises or in non-manufacturing sectors (e. g. 
education, health care) would not. 
The rules for foreign investors were not dissimilar to those applying to domestic 
investors. Nonetheless, foreigners had to undergo a long procedure if they wished to 
offer a privatisation plan in the mass privatisation programme. The procedure involved 
negotiations on at least four levels including management, branch and privatisation 
Ministries, and the government's Economic Council. 69 
The bidding process for shares in privatised enterprises in the first round of privatisation 
was characterised by oversubscription. For example, the biggest oversubscription (88.2 
percent) took place in the third round in which the government lowered rates for some 
enterprises in order to increase the demand for cheaper shares. 70 
the voucher scheme, 41% investment funds participated in the voucher scheme, 8.4% unsold (Hingorani, 
1997: p. 360). 
68 A small proportion of shares was sometimes given free of charge to townships or municipalities. 
69 Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign investors decided to wait until shares were distributed to the 
new owners rather than attempting to buy in. 
70 The rates for some companies were lowered by the government by up to 97 shares for 100 points 
(Czech Ministry of Finance, 1995: p. 14). For a description of the bidding process and changes in patterns 
of demand see Hingorani et al. (1997). 
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The second wave, conducted separately by the Czech and Slovak Republics, was 
launched in February 1994 and included 676 newly founded joint-stock companies from 
various sectors including telephone utility, gas distribution, pharmaceuticals, agriculture 
etc. 71 In the second wave, the Czech Ministry of Privatisation changed the approach 
towards direct sales which were often criticised because of unfairness and lack of 
transparency. Consequently, direct sales were only encouraged for smaller firms. " In 
all other cases, auctions and tenders had priority over direct sales. Another important 
change was that voucher holders reduced the percentage of vouchers they invested via 
investment funds. " Individual voucher holders focused their attention on `cheap' shares 
even more than in the first wave. On average individual voucher holders bought 34 
one-thousand-crown shares for 1,000 investment points, whereas IPFs bought only 19. 
Consequently, individual voucher holders bought more shares than IPFs, despite the fact 
that they had only one third of the investment points available. 
The capital stock of all companies involved in the two waves of voucher privatisation 
totalled CZK 690 billion, ' out of which 50% was privatised via vouchers, 20% by 
`standard' privatisation methods (direct sales and PIPOs), and 10% remained with the 
National Property Fund. The largest percentage of privatisation proposals came from 
outside investors (about 40%) and managers (about 30%). 75 The privatised companies 
were directly introduced to and began to trade on, the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) in 
March 1993. In 1998, about 80% of the economy was in private hands, compared to 
about 2% at the beginning of the privatisation process. 76 
" An additional 185 joint-stock companies previously in existence but not included in the first wave were 
included in the second wave of privatisation (Czech Ministry of Finance, 1995: p. 19). 
Smaller enterprises are those with a book value under 50 million CK, $1.7 m (Majstrik, 1995: p. 62). 
" Consequently, the percentage of investment points invested by the funds dropped to 64% (Czech 
Ministry of Finance, 1995: p. 19). 
"This is an estimate based on book values. Market valuation was required only for sales to foreigners. 
's Czech Ministry of Finance, (1995: p. 19). 
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2.13 Hungarian privatisation, 1988-98 
Structural and other changes in ownership of Hungarian enterprises began in the early 
eighties resulting in some components of a Western legal code, a few commercial banks 
and a more vibrant private sector than in other command economies. Large SOEs were 
broken into smaller units and a `self-management' system was introduced during the 
period 1980-86. Under the self-management system, workers would elect directors and 
workers' councils would be involved in making strategic business decisions. In 
addition, workers were allowed to use enterprises' assets for their own purposes after 
normal working hours. After 1989 SOEs were encouraged by tax incentives to 
transform into joint-stock companies. Although it contributed to important 
organisational and structural changes, the bottom-up approach to reform and changes in 
ownership was not an overall success, for the collusion of workers and managers, and 
lack of control of the transformation process enabled managers to strip valuable assets 
and leave behind an empty shell. This `spontaneous', often called `wild', privatisation 
continued until March 1990 when the government decided to centralise privatisation by 
establishing the State Privatisation Agency (SPA). " 
Give-away privatisation schemes were rejected by Hungarian authorities at the outset 
and Hungary opted for case by case privatisation with the emphasis on sales to strategic 
partners. 78 The government took the view that this would provide the know-how, 
management capability and corporate governance that could not be achieved with a 
voucher privatisation programme. In addition, sales were preferred to a give-away 
scheme because of mounting government debt and pressure to increase government 
revenues. Associations with a foreign or a domestic partner, direct sales, and initial 
public offerings have been dominant privatisation methods of the privatisation process 
76 This may be an exaggeration since the state still holds a significant stake in privatised companies via 
the National Property Fund. In addition it still not clear to what extent the government is continuing to 
provide subsidies to state-owned companies. 
"For numerous examples of corruption and cases where serious valuation problems arose during 
`spontaneous privatisation' see Lipton and Sachs (1990), Grosfeld and Hare (1991), and Valentiny et al. 
(1992). 
" The only free distribution of shares was to the Social Security fund and local councils. In addition, 
workers were able to buy about 10 percent of shares in relevant firms at reduced prices. 
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since the creation of the SPA. 79 Under the first privatisation programme, Hungary was 
expected to privatise about 50-60 percent of state owned assets over a 3-5 year period. 
The programme recognised two types of privatisation: `privatisation from above' and 
`privatisation from below'. Privatisations in which the initiative for transformation 
comes from the SPA are called `privatisation from above'. These include privatisation 
programmes for large firms as well as pre-privatisations of small family businesses. 
About 500-600 large firms were supposed to be privatised by 1993. The main 
privatisation method for the most successful firms in this group were PIPOs. The list of 
the first 20 companies to be privatised via share issues was announced in September 
1990. 
In `privatisation from below' transformation of state-owned firms into joint stock 
companies was initiated by enterprises and the SPA only approved and supervised 
subsequent sales to private partners. This privatisation method involved about 300-400 
small and medium-sized firms with strategic foreign investors. `Privatisation from 
below' proved to be much more successful than `privatisation from above' in the first 
two years of the programme. Sugar refining, tobacco, paper and other processing 
industries were particularly successful in attracting foreign capital and Hungary received 
more than 50% of the total foreign direct investment in the whole of Eastern Europe in 
1991.80 
In 1992 the government introduced a new privatisation programme, which marked a 
shift of emphasis from revenue maximisation towards speed, improvement in efficiency, 
and greater participation by domestic buyers. Two new institutions were founded: the 
Hungarian State Holding Company (AVRt) and the State Property Agency (AVU). 
According to the programme, the state was to retain permanent stakes in 184 
strategically important companies. The State Holding Company would be responsible 
for day-to-day management decisions and for carrying through government 
recommendations regarding privatisation in these firms. In order to increase the pace of 
privatisation of the largest firms the government introduced additional privatisation 
methods. These were privatisation through leasing arrangements and privatisation 
" SPA was given responsibility for supervision and initiation of ownership transformation in nearly 
1,850 firms. 
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through partial private shareholdings. Employees were allowed to buy up to 25 percent 
of shares offered at preferential terms. The government also became more sympathetic 
to the role of management in leading buy-outs. 8' In addition, managers were given the 
choice to sell assets in small and medium enterprises without state involvement, the 
only condition being that firms, prior to the sale, should choose an SPA-approved 
consultant to value the assets. 82 
The new privatisation methods and institutional changes contributed to hard-currency 
sales of $500 million in 1992 and $1.3 billion in 1993, but they dropped to less than 
$100 million in 1994, as a consequence of tensions over the direction of reform within 
the ruling Socialist-Liberal coalition resulting in a delay in the Privatisation bill. 83 The 
financial crisis in Mexico, and other emerging markets, caused additional problems for 
the programme. "' Some high-profile privatisation were cancelled and the privatisation 
minister was sacked. During the first six months of the new government privatisation 
ground to a near-halt. 
Privatisation accelerated after the merger of AVRt and AVU and creation of a single 
agency, APV Rt, in the second half of 1995. Its objective was to speed up the sale of 
some 1,000 state-owned or partially privatised companies which would increase the 
share of the private sector in the economy to more than 80%. 8S It was also planned that 
the state would continue to hold minimum 25% stakes in some major companies for a 
further 20 years in order to steer them gradually towards privatisation. Sluggish 
domestic consumption in 1995 and 1996 contributed to a low domestic demand for 
shares, so that foreign institutional investors dominated the BSE. 86 According to the 
Law on Investment, foreigners were given the right to own up to 100 percent of 
enterprises with favourable rules for the repatriation of profit. Foreign investment 
accounted for about 85 and 70 percent in 1991 and 1992, respectively, but dropped to 
80 Bolton and Roland (1992: p. 9). 
E1 After the wild privatisation there was a strong resistance to the leading role of managers in the 
privatisation process. The management was able to participate actively in privatisation only as a 
complement to employee buy-outs (Karsai and Wright, 1994). 
$2 Bolton and Roland (1992: p. 11). 
" Euromoney (1995: p. 79). 
The Mexico crisis knocked about 20% off the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) in early 1995. 
as Ile private sector's share of the economy was 55-60% in June 1995; Euromoney (1996). 
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about 50% in 1995. In the same year, domestic institutional investors, insurance 
companies and households accounted for not more than 5% of total market 
capitalisation. To encourage about two million small domestic investors the 
government allowed eligible investors to buy up to $970 worth of shares through 
interest free loans repayable in instalments over five years. The loans were either given 
directly by the National Bank of Hungary or extended by commercial banks and then 
refinanced by the National Bank of Hungary. $' 
In 1997 the Hungarian Parliament passed an amendment to the Privatisation Law which 
changed the state's shareholdings in the telecommunication company Matav and the 
leading commercial bank OTP from 25% plus one vote to a single golden share. This 
enabled APV Rt to proceed with privatisation share issues for these two significant 
Hungarian companies. The state would also retain a golden share in another 27 
companies from various industries and would retain a long-term ownership stake in 116 
enterprises. For all these companies plans were made for future public offerings. " 
Privatisation of the gas, oil and electricity sectors was mostly complete by the end of 
1997 and in line for privatisation during 1998 and 1999 were pharmaceutical firms, 
banks and some agricultural enterprises. With regard to banking sector, the agency was 
planning to permit the sale of a stake of at least 25% plus one vote to a strategic 
investor, who would be expected to acquire the stake through the purchase of shares or 
via re-capitalisation of the relevant bank. " The economic outlook is very good, and 
earnings for Hungarian listed companies are forecast to rise more than 60% in the 12 
months to October 1999 (more than 6 times the growth rate predicted for Poland), and 
the GDP is expected to continue rising at 5%. * 
" Tough austerity measures to deal with the rising deficits in the budget and the balance of payments, 
were one of the main causes of to the sluggish domestic demand. 
"For example, investors in Danubius hotels could borrow up to 50% from banks with ten percent of the 
balance to be paid immediately, and another 40 percent after 6 months; Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook (1995. p. 149), The Times, 21 June 1995, and Financial Times, 7 January, 1993; Apart from the 
credit facilities the Small Entrepreneur's' Guarantee Fund and the Credit Guarantee Corporation were 
founded to help small investors borrowing through extended guarantees (Bakos, 1995: p. 100). 
E8 EBRD (1998). 
E9 The plan was not always welcomed by the existing managers reluctant to cede full control to foreign 
investors. However, twenty-six out of forty-four banks were privately owned by the end of 1995. 
Twenty-two of the privately owned banks are majority foreign controlled. Financial Times, 16 December 
1996. 
90 Financial Times, Central and Eastern Europe Look Up, 7 December 1998. 
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The Hungarian government has tried to use the privatisation programme to compensate 
individuals who had lost property under the communist regime. Applicants with valid 
claims have received compensation coupons, which are similar to convertible bond in 
that they have a face value and have accumulated interest to the end of 1994, and can be 
exchanged at redemption value for shares in state-owned enterprises. The supply of 
shares in state-owned enterprises has been rather low and consequently coupons were 
traded at huge discounts on the secondary market 91 
Commentators agree that Hungary is leading the way in bank privatisation and the 
development of a capital market among CEECs, and it has the highest private sector 
share of GDP of any CEEC at around 80 percent 92 SPA and AVRt accounted for FT 97 
billion and FT 205 billion in sales to foreign investors respectively, and they privatised 
660 and 26 enterprises during the 1990-95 period, respectively. 93 During 1989-97 
foreign investors invested about $15,403 million of direct investment into Hungary 
representing 25.2% of the total cumulative foreign direct investments in CEECs and 
Baltic countries during the same period, far more than in any other country. 94 It is 
estimated that about half of the investment has come from participation in Hungary's 
privatisation programme with the largest stakes resulting from the privatisation of the 
electricity and telecommunications utilities. 
91 During 1996 and 1997, however, the supply of the shares increased, resulting in the exchange of 
around 75% of the coupons; Privatisation Yearbook (1997: p. 79). 
1 `... The Budapest stock exchange has set the standards for others, with big, liquid issues, a political 
commitment to the reform and privatisation process that has not wavered despite changes of government, 
and a market watchdog firmly on the side of the investor. ' ; Financial Times, 8 May 1998. 
91 Exchange rates varied between FT 75 and FT 110 to the US dollar during the period; Euromoney, 
(1995: P. 80). 
" EBRD (1998a). 
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2.2 Summary of conjectures on privatisation plans and choice of privatisation 
methods 
Table 2.1, summarises the most popular methods of privatisation used in transition 
economies. Each of the methods has some political or other implication for 
implications for efficiency, revenues, restructuring, and corporate governance. The 
biggest advantage of voucher schemes, for example, seems to be their speed and 
political popularity. Their advantages, however, could be outweighed by a diffuse 
ownership structure and related problems with corporate governance. Direct sales to 
foreigners are almost exactly opposite to the voucher schemes. They tend to bring in a 
new capital and corporate governance but they seem to be rather slow and are often 
politically unpopular. PIPOs and sales to management and employees are both 
politically popular. The biggest advantage of PIPOs is that they contribute to 
development of a stock market. The main disadvantages, however, are underpricing and 
their slow pace due to limited market capacity. Sales to management and employees are 
a relatively quick way to privatise state assets in a popular manner, but they may result 
in a diffuse ownership structure dominated by insiders who may resist restructuring. 
Table 2.1 about here 
Conjectures formulated in the literature on privatisation plans and the choice of 
privatisation methods summarised in section 1.3., however, have not yet been explicitly 
tested in the context of transition economies. We, therefore, examine the following 
conjectures regarding the structure of privatisation plans and the choice of privatisation 
methods, utilising a sample of large Polish, Czech, and Hungarian non-financial 
companies. 
Privatisation Strategies and Choice of Privatisation Methods 51 
I Conjectures on privatisation plans 
C: 2.1 Privatisation (regardless of method) are predominantly partial (Perotti and 
Guney, 1993; Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 1997). 
C: 2.2 Privatisation proceeds and percentage sold increase over time (Perotti and 
Guney, 1993; Perotti, 1995). 
C: 2.3 Manufacturing enterprises in competitive markets tend to be privatised with 
relatively larger initial sales than enterprises in politically sensitive sectors, 
such as. utilities and other regulated industries (Perotti and Guney, 1993). 
C: 2.4 Governments allocate shares in a politically motivated manner favouring 
employees (Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 1997; Jones et al., 1999). 
C: 2.5 Governments tend to give up day-to-day control, but retain some form of 
effective veto power (Jones et al., 1999). 
C: 2.6 Stakes in several enterprises are often sold simultaneously (Perotti and Guney, 
1993). 
II Conjectures on the choice of privatisation methods 
C: 2.7 Governments favour direct sales to PIPOs (Megginson et al., 1998b; Jones et 
at., 1999). 
C: 2.8 The average percentage of shares sold is higher indirect sales than in PIPOs 
(Megginson et al., 1998b). 
C: 2.9 PIPOs are, on average, larger transactions than direct sales (Megginson et al., 
1998b). 
C: 2.10 Enterprises in some industries (e. g. telecommunications) are more likely to be 
privatised by PIPOs (Megginson et al., 1998b). 
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2.3 Data description 
Although data on `mass privatisation' programmes tends to be centralised, privatisation 
data varies, depending on the source, and is sometimes incomplete. This is particularly 
the case with direct sales, where enterprises often choose not to disclose all details. 
Sometimes reasons are related to government statistics and political interests. For 
example, some privatisations are recorded in the year when the process started and the 
others in year of completion. There are, however, some examples of `window dressing' 
and more fundamental problems with privatisation data. Given the high political 
sensitivity of privatisation in CEECs it is not difficult to understand government's 
temptation to meet a revenue target at all costs. The Polish Ministry of Privatisation, 
for example, intentionally used the remaining number of non-privatised enterprises from 
the last period instead of the total number of enterprises supposed to be privatised when 
privatisation started for the calculation of the percentage of completed privatisations in a 
specific year (Jermakowicz, 1995). Bakos (1995) gives an example where the 
Hungarian State Property Agency's data differs from that given by the Hungarian 
National Bank. The difference in estimated total revenue from privatisation between 
these two sources was about FT 5 billion in 1992. Finally, Karsai and Wright (1994) 
suggest that Hungarian SPA's annual revenue targets and lack of manpower to monitor 
the privatisation revenue streams affected not only the accuracy of privatisation data but 
the valuation of some privatisation buy-outs as well. 
Sources of data on privatisation in this study include various issues of Privatisation 
Yearbooks, data used in previous research on privatisation (Perotti and Guney, 1993 and 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997), the financial press, Ministries of Finance in respective 
countries, and other sources as cited in the text. While not underestimating the 
importance of small-scale privatisations and the emergence of the `de novo' private 
sector, in our empirical analysis of privatisation strategies and methods we address only 
privatisation of large enterprises in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. " Where 
forced with differences in aggregate data on privatisation we give the most conservative 
estimates of representativeness of our sample. Even with conservative estimates our data 
seems to be more comprehensive than similar data in previous studies. 
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2.3.1 Poland 
There were 1,243 `liquidation' and 512 `mass-privatisation' projects for small and 
medium enterprises, and 184 `capital' privatisation projects for large enterprises 
completed in Poland by the end of 1996.96 In order to obtain comparative data with that 
used in previous studies, we concentrate only on `capital' privatisation projects for large 
non-financial enterprises which involved direct sales and PIPOs. 
We examined 211 privatisation transactions during the 1990-99 period which is around 
80% of the population for `capital' privatisations (Appendix 3). 97 The data on 
privatisation proceeds, percentage of shares sold, industry, and the privatisation method 
was collected by an extensive press search and from various issues of Privatisation 
Yearbook, Dynamika Prywatyzacji, and Dow Jones Newswires. Some data on proceeds 
and percentage of shares sold was obtained from an unpublished appendix in Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1997), and various tables in Jermakowitz (1995), and Perotti and Guney 
(1993). 
2.3.2 Czech Republic 
Our sample for the Czech Republic consists of about 26% of the total number of 
companies privatised in two privatisation waves by standard methods (Appendix 4). " 
The data on proceeds, percentage sold, industry, and the privatisation method for large 
non-financial enterprises was collected from Privatisation Yearbooks (various issues), 
an unpublished appendix in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and from an extensive 
press search (mainly the Financial Times and Euromoney). Data for some early 
privatisation is from the Financial Times, as cited in Perotti and Guney (1993). 
Finally, data on planned privatisation has been obtained from government sources 99 
9s For more on de novo companies in CEECs see : Lane (1995) and Gibb (1993). 
Privatisation Yearbook (1998: p. 93). 
We also considered privatisation planned for 1999. 
98 This percentage would have been much bigger had we used for our calculations only transactions 
involving large companies. We, however, do not know the proportion of larger companies in the total 
number of companies privatised by standard methods. 
The Czech Republic Ministry of Finance (1999). 
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2.3.3 Hungary 
We examined 123 privatisations of the largest Hungarian enterprises over the period 
1988-1999, which is about 50% of the all privatisation transactions involving large 
enterprises during the period (Appendix 5). The data on proceeds, percentage of shares 
sold, industry, and privatisation method for large non-financial enterprises was collected 
from Privatisation Yearbooks (various issues), an unpublished appendix in Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1997), from an extensive press search (mainly the Financial Times and 
Euromoney), Dow Jones Newswires, Perotti and Guney (1993), and various Budapest 
Stock Exchange (BSE) sources. 
2.4 Privatisation strategies and choice of privatisation methods 
2.4.1 Assessment of Polish privatisation strategy and choice of privatisation 
methods 
The Polish approach to privatisation was gradual. The majority of assets were 
dispossessed in stages, with smaller disposals preceding subsequent sales. The average 
percentage of shares sold in PIPOs and direct sales was 66% and 80%, respectively 
(Table 2.2; Panel B). 1°° The Polish government began with high percentage sales in 
competitive industries such as food, breweries, and confectioneries in the early nineties. 
Privatisation in banking and other politically sensitive industries followed. ` Heavy 
industry is the sector that has attracted interest from foreign investors only recently. 
The steel industry is leading privatisations in this sector with 11 out of 25 state-owned 
mills already sold and a further four in preparation for privatisation. "' In the coal 
industry the government postponed privatisation and developed a radical five-year 
restructuring plan. 
10° Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) reported an average of 89.3% for 19 Polish PIPOs in an unpublished 
appendix. 
101 Privatisation in banking started in 1993-1994 with the help of EBRD. 
102 Financial Times 26 March 1997. 
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According to our data, during 1990-93 the average percentage sold per company was 
around 76 percent. During 1994-98 the average, however, dropped to about 46 percent 
(Table 2.2; Panel A). The Polish government has preferred direct sales to PIPOs by a 
2.8 to 1 margin. (Table 2.2; Panel B). This is higher than the 1.8 to I margin for 113 
Polish privatisation reported in Megginson et al (1988b). The margin is, however, 
lower than the 3 to 1 margin reported for East European countries in Megginson et al. 
(1998b). '°3 Seventeen companies in our sample combined direct sales with PIPOs. 
About 33 percent of total proceeds raised by enterprises were raised via share issue 
privatisations. 104 Average capital raised per transaction for PIPOs and direct sales was 
about $47m and $42m, respectively. PIPOs are, on average, bigger transactions. The 
percentage of shares sold, however, is bigger in direct sales than in PIPOs (80% 
compared to 66%). '° 
Table 2.2 about here 
Around 35 percent of privatisation in our sample are with some foreign participation 
(Table 2.2; Panel B). 106 Direct sales have higher percentage than PIPOs (the average for 
direct sales is around 41%). Exact data on the block held by foreigners is available for 
46 privatisation. The average block held by foreigners is high at about 62.5 percent. 
A distinctive characteristic of the Polish privatisation programme is the preferential 
treatment of employees. On average, more than 21 % of shares has been allocated to 
employees and the shares are sold at a significant discount. "' One of the reasons for a 
preferential treatment of employees in Poland is the government objective to reduce 
labour's control over enterprises. This was intended to be achieved by making workers 
shareholders in the company, and by abolishing the powerful workers' councils which 
kept enterprises tied to union requirements over pay and employment. Under Article 36 
of the Law on Commercialisation and Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises of 
103 Megginson et al. (1998b) sample comprises Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovalia, and Croatia. Except for Hungary, the above mentioned countries have had only a few PIPOs. 
10` The Megginson et al. (1998b) report 37% for a sample of 113 privatisations in Poland. In their sample 
PIPOs were 35% of all privatisations. 
pos Dewenter and Maltesta (1997) report average proceeds of $12.6m for 19 Polish PIPOs in an 
unpublished appendix. 
106 Foreign participation includes EBRD shareholdings. 
107 Detailed data was available for 21 companies. 
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August 30 1996, employees are offered a stake of up to 15% of shares in the share 
capital of the company free of charge. 1°8 
2.4.2 Assessment of Czech privatisation strategy and choice of privatisation 
methods 
The Czech government has clearly chosen a mass privatisation programme dominated 
by a novel voucher privatisation method, placing emphasis on the speed and fairness of 
the privatisation process. More than 1,000 enterprises were privatised in two 
privatisation waves dominated by voucher privatisations, whereas direct sales and 
PIPOs have played only a marginal role (Table 2.3). The results of our analysis on 59 
privatisation via direct sales and PIPOs presented in Table 2.3, therefore, should be 
treated cautiously and in the context of the overall privatisation programme. For 
example, the direct sales to PIPO ratio is almost 1 to 6, which is very much different 
then the ratios in Poland and Hungary. A clear majority of sales were concentrated in 
two privatisation waves and the Czech government has relied on PIPOs to a lesser 
extent then governments in other CEEC. The second notable difference between the 
results for Czech Republic from those for Poland and Hungary is the lower average 
percentage shareholdings owned by foreigners (47% compared to just above 60% in 
Poland and Hungary). Other results for standard privatisation methods, however, are 
similar to those reported for Poland. 
Table 2.3 about here 
The massive and complicated privatisation programme has created numerous problems 
at both government and enterprise levels. At the government level, changes in 
regulation were numerous and not always synchronised with the privatisation process 
itself. For example, the new commercial code was not reflected in privatisation projects 
because it came only after privatisation started (Majestrik, 1995). There were cases 
where industry ministries had quite different views on a privatisation from privatisation 
"' "The need to buy off union opposition is the main reason why the privatisation of highly unionised 
state companies provides for 15% of the stock of the newly privatised company to be distributed free to 
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ministries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the privatisation ministry was often biased 
in favour of existing management. 
At the enterprise level, the evaluation of numerous privatisation projects created major 
problems. The business plans were rather weak, often proposing break-ups even when 
they were not technologically feasible. 1°9 Among teams with the competing projects a 
team supported or led by the existing management of the enterprise would normally 
have a huge advantage due to management's information monopoly. "' The 
management was also in a position to delay privatisation by refusing to disclose relevant 
information, or by signing long-term rental agreements for assets in their control. There 
were also examples of asset stripping by management, either directly or via parallel 
companies using transfer prices. Such behaviour prompted changes in the Privatisation 
Law in 1992. 
A number of problems became acute only after the completion of the mass privatisation 
programme in 1995, mainly in the area of corporate governance. About 265 investment 
privatisation funds registered in the Czech Republic have, without any doubt, facilitated 
the speed of the privatisation programme. They attracted about 60% of vouchers in the 
first privatisation wave, which resulted in control of about 29 % of all outstanding 
shares in privatised companies. "' The funds were, however, allowed to acquire up to 
20% percent of shares in a company. "' Due to this limitation they were not able to 
acquire enough shares to become the majority shareholder in the privatised 
companies. "' Some of the funds have retained shares in more than 100 companies 
making it practically impossible to perform any active role in their monitoring and 
restructuring. "a The funds seem to be caught between becoming portfolio investors and 
strategic shareholders in the companies. Sluggish domestic demand for shares of 
the workforce", Financial Times, 26 March 1997. 
109 On average, each privatisation project led to the creation of two new business units (Majestrik, 1995: 
p. 55). 
10 This has also been documented for Hungarian privatisation where management in some companies 
submitted buy-outs proposals to the SPA only to waive the competition requirement (Karsai and Wright, 
1994). Similar problems were documented in management buy-out literature on developed countries (see 
Thompson et al., 1990). 
"' Czech Ministry of Finance (1995: p. 13). 
12 In addition, the funds were allowed to invest up to 10 % of its own assets in a single company. 
"3 A 34% stake gives the right of veto in the boardroom. 
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privatised companies and an illiquid stock market have made changes in this area even 
more difficult. 
The concentration of power and lack of involvement in corporate restructuring are not 
the only problems related to the investment privatisation funds. Of the 13 biggest funds 
only one is not owned by banks. "' On the other hand, the State Property Agency owns 
about 40-45 percent of shares in the banks. The privatisation law, in spirit, ruled out 
such cross-ownership, but the government responded passively in order to gain support 
of the major banks in the distribution of voucher books to eligible citizens. "" During the 
privatisation process Czech enterprises have significantly increased bank borrowing. 
The reasons for the higher borrowing were twofold. Firstly, the privatisation process 
was rather long, often lasting for a whole year. During this period bank loans were the 
only source of financing. Markets for corporate bonds and equity were not functioning 
and there was neither market nor government monitoring to prevent excessive 
borrowing by managers. Availability of foreign loans to enterprises was also limited by 
government regulation. "' Secondly, a significant number of buy-ins and buy-outs were 
financed almost entirely through bank loans. 18 Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks 
use influence on enterprise boards through investment fund representatives to safeguard 
their loans to the enterprises, and sometimes to endorse asset stripping by funds. This 
cross-ownership also leads to a conflict of interest between banks' commercial and 
investment activities and jeopardises the interests of minority shareholders' in both 
funds and privatised companies. "' 
"" For example, the Komercni Fund (controlled by Komercni Banka) has retained stakes in 265 
companies. Gavin Gray, Czech Republic's Invisible Revolution, Euromoney, April 1995. 
"I The top 13 biggest funds control about 56% of the vouchers and the 20 top funds control 90 percent of 
the vouchers (Financial Times, 2 June 1995). 
16 Fries (1995). 
I" The government required that interest on the loans more than four times a firm's capital stock were not 
tax-deductible (Majestrik, 1995 p: 60). 
18 This resulted in much higher gearing ratios than in other transition economies. Our own calculations 
based on accounting data from the Amadeus database suggest much lower gearing ratios than in OECD 
countries. For example, total debt/total assets ratio for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were 
21%, 12%, and 16% respectively in 1995. The average gearing ratios for non-financial companies in 
transition economies, however, are surprisingly low. For example, the average comparable ratio for the 
UK, France, Germany, and Italy was 24% in the same year (Own calculations based on results reported in 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
"' This expropriation of companies' assets by banks via investment funds in the Czech context is called 
'tunnelling. ' 
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The government is admitting the failure of the voucher privatisation programme to 
create strong majority owners who could bring new capital and promote restructuring. 
The programme lacked a mechanism for ensuring the emergence of a `stable core' of 
owners and the rapid marketability of shares so that holdings could become more 
concentrated. 12° In a recent government study on the operating performance of newly 
privatised Czech enterprises, results show that enterprises privatised under the mass 
voucher programme underperform those privatised by `standard' methods in terms of 
profitability and productivity, while enterprises controlled by foreigners outperform 
other enterprises in all categories. 12' A surprising result was that, in terms of value- 
added per employee, state enterprises performed better than the privatised enterprises 
(except those controlled by foreign investors). The Czech government seems to have 
succeeded in privatising fast and transferring ownership to new economic agents, but to 
have failed in creating incentives for companies restructure and improve efficiency. '22 
In order to correct some of these irregularities, the government has been trying to 
change the ownership structure of privatised companies. Changes have already been 
made with regard to previous limits to the maximum concentration of ownership in 
investment privatisation funds. These have now been reduced, with a view to creating a 
better marketability of shares. The government is hoping that this will lead to higher 
concentration of shares in the hands of `active' owners. The government is also 
encouraging direct sales of shares held by the funds to potential strategic partners via 
so-called derivative privatisation (Appendix 4, Panel B). Derivative privatisation is a 
method whereby funds pool their interests in a company and market them together. The 
new privatisation method aims to attract potential strategic partners, and to enable funds 
to concentrate their holdings in certain companies or industries. 
The government has recently selected about 30 companies for further privatisation 
through direct sales. These companies are mostly regional power plants (see Appendix 
120 For more on the French-style 'stable core' policy see Estrin (1991: p. 8) and Lipton and Sachs (1990). 
The study analyses the performance of manufacturing companies excluding the electricity, gas, and 
mining sectors; Zprava Vlady CR o Stavu Ceske Spolecnosti, as cited in Hospodarske Noviny, 15 
February, 1999. 
" 'The aim of privatisation was not corporate restructuring but to introduce a new economic agent... if 
you judge it by this aim, it (privatisation) has been an unequivocal success. ' Nigel Williams, Chairman of 
Creditanstalt Investment Company in an interview to Euromoney, Czech Republic's Invisible 
Revolution, Supplement on Privatisation, April, 1995. 
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4, Panel B). The government is planning to sell its complete remaining stake in these 
companies (on average 47%) exclusively to strategic partners and/or investors who 
already hold considerable stakes in the companies. 
Finally, the government has taken an extreme measure by practically re-nationalising 
about 30 financially distressed privatised enterprises. The re-nationalisation was 
performed through debt-equity swaps in April 1999. '2' The enterprises' loans are to be 
transferred to a new Development Agency that guarantees the enterprises' working 
capital and will install new management. The objective of re-nationalisation is to 
prepare the enterprises for a new privatisation by direct sales to strategic partners. The 
government has argued that the re-nationalisations do not indicate a shift in government 
policy towards privatisation, but an attempt to correct failures of the previous 
programme. '24 
2.4.3 Assessment of the Hungarian privatisation strategy and choice of 
privatisation method 
Hungary is one of the rare CEECs not to embark on a mass privatisation programme. 1 ' 
Its privatisation has been gradual and dominated by partial sales. The average 
percentage of shares sold, during 1988-98, is 54%, as shown in Panel A of Table 2.4. 
The percentage increased up to 1993, with percentages of 47,50,56,60, and 73 percent 
in 1989,1990,1991,1992, and 1993, respectively. "' 
Table 2.4 about here 
I" Among the companies are some well known large enterprises such as Chemapol, Skoda Plzen, and 
CKD (Financial Times 14 April 1999). 
'24A similar case of re-nationalisation has recently happened in Jamaica where the government re- 
nationalised three sugar mills. Re-nationalisation has also been advocated for Russian gas and oil sectors 
by Jeffrey Sachs, one of the most prominent supporters of privatisation, who acted as an adviser to many 
Eastern European countries. In these companies shares were surrendered to banks as a collateral for 
loans. The banks are, however, dominated by powerful insiders who prefer the `status quo' and resist 
any restructuring (Euromoney, March 1999). 
'25 Other countries are Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FR Yugoslavia (Estrin, 1998). 
' We ignore 1988 for which we have data for one company only. 
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The average percentage of shares sold, however, dropped from 57% during 1989-93 to 
about 32% in 1994. In 1997 the percentage was about 35%. 127 The drop in 1994 can be 
explained by the political tensions, after which the new government opted for a more 
gradual approach and decided to retain at least 25 percent of ownership in some key 
companies for up to 20 years. Furthermore, since 1994 the government has increased 
the number of PIPOs, which normally reduces the percentages sold. Proceeds from 
sales increased from an average of $58.2 million per sale in the early nineties to about $ 
166.25m per sale during 1994-97, with an average for the whole period of $116 million, 
which gives some support for conjecture 2. 
The percentage sold in companies in highly competitive industries (e. g. food, electrical 
appliances, soft drinks, confectionery and tobacco) was much higher than the percentage 
sold in enterprises from regulated industries. Lack of more detailed data and the big 
difference in size between the two groups of companies, however, prevents us from 
drawing any conclusion as to whether this was a result of government policy or not. 128 
The average percentage sold to employees (excluding management) was around 6% 
which is lower percentage than that in Poland (21%). 129 Karsai and Wright (1994) 
report the aggregate ownership proportion held by employees within firms managed or 
wholly or partially sold by the SPA of only 3.4% in the beginning of 1993.130 It is 
important to stress, however, that employees and management participation was much 
higher in privatisation of small and medium enterprises. Karsai and Wright (1994) for 
example, report an average ownership and management participation in 17 Hungarian 
privatisation buy-outs of about 75 percent. 
The result of employees participation in the privatisation of large companies may be 
attributable to the much weaker position of workers' unions in Hungary than in Poland. 
It can also be explained by the lack of a free distribution of shares and the sluggish 
'27 We do not have detailed data on the percentage of shares sold in 1998 and 1999. 
" Small enterprises may have sold a higher percentage of shares simply because it is easier for investors 
to accumulate enough wealth to acquire a significant level of ownership in a company (Demsetz, 1992). 
u9 The percentage, including managers would probably be much higher. Earle and Estrin (1996), for 
example, report a 42% employee (workers and managers) ownership resulted from the Hungarian self- 
privatisation programme. 
110 The authors, however, report a rapid growth in employees' participation during 1993. 
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domestic demand for shares in Hungary. A further factor may be the very favourable 
Law on Investments for foreigners, under which foreigners are given the right to own up 
to 100 percent of enterprises with favourable rules for repatriation of profit. 
Stakes in several firms were sometimes sold simultaneously, creating considerable 
government risk-sharing across industries and a number of companies have had more 
than one sale which confirms the government's intention to sell off gradually over a few 
years. Direct sales are usually followed by PIPOs, especially in the case of larger 
companies (e. g. MVM, Ibusz, Primagaz, Pannonia Hotels, Raba, Scala-Coop) and 
banks. In about 30 cases the government has retained special or golden shares. "' 
Initial sales to a strategic foreign partner are seen by the government as a good way to 
promote restructuring and to increase revenues in subsequent PIPOs. About one-half of 
companies in our survey involve some foreign participation. Exact data on the blocks 
held by foreigners is available for 51 companies, and the average shareholding of 
foreigners is about 61%. "Z Some larger companies have opted for international issues 
and are listed both in Budapest and on foreign markets. For example, Novotrade is 
listed on the Budapest, Vienna, Stuttgart, and Munich Stock Exchanges. Ibusz is listed 
in Budapest and Vienna, Matav in Budapest and New York, and Mol in Budapest and 
Luxembourg. Among foreign stock exchanges German stock exchanges are the most 
popular among Hungarian companies. By March 1999 about 50% of companies listed 
on the BSE have obtained listing on one. of German stock exchanges (Pistor, 
1999: p. 57). 133 
Overall, the Hungarian government has preferred asset sales by a2 to 1 margin (Table 
2.4; Panel B). "a Between 1988-93 the margin was almost 4 to 1, but since 1994, the 
"' Good examples are Pick Szeged, Matav, OTP Bank, Mol, and regional gas and electricity distribution 
companies. 
"Z Valentiny et al. (1992) report an average foreign participation of 49% for 20 early Hungarian 
privatisation. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) report average foreign holdings of 18 % and an average 
allocation to employees of 2.7% for ten Hungarian PIPOs. 
The reported percentages for the Czech Republic and Poland are 19% and 6%, respectively. 
Megginson et al (1998b) reported a 2.6 to 1 margin for Hungarian privatisation, and a3 to I margin 
for his sample of all East European countries.. 
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government has increasingly relied on PIPOs. 13S Consequently, there were about an 
equal number of direct sales and PIPOs during 1994-98.16 The percentage of shares 
sold in PIPOs is lower than that in direct sales. The average for direct sales is about 
58%, whereas that in PIPOs is about 34%. "' Companies from competitive industries 
are more likely to be 100% sold than companies from other industries. 
Despite the differences in the average proportion sold, average proceeds in PIPOs and 
direct sales are very similar ($90 and $93 million respectively). This indicates that 
PIPOs involve, on average, larger companies than direct sales. The percentage of total 
dollars received from PIPOs, however, is around 30%. The remaining proceeds are 
raised via direct sales (Table 2.4; Panel B). 138 The government has tried to spread risk by 
simultaneously selling stakes in several firms from different industries. 
The Hungarian government has relied on case-by-case direct sales and PIPOs and has 
adopted a gradualistic approach towards privatisation. It seems that a major objective of 
direct sales has been to find a strategic partner (often with a majority stake) whereas the 
main objective of PIPOs was to increase government revenues and to promote a 
shareholder democracy. With the development of the capital market the government has 
increasingly been relying on share issue privatisations and initial direct sales to strategic 
partners are normally followed by PIPOs. 19 Subsequent sales of shares confirm the 
government's intention to sell its retained stakes. 
iss The small number of PIPOs during this period was a consequence of relatively low domestic 
purchasing power and the fact that the country's capital market was in an embryonic stage. 
16 Megginson et al. (1998b) sample comprises 48 Hungarian privatisations (28% of which were PIPOs 
and 72% direct sales). Apart from Poland and Hungary, their sample for East European countries 
includes privatisation from the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia. 
I" Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), in an unpublished appendix, report an average percentage of shares 
sold of 32%, and average proceeds of $ 11.7 million, for the early Hungarian PIPOs. 
18 Megginson et at (1998b) report 28% for the proportion of PIPOs in all privatisation, and 19% for the 
proportion of dollars received from all privatisation. 
"' For example, the proportion of privatisation cash proceeds raised through capital market transactions 
increased from one-third in 1996 to over 85% in 1997; Faiz (1998: p. 68). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
A summary of the main features of privatisation programmes in CEEC is given in Table 
2.5. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary began their privatisation programmes 
with somewhat different goals and targets. Hungary emphasised efficiency, the Czech 
Republic speed, while Poland was trying to achieve both goals simultaneously. The 
Czech Republic set the most ambitious target, planning to privatise 60% of assets of the 
state enterprises over a five year period, while Poland and Hungary set lower targets of 
about 50 percent for the same period. The targets were ambitious and they reflected the 
great desire and enthusiasm for market reforms in these countries in the early nineties. 
The goals and targets predetermined the choice of the main privatisation methods and 
design of the privatisation programmes: the Czech government chosen a mass voucher 
privatisation programme, the Hungarian government relied on sales and PIPOs and the 
Polish government combined standard methods with a mass voucher privatisation 
programme. 
Due to legislative bottlenecks and political fights surrounding the privatisation 
programmes none of the countries actually achieved the targets set in terms of 
percentage of assets to be privatised. 14° But this does not mean that the countries 
actually failed in their privatisation programmes. By mid 1995 private sector share in 
the gross domestic product in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic was 60%, 60%, 
and 85%, respectively. 
Table 2.5 about here 
Partial sales were predominant in CEEC, and the countries seem to prefer direct sales to 
PIPOs (conjectures 1 and 7 in Table 2.6. ). PIPOs in Poland and Hungary, though, have 
played an important role both in the privatisation programmes and in the development 
of stock exchanges. These two countries relied on PIPOs more than any other country 
from Eastern Europe. The average percentage of shares sold was higher in direct sales 
then in PIPOs, whereas PIPOs achieved higher average proceeds (except in Hungary; 
10° Regardless of the method all countries suffered from a high level of legal instability. Changes in 
legislation were frequent and sometimes chaotic. Typical examples were delays in passing Commercial 
law in the Czech Republic, delays in passing the Privatisation Law for the mass privatisation programme 
in Poland, and delays in the Hungarian Privatisation bill. 
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conjectures 8 and 9 in Table 2.6. ). The average percentage of shares sold was the 
highest in Poland (about 70%) and lowest in the Czech Republic (about 43%). 
In Poland and Hungary the average percentage of shares sold was increasing during the 
early years of the programmes (up to 1994) but the trend was reversed due to political 
tensions, caused by opposition to foreign domination. There is, however, evidence that 
average proceeds from privatisation have increased over time (conjecture 2 in Table 
2.6). For example, to buy a Polish confectionery company investors had to pay 40 
percent of the value of its sales in 1992, but more than 80% in 1997. 'a' 
Polish, Czech and Hungarian governments gave up day-to-day control in great majority 
of privatised enterprises. Surprisingly, CEEC governments have not very often 
exercised an option to retain some form of veto power (e. g. golden share). The 
Hungarian government has retained a golden share in about 30 cases whereas the Czech 
government has exercised this option only in a dozen cases. 142 The Polish government 
insisted more on various investment and employment commitments by foreign investors 
than on retaining shares with preferential rights. We have also found not many examples 
of clawback mechanism and performance contingent pricing. "' This is a surprising 
result given the long history of state control and the difficulties with valuation of 
Eastern European companies. 
Hungarian and Polish companies have made some organisational changes prior to 
restructuring whereas Czech companies tend to postpone changes until after 
privatisation. '" Hungary and Poland, also, selected the best companies for their 
privatisation programmes, and higher than average profitability was one of the 
requirements for companies to be included in the privatisation programme. The Czech 
"' Much remains to be done, Financial Times 26 March 1997. 
142 The option to retain a golden share seems to be exercised more often in developed countries than in 
CEECs (see Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; unpublished appendix). 
'a' Clawback mechanisms are arrangements by which the vendor will receive a predetermined proportion 
of capital gains when the entity itself is either floated or sold to a third party or where some of its assets 
are sold. These performance-contingent prices involve establishing a range of prices within which the 
eventual prices to be paid will fall and will depend on future profits or market capitalisation on flotation 
or sale to a third party (Wright et al., 1989). 
10 Exceptions are companies in steel, mining, and telecommunications. 
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government included a large number of companies in the privatisation programme 
regardless of their profitability. 
Table 2.6 about here 
In all CEEC governments allocated shares in a politically motivated manner favouring 
employees (conjecture 4 in Table 2.6. ). The Czech government focused on the 
allocation of shares to citizens whereas the Polish and the Hungarian governments have 
preferred to allocate shares and make concessions to insiders (workers and managers). 
Workers received discounts in Poland and Hungary. Polish workers received the 
biggest allocations in CEEC (about 20%). The high employees' tranches are not an 
exclusive feature of Polish privatisation programme. Jones et al. (1999), report that 
90% of governments allocated a significant proportion of shares to employees, with 
small investors being the second most favoured group. Perotti and Guney (1993) and 
Menyah and Paudyal (1996) explain this as an "insurance policy" against subsequent 
denationalisation. Managers played an important role in privatisations regardless of the 
privatisation method. This sometimes resulted in asset stripping and other irregularities. 
Governments in transition economies, however, have little choice but to involve 
existing managers in the preparation of privatisation plans and the choice of 
privatisation methods. 
Earle and Estrin (1996) use the World Bank data and Central European University 
Privatisation Project to provide some evidence on the employee ownership, which 
resulted from privatisation. Average percentages held by employees (including 
managers) in all enterprises in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were 4.4,42.0, 
and 50.8 percent respectively. "' Although the percentages reported in our study 
exclude management ownership they do indicate similar patterns to those reported in 
Earle and Eastrin (1996): insider ownership is important in Poland and Hungary and of 
little importance in the Czech Republic. To some extent these results can be explained 
"s The author acknowledges the limitations of the data set: the Czech data includes only enterprises from 
the first wave of voucher privatisation where more than 50 percent of shares were distributed to 
employees, the Hungarian data includes only the self-privatisation programme, and the Polish data 
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by an absence of workers councils and the fact that the mass coupon privatisation 
programme effectively discouraged employees and foreign ownership in the Czech 
Republic. 
Governments often sold stakes in several companies simultaneously (conjecture 6 in 
Table 2.6. ). This has been motivated by the desire to encourage trading in stock 
exchanges (Poland and Hungary) rather than to diversify risk. Our analysis also shows 
some cross-sectional differences in the choice of privatisation methods. For example, 
companies in the retail and food sectors are more likely to be privatised with larger 
initial (even with complete) sales than companies in other industries (particularly 
utilities). Telecommunication companies in all countries are privatised via PIPOs 
(conjecture 10 in Table 2.6). 
Foreign investors have played an important role in privatisation programmes in selected 
countries. They participated in about one half of privatisation in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, and in about one third of those in Poland. The foreign investors prefer to 
hold a significant proportion of shares in privatised companies. The average block 
shareholdings owned by foreign investors is about 60% in Poland and Hungary and 
about 47% in the Czech Republic. The lower percentage in the Czech Republic shows 
the government's desire to retain control in certain sectors (e. g. banking). Hungary has 
attracted the highest foreign direct investment in the region. 
Both in Poland and the Czech Republic shares in the mass privatisation programmes 
were issued in waves. "" This is different from other countries that embarked on mass 
privatisation programmes. For example, in mass privatisation programmes in Russia, 
Romania, Ukraine, and Slovenia shares were sold continuously (Estrin 1998. p79). The 
vouchers, however, were tradable in the Polish mass programme but not in the Czech. 
Finally, the role of investment funds in the mass privatisation programmes was 
compulsory in Poland but not in the Czech Republic. 
consists of 21 enterprises in the liquidation programme from a total of 1,999 enterprises included in the 
Polish privatisation since 1991 
' Estrin (1998: p. 78) defines waves as the simultaneous offers of 25% or more of enterprises eligible for 
privatisation. 
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Restitutions were an important feature in all privatisation programmes but Poland and 
Hungary seem to be making slower progress than the Czech Republic. After some 
experiences with a de-centralised approach towards privatisation (notably in Hungary) 
the privatisation programmes were run centrally by separate Ministries of Privatisation 
(or State Privatisation Agency in Hungary). ` The Ministry was separated from the 
state treasury in Hungary and the Czech Republic, but not in Poland. 
Overall, our results provide support for the conjectures on privatisation plans and the 
choice of privatisation methods with the exception of conjectures two and five. In 
Poland and Hungary, for example, the trend in increase in average percentage of shares 
sold in the early nineties was reversed in mid nineties due to political strife surrounding 
the privatisation programmes. Privatisations are innately political in all countries, and it 
should not be a surprise that privatisation programmes in transition economies have 
been dominated by politics. Frequent and sometimes chaotic changes in legislation 
were a consequence of political tensions and compromises between various political 
parties. "' It is, however, a surprising result that the governments in transition 
economies have not insisted on retaining golden shares, and on making clawback 
agreements more often. 
" Polish authorities allowed a decentralised approach only for privatisation through liquidation. 
Hungarian authorities also allowed a decentralised approach for small companies since 1993. 
"$ For examples of legislative bottlenecks and political strife surrounding the Polish privatisation 
programme see Jermakowitz (1995: p. 84). 
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Chapter 3 
SHORT RUN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF PIPOs IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
The importance of stock market has been widely recognised in economic development 
literature (McKinnon, 1973; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1993; Singh, 1995). This has 
also been echoed in economics of transition literature which emphasises importance of 
reforms in financial sector for development of mechanisms for corporate finance and 
governance in CEECs (Stiglitz, 1992; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have made considerable progress and are 
leading countries in development of stock markets in the region. 14" Privatisation 
programmes in these countries have been the main contributor to a rapid growth in 
terms of both number of listed companies and market capitalisation. 
This chapter provides insights into the development of stock markets in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary and evaluates the short run financial performance of 
PIPOs in these countries. Results of our analysis on financial performance of PIPOs in 
CEECs contribute to both economics of transition and IPO literature. Within economics 
in transition literature, the results provide an additional measure of success of various 
privatisation programmes. Within IPO literature, numerous PIPOs from wide range of 
industries provide an opportunity to test for various theories on valuation of new issues 
as well as to examine relative performance of PIPOs and private sector IPOs. 
Apart from Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, the only countries in Eastern Europe with 
reasonable developed markets are Estonia and Slovenia (EBRD, 1998). 
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3.1 Institutional aspects of CEEC stock markets 
3.1.1 The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE)'so 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) opened on 16 April 1991 with only five 
companies listed. "' By the end of the year market capitalisation reached $lbn. 1998 
was a record year with 57 new companies coming on to the market and there was a total 
of a 165 companies listed on the main market by the end of the year (Table 3.1), with a 
market capitalisation of around US$20 billion which is equivalent to around 15% of 
GDP. The leading sector is telecommunications due to the flotation of Telecomunikacija 
Polska (TPSA) with an estimated market capitalisation of US$7.7 billion. 152 The next 
is the financial sector accounting for about 20% of market capitalisation, followed by 
industrial and trade stocks representing 17% and 9% of market capitalisation, 
respectively. The 15 NIFs account for 5% of the entire market capitalisation. " 
Table 3.1 about here 
The substantial growth of the WSE can, to a large extent, be explained by eight 
successive years of economic transformation. The country's GDP began to grow in 
1992 and the real annual growth rate exceeded 5% during the period from 1994 to 1998. 
Another major contributing factor is the successful privatisation programme with PIPOs 
as an important privatisation method, and many incentives for investors. For example, 
personal income from stock investments is tax exempt. Furthermore, small investors 
are able to exchange government discount bonds for privatisation shares at a 20 percent 
price discount to the offer price and employees are able to buy up to 10 percent of their 
company's shares at half of the regular offer price. "" These incentives have contributed 
to a very popular equity culture in Poland. Domestic investors, for example, own some 
1S0 The description of the WSE is based on The 1997 Guide to Poland, Euromoney, December 1996, and 
The 1998 Guide to Central and Eastern European Equities, Euromoney, February 1998, and various 
issues of Financial Times. 
The government organised the joint flotation of Tonsil, Krosno, Prochnik, Exbud, and Silesian Cable. 
's2 The flotation of Telekomunikacya Polska (TPSA), in late 1998, pushed the market capitalisation from 
$l3billion to $20 billion. TPSA is the single largest equity traded in Central Europe (Euromoney, April 
1999: p. 6). 
Own calculations based on end of 1998 data from Datastream. 
's' Reuters, 1 April, 1993, as cited in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997; Unpublished appendix A). 
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62% of Polish equities and the percentage of the adult population holding shares in 
1994 was 4.1 percent which was higher than that in Austria in the same year. "' This is 
in sharp contrast to Hungary where domestic investors own only about 30 percent of 
equities. A launch of private pension funds in April 1999 has given a further impetus to 
development of the WSE. 
Trading in securities in the WSE is exclusively conducted through stockbrokers. There 
are about 1.2m registered brokerage accounts in Poland, the majority of which are held 
by private investors. Until 1996, trading was conducted five times per week under a 
single quotation system (modified form of the French Bourse `par casier' system) with 
a 10% limit on daily share movements and with no short selling. "" A fully computerised 
system has been installed and the exchange has operated a single price market system 
(order driven) since 1996, with a limited number of securities traded under a continuous 
quotation system since 1997. The daily turnover of the WSE was about $30m in late 
1998 and the main index is the capitalisation-based, total return, WIG index established 
on 16 April 1991.157 Trading in WSE index futures started in January 1998. '58 
According to the IFC classification of emerging markets, Poland is considered to be 100 
percent open to foreigners. 159 
One of the main characteristics of the WSE is a rather strict and detailed regulatory 
system designed to increase transparency and to provide security of trading. Despite 
some complaints about the extensive disclosure requirements, the regulation of the 
WSE is judged to be the best in Central Europe. 160 The most important piece of 
us Jermakowitz (1995) report that 55.4% of shares went to domestic private investors, 13.6% to strategic 
investors, 21.9% to workers, 7.2% to managers and 8.9% to foreign investors, during 1990-93. In 1994, 
19% of Poles said that they are interested in buying shares; Financial Times, Supplement on Poland, 28 
March 1995. 
11 Trading was one day per week during 1991, two days per week during 1992, three days per week in 
1993, and five days per week since 1994. 
'The maximum participation of one company, however, is limited to 10%. The index started with a 
base value of 1,000 points and is reset quarterly. 
`s$ Zloty-US dollar futures and zloty-euro futures began in late 1998. 
's9 The IFC's criteria for openness are the extent to which foreign institutions can buy and sell shares on 
local exchanges and mechanism they can use to repatriate capital, capital gains, and dividend income 
without undue constraint; IFC (1998: p. 28). 
160 Commentators often suggest that Poles took the philosophy that everything that is not allowed is 
forbidden, whereas the Czechs followed the line that everything that is not forbidden is allowed, 
reflecting the laissez-faire principles of Vaclav Klaus's government. The Asian Wall Street Journal, 
Thursday, March 6,1997. 
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regulation is the Act on Public Trading in Securities and Trust Funds of 22 March 
1991,16' according to which all transactions in traded securities must be reported in the 
WSE, and all securities are registered and held with the National Depository of 
Securities (NDS). 162 A Guaranteed Fund was established to provide insurance against 
civil liability for defaulted transactions. Companies must publish financial reports 
monthly and quarterly, as well as semi-annually (reviewed by auditors) and annually 
(fully audited). In addition, any other information that may affect stock prices is 
required to be announced by companies. 
Threshold requirements for listings on the main market are high, which prevents a flood 
of small and possibly speculative companies. Subsequent to the approval of a listing 
prospectus by the Polish Securities Commission (PSC) companies sign the underwriting 
agreement and may launch the public offer. The information in the prospectuses is 
strictly regulated and is more detailed than in other countries in the region. "' An offer 
price could be fixed or based upon a book-building process. Offers with a fixed price 
were often conducted on a first come, first-served basis, so that there are no reliable 
measures of the extent of over-subscription. "' Other popular methods of share 
distribution are simple subscription and distribution through the WSE. Domestic banks 
such as Polski Bank Razwoju, Bank Handlowy and Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy 
dominate the underwriting market. 165 
16' A new law regulating public securities trading came into force in 1998. 
'62 Shares have been also traded on parallel and free (OTC) markets. Market capitalisation on the parallel 
market was $1.8 bn in 1997. Eighteen companies were listed in the OTC market in 1997; Euromoney, 
April, 1999. 
163 Euromoney, April 1999. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997, unpublished Appendix A). 
'6s Polski Bank Razwoju underwrote 12 issues, Bank Handlowy 8 issues, and Powszechny Bank 
Gospodarczy 8 issues during 1991-96 period. 
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3.1.2 The Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) 
The bidding process in the first wave of mass privatisation was concluded in December 
1992. It took, however, six months before the shares were transferred to the new 
owners. Soon after, three trading options became available to the new owners: a) 
Registranci Misto System (RMS), b) Security Depository Centre, and c) The Prague 
Stock Exchange (PSE). The privatisation programme contributed to the flotation of 
practically all companies, and in that respect the Czech capital market is unlike any 
other. ' 66 
The RMS organised eleven periodical auctions from July 1993 to December 1994. The 
prices were determined by a continuous, on line, order-matching system which excluded 
the transactions of market makers. The RMS proved to be the most liquid market 
during 1993. Trading through the Security Depository Centre was not available to all 
investors. Due to an absence of disclosure requirements, prices and volumes of trades 
on this market were not available until recently. 
The number of shares traded on PSE has grown rapidly since 1993, and current total 
turnover accounts for almost 90% of the turnover of all organised markets in the Czech 
Republic (Table 3.2). The main index of the PSE is the value-weighted, price-based, PX 
50 index established in 1995. According to the traditional indicators the PSE was the 
biggest stock exchange in Central and Eastern Europe in 1997. The indicators are, 
however, affected by a number of functional problems and they exaggerate the extent of 
the PSE development. For example, number of traded companies and turnover are 
affected by double counting, and most of the shares are not actively traded. In addition, 
new cash issues are aggregated with non-cash introductions to the market. 167 
During 1997, the PSE de-listed about 1,300 stocks, which had not traded actively or did 
not satisfy the new stricter criteria. At the beginning of 1998, there were 323 listed 
companies on the main, the second and the free market. Only ten were listed on the 
main market, 92 on the second market, and 221 on the free market. 
After separation, however, the Slovak capital market shares the same characteristics. 
'ý' Examples of functional problems are adopted from World Bank (1999: p. 11). 
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Table 3.2 about here 
The PSE consists of three markets, the main, the second, and the free market. The 
criteria for flotation on the different markets are issue size, liquidity and reporting 
requirements. Measured by market capitalisation, the leading sectors are energy 
utilities, transport and communications, investment funds, financial services, chemicals, 
pharmaceutical and rubber producers. 168 The market is very concentrated, in that SPT 
Telecom, EEZ, Komercni Banka, Tabak and Unipetrol together account for about 50% 
of the total market capitalisation. The major market participants on demand side are the 
state owned National Property Fund (NPF), Privatisation funds and foreign investors 
holding 37%, 13% and 25% of the market capitalisation respectively. 
Czech companies, however, have been very slow in raising equity capital. The main 
problem seem to be a low liquidity and a poor reputation of the PSE which is regarded 
as a way of gaining control rather than raising capital. Many shareholders in companies 
privatised through voucher privatisation in 1992 and 1994 have been worried about 
losing control. When some companies do decide to issue equity demand is rather low. 
The domestic population has been given shares for free and it is unlikely that Czech 
retail investors would want to pay for more equity. "' Consequently, the Czech market 
seems to be illiquid to support new flotations. Recent surveys found that only one third 
of private companies intended to seek a listing and that the market can handle only IPOs 
between $25m-20m. "o 
Another problem for PSE has been lack of market discipline and transparency, with 
numerous cases of failing to honour a trade. Finally, a high volume of trading takes 
place outside the organised markets. "' In order to improve overall trading volume and 
transparency, the PSE imposed stricter requirements on its members in September 1997. 
168 Although market capitalisation changes on a daily basis our own estimates suggest that energy and 
transport sectors together count for about 40% of the total market capitalisation. Financial services and 
investment funds follow with about 10% each of the total market capitalisation. 
'69 Euromoney, April 1995: p. 96. 
"o Financial Times, Czech Groups Cast Their Net Abroad in Search of Funds 26 May 1998. 
In 1995 the estimates were that off-market trades accounted for between 50 and 80 percent of all 
market activity. In 1997, estimates were around 50%. 
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All companies and funds listed on the main and second markets are now required to 
publish financial statements, and other relevant information on a quarterly basis. A 
Czech Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was founded and the SEC Bill was 
recently signed into law. In addition, Bank Law amendments were made in order to 
limit the influence of banks upon non-financial companies. Finally, the law on 
investment companies and funds is to be changed, introducing the voluntary opening of 
investment funds, and lowering the holdings of any company by a single fund from 20% 
to 11%)72 
In its 1998 survey, however, the Securities Commission found that more than 40% of 
issuers had failed to disclose required information. New listing requirements are on the 
way and they will force managers of 100 leading publicly quoted companies to disclose 
their active shareholdings and to declare the contracts and transactions between their 
companies and private companies owned by themselves and that of their family 
members. " 
According to the IFC classification for emerging markets, the Czech market, except for 
banks, is generally considered 100 percent open to foreigners. Trading in Czech bank 
stocks by foreign investors is subject to the prior approval of the Czech National Bank. 
Due to the lengthy procedures, however, Czech bank stocks are practically unavailable 
to foreign portfolio investors. "' 
"n Investment funds control 18 of the top 60 Czech companies. New legislation forces investment funds 
to change to open-ended funds (from quoted closed end funds) if they trade at a 40% discount or more to 
their net asset value over a three month period. Also, the amendments to the banking act passed in 
November 1997, by the lower house of parliament stops banks from holding more than 50% in non- 
financial companies. 
"" The fines for a failure in disclosure duties will be increased up to 60 times from current levels 
(Financial Times, 16 June 1999). 
"" IFC (1998: p. 56). 
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3.1.3 The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) 
The BSE was opened in June 1990 with only six traded stocks and it was the first stock 
market to re-open in CEEC. 15 As shown in Table 3.3, the BSE has exhibited steady 
growth during the 1990s and by the end of 1997, the number of traded stocks had grown 
to 49, with market capitalisation reaching 16% of GDP. Around 95% of the market 
capitalisation is represented by fully or partially privatised state-owned enterprises. 
Table 3.3 about here 
The largest and the most important flotation on the BSE has been that of the 
telecommunication company Matav, which was the first global offering of a 
telecommunication company from Eastern Europe. With a gross value of US$1.3 
billion the flotation increased the BSE market capitalisation by almost 50%. 16 It was a 
global share offer and consisted of a US offer, an international offer, and a Hungarian 
retail offer. ' The Hungarian state sold just under 20%, and the major strategic partner 
MagyarCom offered 8% of Matav' share capital. The domestic retail offering generated 
huge interest and some 168,000 applications were received resulting in the issue being 
oversubscribed three times. Consequently, the size of the issue to domestic retail 
investors was increased from 2% to 5.9% of the company's share capital. Although the 
flotation coincided with a period of turbulent conditions in the world equity markets and 
the Asian crisis in November 1997, the transition was completed successfully without 
any changes to the offer size, giving a boost to the government's privatisation 
programme, and the BSE. 
Listed stocks are divided into "A" and "B" sections. "A" is the more transparent 
section, where companies release financial statements on a quarterly basis. These are 
"s The Budapest Commodity and Stock Exchange was opened for the first time in 1864 and was active 
until 1948 when it was closed by the communist regime. A market for corporate bonds (Hungarian 
Securities Market) was opened in 1988 and replaced by BSE in 1990. 
16 The description of the offering is based on Faiz (1998) and EBRD (1998). 
'" The US offer consisted of a private placement to a group of Canadian investors and offers to the US 
public. The international offer was a private placement to Hungarian and international investors outside 
the US and Canada. 
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also more stringent requirements regarding the liquidity of stocks, while trading is daily 
and there are no limits on price movements. 17' The BSE Market Index started in 1991, 
and was replaced with the BSE BUX Index in January 1995. The BUX Index is a 
capitalisation-based, total returns index. The BSE was the first market in the CEEC to 
commence trading in financial derivatives. "' 
The comparatively small number of traded stocks compared with other markets in the 
CEECs reflects the absence of a mass voucher privatisation programme in Hungary. 
Liquidity, however, measured by the turnover/capitalisation ratio, seems to be much 
higher than in the Czech Republic (26.6% vs. 15.5% in 1995). In late 1998, daily 
turnover in Budapest and Warsaw was about $30m, compared with $15m for the Czech 
Republic. "' In December same year value traded in BSE was twice as much as in WSE 
and three times as much as PSE (Table 3.3). The BSE was one of the world's best 
performing stock markets from 1996 to the end of 19972$' According to the IFC 
classification for Emerging Markets, the Hungarian market is considered to be 100 
percent open to foreign portfolio investors. 
3.2 Summary of conjectures on short run financial performance of 
privatisation share issues 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the results of empirical studies which actually compare the 
performance of PIPOs with that of other IPOs is scarce and inconclusive. Perotti and 
Guney (1993) report higher initial returns for PIPOs in several countries. However, 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) found no general tendency for privatisations to be 
underpriced to a greater degree then private company IPOs using data from eight 
countries. In addition, the various hypotheses on reasons for PIPO's underpricing, and 
differences between PIPO and IPO underpricing have not yet been tested in the context 
of transition economies. 
18 Faiz (1998: p. 73). 
On 31 March 1995, trading started in futures for T-bills, Budapest Stock Index, and currency futures 
for US$ and Deutsche marks. 
180 Financial Times 7 December 1998. 
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The political value of shares in privatised companies in a transition economy is 
significant. First, capital market is completely new and dominated by PIPOs which play 
promotional, as well as an educational role for citizens (Moore, 1992). Second, 
privatisation of large state owned enterprises, which served as symbols in socialist era, 
is the strongest signal of governments commitment to market reforms and virtues of 
capitalism. Governments committed to market reforms may seek to signal its identity by 
choosing to privatised gradually and by selling at discount (Branco and Mello, 1991; 
Perotti, 1995). The privatisations are real test not only for governments but also for an 
entire programme of market reforms in these countries. The governments are, therefore, 
likely to choose a privatisation strategy with sufficient underpricing in order to attract 
median class voters as bidders in fixed-price offerings. This strategy would reduce the 
likelihood of re-nationalisation policy reversal and increase the popularity of the 
governments and market reforms (Biais and Perotti, 1997). 
We, therefore, examine the following conjectures regarding the underpricing and 
relative performance of PIPOs and private sector IPOs by utilising a large sample of 
Polish, Czech, and Hungarian privatisation share issues: 
C: 3.1 PIPOs have positive initial returns (Perotti, 1995) 
C. 3.2 PIPOs tend to be underpriced more than private sector IPOs (Perotti and 
Guney, 1993; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997) 
18' The BUX index increased 263% in USS terms over this two year period; Faiz (1998: p. 74). 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data: sources and description 
For the calculation of initial returns daily price series from the Warsaw, Prague, and 
Budapest Stock Exchanges were used. The primary source for the daily stock prices 
and various national stock indices is Datastream database. The stock base dates in 
Datastream, however, are sometimes later than the base dates provided by the local 
stock exchanges. In these cases we choose earliest dates and fill in the gaps in stock 
price series with prices provided by the local stock exchanges. 18' 
A summary of price index performance for CEEC markets is given in Table 3.4; Panel 
A. Although 1996 was a very good year for all CEEC markets, only Hungary continued 
on a positive note in 1997 whereas Poland and the Czech Republic were affected by the 
negative trend in emerging markets, and in particular by developments in the Russian 
market. The prices in the three markets exhibited a positive correlation during 1993-98. 
(Table 3.4; Panel B). The strongest correlation measured by Pearson's correlation was 
between Poland and the Czech Republic (0.46) and the weakest between Hungary and 
the Czech Republic (0.32). 
Table 3.4 about here 
The short-term returns were calculated using two different benchmarks. Apart from the 
local market indices we have also used Datastream's Europe Index as a benchmark for 
international investors. The Europe Index is a value-weighted, price-based composite 
index in US$ dollars with January 1,1973 as its base date. The index constituents are: 
United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherland, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
" Megginson et al. (1998a) also report that the issue dates provided by Privatisation International may 
not be the dates when the offers are actually listed in the stock exchange. He, however, find that 
Datastream coverage commences within three weeks of the issue date in over 80% of all cases. 
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Switzerland, and Turkey. The daily values for the Europe Index are extracted from the 
Datastream database. 
The problems of defining privatisation universe have not been discussed in the IPO 
literature. In many IPO studies enterprises would normally be classified as privatised 
even when a major foreign investor is actually owned by the foreign government. Some 
acquisitions made by French and Austrian banks are typical example. There is also a 
big difference among privatised companies. In the UK, for example, transactions 
involving both Stagecoach and Railtrack would be classified as privatisations even 
though Stagecoach has bought a business from the government whereas Railtrack has 
been floated directly. "' The problems in differentiating private and privatised 
companies in transition economies are exacerbated by the networks of inter-enterprise 
ownership and the various categories of ownership that emerged after privatisation. "' 
Private sector IPOs in our sample are either de novo companies or companies which 
emerged from assets carved-out from SOEs, but owned by private or foreign investors 
before flotation. "' For example, the Hungarian company Nabi is classified as a private 
sector IPO even though it is an offspring of a state-owned company Ikarus, the largest 
bus manufacturer in the region. We define PIPOs as offerings where at least some of the 
shares on offer were in the government possession. "" In order to be included in our 
sample of PIPOs a company must also be on a list of PIPOs published in the 
Privatisation International Yearbook. 
Raily (1997). 
Earle and Estrin (1996), for example, categorise ownership after privatisation at four levels: state 
owned vs. private; privatised vs. de novo private; privatised by insiders vs. privatised by outsiders; 
privatised by managers vs privatised by workers. State ownership here indicates a vacuum in property 
rights, with the enterprises effectively controlled by managers and/or workers. Stark (1996) suggests that 
privatisation in Hungary resulted in inter-enterprise ownership and complex networks of companies 
which is distinctively different from unambiguously private ownership. The author makes a case for 
emergency of a distinctively East European capitalism that will be different from both the West European 
and East Asian variants. 
gas The majority of Hungarian and Polish de novo enterprises and joint ventures have an emigre 
Hungarian or Pole as one of the partners. For more on Hungarian and Polish de novo companies see Lane 
(1995) and Wyznikiewicz et al. (1993). 
'" Our definition is different than that adopted by HSBS James Capel for the calculation of the Guinness 
Flight 200 Privatisation Index. The HSBS James Capel definition stipulates a minimum state holding of 
5% within the past ten years in order to classify a company as a PIPO (Raily, 1997). 
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Poland 
The Polish sample consists of 55 PIPOs. Their performance is compared with the 
performance of 110 privately owned company IPOs. The list of all companies included 
in the sample is given in Appendix 6. These companies represent the entire population 
of companies which joined the WSE main board during 1990-98. Daily prices, listing 
dates, industry classification codes, and market values, were obtained from the 
Datastream database or directly from the WSE. '$' Since data on the `original' offer 
price was available for only one third of the companies in the sample, opening prices on 
the first trading day were used for calculation of initial returns. The `original' offer 
prices were used in the calculations performed to check for the robustness of the 
results. 18' Data on share proceeds, percentage sold, time to listing, and foreign 
participation was obtained from the financial press, Privatisation Yearbooks, and 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997; unpublished appendix A). 
Descriptive statistics for Polish companies in our sample are given in Table 3.5. 
Privatised companies are, on average, larger than their private counterparts. The 
average market capitalisation of PIPOs is around $244m 189 which is more than five 
times the average of private companies IPOs. The biggest companies in the sample are 
the privatised telecommunication group TPSA and Bank Handlowy. The smallest 
company, by market capitalisation, is Irena Huta. Measured by the standard deviation 
of daily returns during the first year of trading, PIPOs seem to be less risky than private 
IPOs. On average, the market seems to be more volatile prior to PIPOs than before 
private companies IPOs. Data on the percentage of shares sold is available for PIPOs 
only and the average percentage sold in our sample is about 65%. Data on sale proceeds 
is available for 43 PIPOs, and the largest issue is TPSA. 
Table 3.5 about here 
187 Data for 16 companies is obtained from the WSE. 
188 `Original' offer prices were obtained from the WSE, the financial press, and Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997; unpublished appendix A). 
189 Using end of 1998 exchange rate this amount is equivalent to PZ 849m. 
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The Czech Republic 
The PSE has been the only daily trading option available to all investors throughout the 
post-privatisation period. This suggests the use of the PSE data in our analysis of 
financial performance of privatised companies, though it is not without limitations. For 
example, the RMS started with 427 companies whereas the PSE opened with only 11 
companies. However, many companies moved from the RMS to the PSE, resulting in a 
higher number of companies being traded on the PSE than on the RMS by December 
1993. The lack of a long series of daily prices and the absence of a market index, 
however, outweigh the potential advantages of RMS's more comprehensive early 
trading data. It is worth mentioning, however, that various studies reported very small 
difference between average prices in the RMS auctions and the PSE auctions. l9o 
The sample of Czech enterprises consists of 98 privatised enterprises from the PSE's 
main and second boards, which represent more than 90% of companies listed in the 
main and second boards of the PSE in 1998.9' As the primary market for shares is 
virtually non-existent there is a noticeable absence of private sector IPOs. Data on daily 
prices, listing dates, industry classification and market values was obtained from the 
Datastream database. In the absence of fixed offer prices, opening prices on the first 
trading day were used for the calculation of initial returns. Data on foreign ownership is 
obtained directly from the Prague Stock Exchange. The average market capitalisation 
of Czech companies in our sample is around $144 (Table 3.6). 192 The biggest company 
(SPT Telecom) is more than one thousand times bigger than the smallest (Electromotaz 
Zavody). 
Table 3.6 about here 
10 Hingorani et al. (1997), and World Bank (1999) report a very high correlation between RMS auctions 
and PSE auctions prices on corresponding dates. Hingorani et al, for example find correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.886 to 0.983. The World Bank study fords very small difference between 
average prices for 100 largest firms in the RMS auctions and the PSE auctions. The result remains the 
same after the average is weighted by size of transactions. The reported cross-firm standard deviation of 
the average price difference is also very small. The reported difference between average prices in other 
marketplaces and PSE, however is significant. 
19' In late 1998, there were 10 companies listed on the main board and 92 on the second board. The list of 
all companies included in the sample is given in Appendix 7. 
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Hungary 
The sample for Hungarian public offerings comprises 25 state and 24 private companies 
IPOs, which is more than 90% of the population of companies that joined the BSE's 
main board between 1990 and 1998.193 Five companies were de-listed during the period 
but were included in the sample since initial returns and long-term returns, for at least 
one year after listing, were available. 194 Data for issue dates, listing dates, number of 
shares outstanding, offer prices, and capital raised was obtained directly from the BSE. 
Data for the percentage of shares sold was obtained from Privatisation Yearbooks and 
various issues of the Financial Times and Euromoney, for daily share prices from the 
BSE Index, and for companies' market capitalisation the Datastream database. 
Statistics for the main variables are given in Table 3.7. End of year market values are 
available for 37 companies, the biggest of which is the telecommunications company, 
Matav and the smallest Hungagent. The gross proceeds raised by the sample issues 
varies substantially, with the highest amounts being raised by the privatisations of 
Matav and Mol, the Hungarian telecommunications and oil and gas companies. "' The 
average time to listing, measured as the difference between the offer date and the first 
listing date is 62 days with a maximum gap of 467 days in the case of Skala Coop 'S' 
retail company. 196 The majority of the issues were oversubscribed and demand for 
shares of the early PIPOs was particularly high. "' For example, the Ibusz flotation, the 
first public offering in post-Communist Eastern Europe, was 23 times oversubscribed. ` 
Table 3.7 about here 
192 Using end of 1998 exchange rate this amount is equivalent to CK 4316.58 million. 
The list of all companies is given in Appendix 8. 
The de-listed companies are: Csopak T, Fonix, Goldsun, Hajdutej, Martfu Sorgyar. 
'95 The Matav issue represented 20 percent of the total market capitalisation in 1997. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), in an unpublished appendix A, report an average time to listing of 60 
days for ten Hungarian PIPOs. 
197 For example, domestic retail offers for Matav and Mol were oversubscribed more than 3 times. 
According to press releases, allocations seem to be made in proportion to the original subscriptions. 
198 Shares were offered simultaneously on the Vienna and Budapest stock exchanges in June 1990. The 
issue raised $33 million and the first day premium was 43 percent (Valetntiny et al. 1992: p. 614). The 
significant underpricing exposed the SPA to criticism and led to the sacking of its head. 
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Not surprisingly Hungarian PIPOs are much larger than their private counterparts 
(Table 3.7. Panel B), with an average market capitalisation almost 15 times higher. 
They also seem to be less risky than their private counterparts measured by the standard 
deviation of the daily return during the first year after listing. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
Short-run returns were measured for domestic investors and for international investors 
investing in European companies. For domestic investors the benchmark returns were 
local currency returns achieved by investing in the national market indices. For 
international investors investing in European companies the benchmark was the US$ 
dollar return achieved by investing an equivalent amount of money in the Europe Index. 
The Europe Index also provides a consistent benchmark across national boundaries and 
eliminates inconsistencies caused by the differing methodologies of locally produced 
indexes. 199 This is particularly important for indices dominated by privatised stocks 
which tend to have high dividend yields with the result that the returns on a total return 
basis may be overestimated. 
The calculations of short-run performance of state and privately owned enterprises 
offerings follow the methodology suggested in Ritter (1991). The first day return for 
each company is defined as the difference between observed returns and the 
corresponding return on a national market index: 
Ri, t = (Pi, I - Pi, a)1Pi, o - (Ii, 1 - li, a)"li, o equation 3.1 
where MAIRU is the market-adjusted initial return of company i; P;, is the closing price 
of company i at the end of the first trading date; P;, 0 
is the offer price of company i (time 
" The WSE and the BSE indices are capitalisation-based, total return indices, whereas PX50 is 
capitalisation-based, price only index. In other words, the PX50 is not a total return index and cash 
dividends, during the period, are not added to the adjusted market capitalisation of the index for each 
period. 
85 
index 0 refers to the issue date); I;, 1 is the index at the end of the first trading day and I;,. 
is the index on the issue day of company i 200 
To check the robustness of the results, and to take into account potential volatility in 
trading of new shares the first week returns, defined as the difference between observed 
returns, calculated using the closing price of the company at the end of the fifth trading 
day, and the corresponding return on a national market index. 
Ri, t = (Pi, 5 - Pi, o)/Pi, o - (Ii, 5 - Ii, a)/li, o equation 3.2 
It has been demonstrated in the literature that any clustering of PIPOs in particular 
months or years may have an effect on offer prices because of the need to reduce PIPO 
prices due to limited market capacity (Valentiny et al., 1992). Clustering may also have 
an important effect on subsequent performance and statistical results (Ibbotson 1975). 
In order to adjust for the potential problem of clustering we followed the approach 
suggested in Firth (1997) and classified PIPOs into portfolios depending on the calendar 
month and year of listing. We then re-calculated average market-adjusted initial returns 
for the portfolios and repeated the tests for statistical significance of our results. 
3.4 Short run financial performance of PIPOs in CEECs 
3.4.1 Short run financial performance of Polish PIPOs 
About 75% of PIPOs and 56% of privately owned company IPOs in the sample have 
positive initial returns (Table 3.8; Panel A). Average raw and market-adjusted initial 
returns for all Polish IPOs in the sample are positive at 0.41% and 0.53% respectively 
(Table 3.8; Panel B). The data set does not appear to contain any outliers. The 
maximum market-adjusted returns were 13.85%, and there were no negative market- 
20° The BSE Index was replaced with the BSE BUX Index in January 1995. The time series used in this 
study has been adjusted to reflect the new index. In some cases Datastream coverage commences after 
the `issue date' provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange. Consequently, we were not able to calculate 
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adjusted returns higher than 10%. The average unadjusted and market-adjusted first day 
returns of PIPOs were 1.28% and 1.16%, respectively, and both are significantly 
positive at a5 percent level. The results are consistent with Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997) who report positive and significant (at 1% level) initial returns for 19 Polish 
PIPOs 201 The unadjusted and market adjusted returns for other IPOs are -0.02% and 
0.22% respectively and these are not statistically significant at any reasonable level. We 
found no significant difference in the market-adjusted initial premiums between PIPOs 
and IPOs (Table 3.8; Panel Q. 
Table 3.8 about here 
The returns reported in this study are much lower than those reported in Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997). Their sample, however, includes only 19 PIPOs from the early years 
of the privatisation programme. They also use Morgan Stanley' Europe Index instead 
of WSE index, and calendar instead of trading dates for calculation of market adjusted 
initial returns. The second reason for lower initial returns reported in this study is the 
use of the opening prices on the first trading day instead of subscription prices. The 
returns, therefore, represent returns to investors who bought the shares at the opening 
price and sold them at the closing price on the first trading day. In many instances, 
however, offer prices reported in the press were different from corresponding opening 
prices at the WSE. 202 In order to examine the robustness of the results, we repeated the 
calculations of both raw and market-adjusted returns comparing the original offer prices 
with first trading day closing prices whenever this was possible. "' The raw and market- 
adjusted average returns for all companies in the sample were negative, -1.45% and - 
1.31%, but not statistically significant. The average raw and market-adjusted returns for 
PIPOs were negative (-4.5% and -4.8% respectively), and those for private companies 
IPOs were -0.06% and 0.21% respectively. The negative average returns for PIPOs 
market-adjusted initial returns and early after-market returns for five companies. Similar problems were 
reported in other studies of the short and long term performance of PIPOs (e. g. Megginson et al., 1998a). 
201 Raw and market-adjusted returns were 50% and 44.4% respectively. They did not, however, have 
data available for private companies IPOs. 
202 Dewenter and Malatesta (1997; unpublished appendix C) reported similar problem for some 
companies in their sample (e. g. Zywiec). 
X03 The following results are presented in the text but not reported in a separate table. 
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seem to be a consequence of the extremely high negative returns for some outliers. "" 
The difference between average returns for PIPOs and for private sector IPOs was not 
statistically significant. 
The highest average unadjusted PIPO initial returns were achieved in 1993,1996, and 
1998 (Table 3.9). Issues tended to bunch together after the stock market had 
experienced strong returns. For example, there were at least 5 calendar months during 
1991,1994,1995 and 1997 with 5 or more PIPOs. In order to take into account the 
potential problem of clustering we re-calculated the average market-adjusted initial 
returns, taking into account the month and year of listing. The recalculated PIPOs 
average (mean and median) initial returns were 2.09% and 1.03% respectively. The 
result of the two tail t-test and the Wilcoxon tests suggest statistical significance of both 
mean and median returns at 5%. 205 
Table 3.9 about here 
Ritter (1991) advocates the `windows of opportunities' hypothesis according to which 
large cycles in volumes, so-called "hot periods, " suggest that companies attempt to time 
their IPOs. To test for market timing attempts on the part of the Polish government, we 
stratified the PIPO initial returns by years of listing and analysed the persistence of 
returns and numbers of PIPOs. The first order autocorrelations of the annual average 
number of PIPOs and average initial returns for PIPOs are negative (-0.18 and -0.58 
respectively), which suggests that the government was not concerned with the 
persistence of returns and the numbers of PIPOs. A high and positive Pearson's 
correlation coefficient between previous year premium and current year volumes 
suggests that average initial returns for privatisation share issues lead volumes, which 
gives further evidence that Polish government may have attempted to time PIPOs. 206 
20` For example, Mostalexp returns were -98%. The flotations of Polski Bank Rozwoju (PBR), Bank 
Przemislowo-Handlowy (BPH), and Budimex are examples of some less successful offerings in which 
underwriters acquired a substantial number of non-subscribed shares. 
205 We tried an alternative approach where only one PIPO for a given month/year is selected randomly. 
The average (mean) returns were 2.10% and these were significant at a 5% level. 
706 The coefficient was 0.69. 
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Table 3.10, shows unadjusted initial returns and the number of PIPOs stratified by 
industry. The banking, food, and construction sectors, with 9,7, and 5 issues 
respectively, are the most represented sectors among PIPOs, while, in terms of initial 
returns the leading sectors are telecommunications (TPSA), health care, and engineering. 
Table 3.10 about here 
Finally, we calculated the first week average market-adjusted initial returns for Polish 
companies. The returns for PIPOs and IPOs were 1.45% and -1.38% respectively 
(Table 3.11; Panel A), neither of which was statistically significant at any reasonable 
level of significance. Unadjusted returns for PIPOs and IPOs were 0.7% and -2.04% 
respectively (Table 3.11; Panel B). The results of parametric and non-parametric tests 
for difference in means and medians indicate no statistically significant differences 
between average returns (Table 3.11; Panel Q. 
Table 3.11 about here 
The low initial premiums for Polish PIPOs contradict the popular belief that the 
Government sold its `crown jewels' at bargain prices. The offer prices were closely 
scrutinised by the opposition and PIPOs were often the cause of political tensions. 207 
For example, the Government forced a political row over the price fixed for the Bank 
Handlowy privatisation share issue, where the opposition argued that the offer price was 
too low and that the shares would rise by at least 30% on the first trading day. 
Fortunately for the Government, the price rose only by 14 % on the first trading day. 
An additional explanation for the relatively lower initial premiums might be the high 
cost of raising capital in the primary market that Polish government had tried to pass on 
to investors. The cost of privatisation of the first five companies was estimated to be 
about $ 6.7 million, about 8.2% of the market value of the privatised companies in 1991 
(Jermakowiz, 1995: p. 73). The fees for international auditing, accounting and consulting 
firms were also extremely high. The Government's sources suggest that advice on all 
20' Anti-foreign sentiment among members of peasant and nationalist parties was particularly strong and 
even caused delays in some legislation (Jermakowitz, 1995: p. 86). 
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aspects of the privatisation of an average Polish firm with a staff of 1,000, carried out by 
a local firm, would cost PZ 400m ($25,000) in 1993, while foreign advisers would 
normally charge five times more. 208 In addition, the Polish Government conducted 
massive multi-media advertising campaigns and opened share information offices. 
These high transaction costs, together with the relatively high demand for the shares, 
could have resulted in higher offer prices being set by the government and consequently 
lower initial premiums. 209 The high cost of privatisation has affected public opinion 
about the benefits of privatisation, for the percentage of people who thought that 
privatisation was good for the economy dropped from 44% in September 1990 to 28% 
in April 1993. At the same time, the percentage of people who opposed privatisation 
increased from 8% to 28% (CBOS, 1990; 92). 
3.4.2 Short run financial performance of Czech PIPOs 
Unadjusted and market-adjusted initial returns for Czech companies are negative and 
statistically not different from zero (Table 3.12). 2'0 The average unadjusted initial 
returns were highest in 1995 (0.86%). Xaverov is the only outlier in our sample with 
raw initial returns of -50%. 
Table 3.12 about here 
Reported results in Table 3.13 show that Czech listings were bunched together, with 
two privatisation waves in 1993 and 1995. There were, for example, 33 listings in 
October 1993 and 36 listings in March 1995. Due to the extreme clustering of issues we 
repeated calculations of the unadjusted initial returns after classifying PIPOs into 
208 Financial Times, Supplement on Poland, 17 June 1993. 
209 There have also been cases where the total underwriting fee (standard underwriting fee plus a 
commission for placing the order for shares not subscribed by investors) reached 30% of the capital 
raised. The commission part of the fees, however, has been drastically reduced in recent issues. 
210 Due to the late introduction of the PX50 index we were able to calculate market-adjusted returns for 
only 39 companies. 
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portfolios depending on the calendar month and year of listing. The mean and median 
unadjusted returns were positive, 1.14% and 2.03% respectively, and were not 
statistically significant at any reasonable level of significance. "' 
Table 3.13 about here 
Results in Table 3.14 show unadjusted initial returns stratified by the year of listing. 
The highest returns were achieved in the Paper and Packaging, and Telecommunications 
sectors (2.5% and 2.4% respectively). The banking sector, with average returns of - 
1.05%, was one of the worst sectors. The reported low, negative and statistically 
insignificant returns are different from those reported in the other countries. There is 
also a large number of companies with raw initial returns equal to zero (56 companies), 
indicating that there was no change in price during the first trading day. 
Table 3.14 about here 
Comparisons with results in the other countries should be treated with caution due to 
several idiosyncrasies of the Czech primary market and privatisation programme. 
Firstly, the shares of privatised enterprises were introduced directly to the market 
without using of any of contractual forms commonly used in other countries (e. g. best 
effort or firm commitment), and without specified offer prices. Hingorani et al. (1997) 
report a positive relationship between the demand for shares in the first round of the 
mass privatisation programme and stock market prices, which suggests that the bidding 
process might be treated as a way to reveal fair market prices for the privatised 
enterprise which would then be tested in the Stock Exchange 21' The Government, 
however, deliberately mispriced some shares in the later bidding rounds in order to 
speed up privatisation and to ensure consumption of all available voucher points. 
Secondly, trading volumes in the Prague Stock Exchange have been rather low. On the 
supply side, privatisation funds were reluctant to sell accumulated shares, while on the 
211 We repeated the calculations using an alternative method where only one company from each 
portfolio is selected randomly. The average mean returns were 0.81% and not statistically significant. 
212 Hingorani et al. (1997) use RMS stock prices in their study. They also find a positive relationship 
between share demand and the percentage of shares held by insiders. 
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demand side, Czech citizens received shares for free and were reluctant to trade them in 
the market. This, coupled with low levels of disposable income and the fact that the 
majority of trades have occurred outside the official market explains the low trading 
volumes in the Prague Stock Exchange. 
The long gap between the auctions and the listing days is the third reason why results 
for initial returns cannot be interpreted in the usual way. Although a gap between the 
conclusion of bidding and the start of trading is not unusual for public offerings, the six 
month average gap in the case of the Czech Republic is a rather long period during 
which new relevant information about the enterprises might easily emerge. "' The 
absence of any trading prior to July 1993 prevents us from using market volatility data 
to evaluate the effect of this factor upon pricing. 
3.4.3 Short run financial performance of Hungarian PIPOs 
The initial returns of Hungarian new issues are reported in Table 3.15 (Panel A). More 
than 75% of companies in our sample have positive market-adjusted returns. Initial 
returns are predominantly positive, which is consistent with results reported in the IPO 
literature. Average raw initial returns for all companies in our sample are 53% 
(significant at the 5% level). "' Average market-adjusted initial returns are positive 
(11%) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The company with the highest 
market- adjusted initial return is Matav. Z'S 
2' The elapsed time between price setting and the issue date varies from one day (USA) to three months 
(Finland and Italy); Loughram et al. (1994). 
21 For the following eleven companies offer prices are not available and we have had to use the opening 
price on the first trading day as a substitute for the offer price: BA V, BIF, Cofinec, Riziko Factory, Brau 
Union Hungaria, Eravis, Inter-Europa Bank, Kekkuti, Konzum, Masodik Deviza Factory, Demasz. Since 
the majority of the above listed companies are private sector IPOs, their first day average returns may be 
underestimated. For issues with base dates before 1991 it was not possible to calculate market-adjusted 
initial returns since the BSE Index only began on January 2,1991. 
2u Flotation of Matav, the only Hungarian telecommunication company, generated huge interest with 
domestic and foreign investors. The issue was three times oversubscribed which resulted in an initial 
premium of about 635%. 
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Table 3.15 about here 
In Table 3.15; Panel B, returns from PIPOs are compared with those of their private 
sector counterparts. Average unadjusted PIPOs' initial returns are 76% (significantly 
positive at the 5% level), while the market-adjusted initial return is 44% (significantly 
positive at the 6% level). As the distribution of initial returns is not symmetric (skewed 
to the right), the t-statistics must be interpreted with caution. Using non-parametric 
tests for the median we find that both average unadjusted and market-adjusted PIPOs 
returns are significantly different from zero at 1% level of significance. 
Average unadjusted market-adjusted initial returns for private sector IPOs are 28% and 
40% respectively. Although both raw and market-adjusted initial returns for PIPOs are 
higher than initial returns for their private counterparts, both the one-way analysis of 
variance and the Mann-Whitney median test suggest no significant difference in the 
average (mean and median) values of these variables (Table 3.15; Panel C)? '6 Our 
results are thus consistent with Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) who found no significant 
difference between initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs and IPOs. 
Underpricing for PIPOs was greatest in 1997 (Table 3.16). The persistence in number 
of offers and average initial returns during the 1990-98 period, measured by first order 
autocorrelation, was low and negative. "' This indicates that cycles in volume and 
average initial returns do not allow investors to predict next year's volume and initial 
returns by using the current year's number of offers and average initial returns. A 
negative and modest correlation coefficient between current year volumes and previous 
year premiums for PIPOs does not suggest that initial returns lead volume or that the 
Government tried to time issues. "' Consequently, we have found no evidence of 
bunching of PIPOs in the months after the stock market has experienced strong 
216 We also tested the hypothesis of equality of means returns using the two-sample t-test. P values for IR 
and MAIR (0.28% and 0.67%) confirm our previously reported results. 
21 Autocorrelations for the means and volumes of PIPOs were -0.32 and -0.36, respectively, and those 
for private companies IPOs were -0.01 and -0.09, respectively. 
21E The Pearson correlation for PIPOs was negative (-0.58), and that for private companies' IPOs was 
positive (0.48). 
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returns 21' This finding could be supported by the fact that Hungarian government went 
ahead with the flotation of Matav in November 1997, despite the crisis in the emerging 
markets uo 
Table 3.16 about here 
PIPOs of companies in telecommunication, retail and distribution, and the food industry 
lead in terms of initial returns (Table 3.17). The average unadjusted initial returns in 
these sectors were 635%, 318%, and 24% respectively. 
Table 3.17 about here 
As in most other studies on IPOs, outliers appear in the data set. It is common practice 
in the literature to truncate the data so that any observed returns exceeding a certain 
percentage are removed from the sample. The cut-off point for outliers in our sample 
was ± 100%. We found seven companies with initial returns above 100 percent, all of 
which were popular companies with very high demand multipliers. "' After the 
exclusion of the outliers, mean and median market-adjusted returns of the PIPOs 
remained positive at 13% and 5% respectively (Table 3.15; Panel B). The mean returns 
are statistically positive at the 1% level. For private IPOs, however, the mean and 
median market-adjusted initial returns dropped to 3% and the results of both parametric 
and non-parametric tests suggest that the average returns are not statistically significant 
at reasonable levels of significance. The difference in mean and median returns between 
state and private sector IPOs is not statistically significant at 10% level (Table 3.15; 
Panel C). 222 
To check for the robustness of the results, and to take account of potential volatility in 
trading of new shares, the first week returns were also calculated (Table 3.18). The 
average first week PIPOs' and private companies IPOs' market-adjusted returns are 7% 
""Mere were only four calendar months with two PIPOs during 1990-98. 
uo During the four week period prior to the setting of the final offer price most of emerging markets' 
indices lost up to 30%. Consequently, some offerings in Germany, Russia, India, and Croatia were 
cancelled or modified in terms of size and offer price (Faiz, 1998). 
u' Matav, Skala, Nabi, Raba, Novotrade, Gardenia, and Brau Union. 
Result remained the same after exclusion of the outliers. 
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and 1% respectively. ' The PIPOs' mean returns are statistically significant (at the 
10% level), whereas private companies IPOs' mean returns are not. Results of the one- 
way analysis of variance confirm no significant difference in the mean returns. The 
Mann-Whitney test, however, suggests statistically significant difference in median 
returns (at 5% level). 
Table 3.18 about here 
These results are consistent with those reported in Jones et al. (1999) who utilise 
international data and find that PIPOs are, on average, underpriced by approximately 
30% measured by market-adjusted initial returns. Our results, however, indicate a much 
higher underpricing than that reported in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) who found 
positive and significant (at the 5% level) average raw initial and market-adjusted initial 
returns for ten Hungarian privatisation share issues of 14.9% and 14.1% respectively. 
The average unadjusted initial returns for private companies IPOs are also higher than 
those reported for five private companies analysed in Dewenter and Malatesta (28% as 
against 14.9%). Possible reasons for these different results are sample selection and the 
use of a different benchmark for the calculation of the returns. 224 
The highly significant initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs are consistent with findings 
for other markets, though they seem to be relatively higher than those reported 
elsewhere. "' Megginson (1998), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and Jones et al. 
(1999), all find relatively high underpricing in other emerging markets. Dewenter and 
Malatesta attribute this to greater uncertainty regarding the intrinsic values of privatised 
firms (because of uncertainty regarding regulatory policy, fewer security analysts, and 
fewer comparable publicly traded firms). In transition economies, however, problems 
with valuation seem to be common for both privatised and de novo companies. 
Privatised firms, on average, have much longer operating history than de novo private 
companies which suggests that the uncertainty may be even greater in the case of the 
private companies. 
The corresponding median values are 0.3% and -0.8% respectively. 
The adjusted returns in Dewenter and Malatesta were calculated using Morgan Stanley's Europe Index 
instead of the BUX index used in our study. 
I With the exception of Malaysia according to the results reported in Paudyal et al. (1998). 
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The high initial returns in Hungary are consistent with the `signalling' hypothesis where 
governments use underpricing and the percentage of retained ownership to signal their 
commitment to privatisation programmes (Perotti 1995). The underpricing is also 
viewed as reducing the likelihood of re-nationalisation, which contributes to wider 
political support for the privatisation programmes. Finally, the high initial returns may 
be related to relatively low levels of disposable income in Hungary. Consequently, 
domestic investors are likely to demand large risk premiums for equities (Perotti and 
Guney, 1993). 
3.5 Determinants of short run financial performance for PIPOs in transition 
economies 
The evidence on determinants of short-term performance of privately owned company 
IPOs is far from conclusive. Evidence based on US data, gives support to a negative 
relationship between the size of the company of the issue with initial returns (Ritter, 
1984; Ibbotson et al., 1988). Beatty and Ritter (1986) find that riskier issues have 
greater initial returns, thus providing evidence for Rock's (1986) winners' curse model. 
Both Logue (1973) and Franks (1995) suggested a negative relationship between initial 
premiums and the percentage of common stock held by outsiders. Finally, Johnson and 
Miller (1988) found a negative relationship between the level of the underwriter's 
reputation and the degree of IPO underpricing. 
Governments need to make several key decisions with respect to PIPOs, including the 
percentage of shares to be sold, foreign participation, participation of employees, order 
of PIPOs within the privatisation programme, and the regulation domain for the 
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privatised companies 26 These variables are thus relevant to the underlying political 
and economic theories on privatisation. In addition, several variables have been used as 
proxies for uncertainty and/or information asymmetry in the IPO literature, such as 
market volatility before the issue, ex-ante uncertainty related to the company, size of the 
company and the issue, demand multiple, age of the company, and the companies' 
growth potential. " To the best of our knowledge, none of the studies so far have 
attempted to combine these variables to explain the initial premiums for privatisation 
share issues in transition economies. As explained before, public offerings in 
economies in transition are different to those in developed, and to some extent, in other 
developing countries which might result in different factors being relevant to the 
explanation of short-run returns. In this section we discuss the economic justification 
and the conjectured role of various factors that might be relevant to cross-sectional 
variations in returns. The conjectures are then examined within a multivariate 
regression model for pooled size samples of Polish, Czech, and Hungarian PIPOs. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) hypothesise higher underpricing for PIPOs which are 
available exclusively to domestic investors. Hence, PIPOs with foreign participation 
are expected to have lower initial returns. The authors report weak evidence that 
governments underprice PIPOs in which foreigners are not allowed to participate more 
than they do those with foreign participation. "' Menyah and Paudyal (1996) and Ma 
(1998), however, report a positive correlation between percentage of shares sold to 
foreign investors and initial returns. u9 Given the strong opposition to bargain sales of 
`crown jewels' to foreigners and the political sensitivity of this issue in transition 
economies it is reasonable to expect a negative relationship between the degree of 
underpricing and foreign participation: 
C: 3.3 There is a negative relationship between underpricing and foreign participation. 
226 Menyah et al. (1995) list the following key decisions: percentage sold, clawing back shares from 
institutional and overseas investors for sale to retail investors, and regulatory situation of the company. 
227 Other variables used as proxies for uncertainty and/or information asymmetry in the IPO literature are: 
demand multiple, age of the company, size of the issue, growth potential, and industry. 
2" Bivariate analysis provided strong evidence whereas multiple regression analysis provided only weak 
evidence for the conjecture. 
I Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) use a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation is allowed 
and 0 otherwise, whereas Menyah and Paudyal (1996) and Ma (1998) use the percentage of shares sold to 
foreign investors. 
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Due to limited market capacity and great uncertainty with regard to the market valuation 
of PIPOs, governments tend to spread PIPOs across a longer period of time for 
numerous PIPOs within short period of time would swamp the market, depress prices 
and eventually reduce sale proceeds (Valentiny et al., 1992, Perotti and Guney, 1993). 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) suggest that the underpricing can best be avoided by 
establishing traded securities prices by disposing of assets in stages 230 This inevitably 
requires a decision as to what proportion should be offered for sale in the early stages of 
the privatisation and what should be offered later. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) 
hypothesise that in the early stages of a privatisation programme PIPOs may be 
underpriced more heavily due to a government's lack of experience and to limited 
market capacity. The early privatisations are very much experimental and governments 
learn from them. With each PIPO the market is becoming larger and more 
sophisticated, so that later PIPOs may require a lower level of underpricing. Thus a 
negative relationship between the order of the offer within a country's privatisation 
programme and the initial returns is conjectured. A variable for this order is created by 
giving value of one for the first offer, two for the second offer, and so forth. l A 
negative relationship between the order of a PIPO in the privatisation programme and 
its extent of underpricing is thus expected: 
C: 3.4 Early PIPOs are more underpriced than more recent ones. 
As explained in chapter 2, employees and managers have played an important role in 
privatisation programmes across CEECs. For the governments in these countries 
employee support for the privatisation programmes was essential. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to expect that the governments used underpricing and other measures to 
secure support of the employees for privatisation. Hence, a positive relationship 
between underpricing and employees' participation is conjectured. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997) found weak evidence for this hypothesis using a large international 
sample of PIPOs whereas Ma (1998) report a significant positive correlation between 
?° Menyah et al. (1995), and Menyah and Paudal (1996) report that results for UK privatisation are 
consistent with both the limited market capacity and risk of mispricing propositions. 
11 This variable is created in the same fashion as one used in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). 
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initial returns and the percentage of shares sold to employees232 The following 
conjecture regarding employee's participation in privatisations is tested: 
C: 3.5 There is a positive relationship between underpricing and employees' 
participation in PIPOs. 
The next conjecture relates to the proportion of shares in privatised companies retained 
by the state. Perotti and Guney (1993) and Perotti (1995) explain partial sales and 
underpricing as the result of a government's signalling of its commitment to current 
policy by retaining a stake in the firm for some time (while transferring managerial 
control) thus showing a willingness to bear some of the financial costs of policy 
changes. Committed governments will have higher underpricing and a lower 
percentage of shares sold. 233 Governments would normally use the percentage of shares 
sold for signalling and underpricing would occur only when the optimal percentage to 
be sold is low. Therefore underpricing tends to be negatively related to percentage 
sold. The empirical evidence on the relationship between initial returns and percentage 
sold is inconclusive. Menyah and Paudyal (1996), Menyah et al. (1995) found a 
negative, but not significant, relationship between initial returns and the percentage of 
shares sold for the UK privatisation share issues. Paudyal et al. (1998) report a positive 
and significant relationship between initial returns and the percentage of shares sold for 
a sample of 18 Malaysian PIPOs. Similarly, Mok and Hui (1998) find a positive 
relationship between initial returns and the proportion of shares sold in China. 
Studies based on comparative international data also provide mixed evidence. Ma 
(1998) report only weak evidence, while Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) found no 
evidence for the conjecture. Jones et al. (1999) found strong support for the conjecture 
and reported that underpricing is more likely to be used in countries with greater income 
inequality and where there is a stronger need for political support for privatisation 
programmes. We, therefore, test the following conjecture about relationship between the 
percentage of shares sold and initial returns: 
Ma (1998) use Dewenter and Malatesta's PIPOs sample and in addition includes data for Taiwan. 
Grinblatt and Huang (1989) discuss similar signalling devices in the context of privately owned IPOs. 
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C: 3.6 Percentage of shares sold is negatively related to initial returns. 
In new and relatively volatile CEEC capital markets, advisors are likely to suggest a 
conservative offer price so that the intrinsic value of the shares would not fall below the 
offer price even if the market drops substantially. As a result, we hypothesise that the 
market condition observed at the time of price setting will play an important role in the 
pricing of both private IPOs and PIPOs. There is an additional, political, reason for 
conservative price fixing, in that if the offer price is too high the risk that some of the 
shares will not be taken is much higher. This would slow down the privatisation 
programme and increase the risk of re-nationalisation. "' The following conjecture is 
tested: 
C: 3.7 There is a positive relationship between market volatility before the issue and 
PIPO initial returns. 
Large companies have normally a long operating history and are generally well known 
to investors. They also tend to spend more on the provision and disclosure of relevant 
information to investors. According to signalling theory, initial returns for large 
enterprises should be smaller due to their lower information asymmetry. Jones et al. 
(1999), however, report evidence that returns in privatisation share issues are not driven 
by asymmetric information between issuers and investors regarding a company's 
quality. Similar findings, which are different from those reported for privately owned 
company IPOs, are reported in Ibbotson and Ritter (1995). They find that in both Japan 
and the UK the largest PIPOs were more underpriced than other IPOs. 'S 
All transition economies inherited large enterprises from the socialist system and, 
although some of these had been broken up before privatisation, the majority remained 
large with a dominant position in local markets. The privatisation of these enterprises is 
a real political test for the governments, for, due to the significant contribution of these 
Z" It is argued that new shares in the British privatisation issues were systematically underpriced because 
of political reasons (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
"For the 36 British PIPOs the average initial return was 41%. The returns for largest companies such as 
British Airways, and British Steel were among the highest. The market price for the privatised Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone in Japan jumped two and a half times from the level of the offer price within 
three months of flotation (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). 
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companies to GDP and the huge number of their current and past employees, there is a 
strong feeling that the majority of the population should benefit from their privatisation. 
If successful, these PIPOs would guarantee the participation of large number of 
investors and secure political support for the privatisation programme. They would also 
significantly increase the market capitalisation of the stock exchange. A failure, on the 
other hand, would deal a serious blow to the privatisation programme and to the 
government. "6 It is thus unlikely that any of the governments in transition economies 
would risk the success of the privatisation of their biggest companies (Megginson et al., 
1998a). We conjecture a positive relationship between size and initial returns: 
C. 3.8 Initial returns are higher for larger companies. 
Perroti (1995) argues that companies from regulated industries (banks, 
telecommunications, gas, water, electricity, and other utilities) are more greatly exposed 
to policy risk due to the threat of changes in regulation. Consequently, they are more 
susceptible to the appropriation of monopoly rents by government. This higher policy 
risk should lead to a higher premium being required by investors. Perotti (1995) found 
that firms in policy sensitive sectors tend to be privatised with smaller initial sales and 
larger underpricing. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Menyah and Paudyal (1996), and 
Menyah et al. (1995) all found strong evidence for higher underpricing of PIPOs from 
regulated industries. The following conjecture is tested: 
C: 3.9 Initial returns for PIPOs in regulated industries are higher than initial returns 
in competitive industries. 
Valentiny et al. (1992) identify presentational, institutional, economic, and accounting 
factors as the variables that affect the valuation process regardless of techniques used. 
All of these factors are found in transition economies. Firstly, political and economic 
risks in the transition towards a market economy are significant. For example, countries 
in transition faced the task of shifting from Eastern European markets to world markets 
in a matter of months. Secondly, accounting and financial disclosure is in its infancy so 
216 For example, the offer price for Telekomunikacija Polska in November 1998, was set at a conservative 
level, giving a market value of U$7.4bn instead of the U$10. Obn estimated before emerging markets 
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there is a lack of information about companies. 237 Even in countries with strict 
regulation regarding disclosure, there is a genuine problem of how to transform 
accounting categories from one system to another. The lack of qualified accountants 
and security analysts exacerbates the problem. Finally, the small number of listed 
companies does not provide sufficient benchmarks for comparison with offering firms 
(Dewenter and Malatesta 1997). Consequently, uncertainty about intrinsic values of the 
companies is probably greater in transitional than in developed market economies. This 
suggests that ex-ante uncertainty may be an important determinant of underpricing in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Ex ante risk is proxied by the standard 
deviation of daily returns of all public offerings 252 trading days after listing and tested 
by the following conjecture'" 
C: 3.10 There is a positive relationship between initial returns and ex ante risk 
Conjectures 3 through 10 are tested first using bivariate analysis and then by testing 
various specifications of the following multiple regression model with market-adjusted 
initial returns as a dependent variable: 
MAIR i= ap + /31 MVi + ß2 INDUSTRYi +, 83 ORDER1 + /4 EX ANTEi (equation 3.3) 
+ X35 MVOLATILITYi + X36 SOLDi +, 87 FOREIGNi + /3 INSIDERSi + Ei 
3.6 Results of the regression model for the pooled size samples 
The results of bivariate analysis of market-adjusted returns and explanatory variables 
confirm the conjectured signs for all variables except for the order of PIPOs within the 
privatisation programme, ex-ante risk, and market volatility before issues (Table 3.19). 
became volatile. 
117 For more on accounting and valuation in transition economies see UN (1993). 
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The correlation is significant only between market-adjusted initial returns and market 
value at the 1% level. It must be stressed that the correlation coefficients cannot 
determine which variable actually causes the other. The coefficients do, however, 
suggest the strength and the direction of the relationship between pairs of variables. 
Table 3.19 about here 
Before testing the conjectures by the multiple regression model we analyse a correlation 
matrix of explanatory variables. The correlation matrix is based on Pearson's 
correlation and missing cases were deleted on a listwise basis (Table 3.20). The modest 
correlation coefficients for market capitalisation, order of the PIPOs, and percentage 
sold provide weak evidence that governments tend to privatise larger companies in the 
later stages of the programmes and to sell a lower percentage of shares in large 
companies. " The correlation coefficients also suggest that governments tend to sell a 
higher percentage of shares in the early stage of the programmes, in issues with foreign 
and employee participation, and in companies with higher ex-ante risk. 240 Finally, 
employee participation tends to be higher in early issues and in issues with foreign 
participation. 2a' 
Table 3.20 about here 
Various diagnostic tests were employed to assess whether the independent variables are 
too highly related to each other. As shown in the correlation matrix in Table 3.20, the 
Pearson's correlations between each pair of explanatory variables does not exceed 0.6. 
Only correlations in excess of 0.8 are deemed to provide evidence of serious 
multicolinearity (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). None of the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) is in excess of 3.8. Only VIFs in excess of 10 are deemed to show evidence of 
significant multicolinearity (Neter et al., 1989 as cited in Firth, 1997). Finally, the 
multiple correlation is low and the tolerance is high in all regressions, which suggests 
28 The same measure of ex ante risk was used in Ritter (1984), and Paudyal et al. (1998). 
Relevant Pearsons' correlation coefficients were 0.454 and -0.479 respectively. 
2°0 Relevant Pearson's' correlation coefficients were -0.436,0.575,0.553, and 0.492 respectively. 
241 Relevant Pearson's' correlation coefficients were -0.468 and 0.402 respectively. 
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that the explanatory variables do not appear to be severely affected by collinearity 
problems. 
The results for the various specifications of the multiple regression model based on 
White's heteroscedasticity adjusted coefficients' standard errors are shown in Table 
3.21 242 In regressions 2,6 and 7a moderate fit is observed with RZ ranging from 25.5% 
to 28.3%. Regressions 3,4, and 5 explain as much as 35.1%, 38.3%, and 39.4% of the 
initial return variance respectively. The majority of the variables have their expected 
signs and are statistically significant in at least one of the regressions. Regression 
coefficients maintain their signs in all regressions suggesting a stable relationship 
between initial returns and explanatory variables. 2a' 
Table 3.21 about here 
We find evidence that privatisation initial returns for larger firms tend to exceed those in 
smaller firms (significant at 10% level). We also find evidence that governments tend 
to underprice more in early stages of privatisation, more volatile market conditions and 
in regulated industries (all significant at 10% level). Finally, we find evidence for 
conjecture 3 which argues that PIPOs with foreign participation, on average, tend to be 
less underpriced than PIPOs offered exclusively to domestic investors (significant at 
10% level). 
An expected negative (but not significant) relationship was found between the 
percentage of shares sold and initial returns in regression 3.244 'In common with 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Mok and Hui (1998), however, we found a positive 
relationship between the percentage of shares sold and initial returns in regressions with 
insiders and foreign participation. Mok and Hui (1998) explain the positive relationship 
with the importance of political backing for Chinese companies. They hypothesise that 
investors see high government equity retention's as a guarantee which reduces ex ante 
risk. This hypothesis is consistent with a popular view in CEECs that governments 
242 White (1980). 
" The only exception is percentage sold in regression 3. 
244 This, however, is consistent with findings of Menyah and Paudyal (1996) and Ma (1998) where a 
negative (although not significant) relationship between percentage sold and initial return is reported. 
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retain higher proportions of shares in best companies and that these companies tend to 
have political backing. Consequently, PIPOs with higher percentage of ownership 
retained by governments might have lower underpricing. 
A possible explanation for the unexpected negative (and significant) coefficients for the 
INSIDER variable may be related to a highly concentrated ownership in companies with 
foreign investors and participation of employees. Pound (1988) proposed the strategic- 
alignment hypothesis according to which management and foreigners may form an 
alliance at the expense of shareholders at large. This is more likely in Eastern European 
privatisations since foreigners could not easily acquired stakes without the support of 
workers and management. Higher percentages of foreign and insider ownership, in this 
context, would indicate a greater likelihood for an alliance and may result in lower 
underpricing by the government. 
The coefficients for the EX ANTE risk variable are significant but with an unexpected 
negative sign. A possible reason may be the use of standard deviation of aftermarket 
daily prices as a proxy for the risk. It is well documented in the finance literature that 
standard deviation of prices could be affected by frequency of trading (MacKinley and 
Ramaswamy, 1988). In emerging capital markets in transition economies, dominated 
by large privatised companies, this would imply that the most liquid stocks have a 
higher than average standard deviation of daily prices. 
105 
3.7 Conclusions 
Overall, we find evidence for a general tendency for governments in CEECs to 
underprice PIPOs, but not to a greater degree than their counterparts in the private 
sector. For example, the average market-adjusted initial returns for Polish PIPOs and 
private sector IPOs are 1.16% and 0.22% respectively. About 75% of the PIPOs and 
56% of the private sector IPOs have positive initial returns. The difference in the 
market-adjusted initial returns between PIPOs and private sector IPOs is, however, not 
statistically significant. The highest average initial returns were found for PIPOs in 
telecommunication, health care, and engineering sectors. The highest average initial 
returns were found in 1993,1996, and 1998. A high and positive Pearson's correlation 
coefficient between the previous year's premium and current year volume suggests that 
Polish government may have attempted to time PIPOs. 
Czech privatised companies were introduced to the PSE with an average gap of six 
months. Our findings for negative average initial returns should be, therefore, treated 
cautiously. After accounting for severe clustering, however, the initial returns became 
positive, but not significant at any reasonable level of significance. 
Average market-adjusted initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs are positive (44%) with 
highest returns in telecommunication, retail, and the food industry. The positive initial 
returns are statistically significant (at 10% level) and much higher than those reported in 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). Average market-adjusted initial returns for private 
sector IPOs are positive (40%) and statistically significant at a 5% level. No significant 
difference was found between average initial returns for PIPOs and private sector IPOs. 
The results are quite robust, as has been confirmed by the calculation of initial returns 
after exclusion of outliers. The difference in average first week median returns for 
PIPOs and private sector IPOs, however, is significant at a 5% level. We found no 
evidence that Hungarian government have attempted to time PIPOs. 
The various multiple regression models with market-adjusted initial returns as 
dependent variable show a moderate to high fit. Regressions 3,4, and 5 explain as much 
as 35.1%, 38.3%, and 39.4% of the initial return variance respectively. The majority of 
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the variables have their expected signs and are statistically significant in at least one of 
the regressions. Regression coefficients maintain their signs in all regressions and 
suggest that governments tend, on average, to underprice to a greater extent the PIPOs 
of large companies, those in the early stages of privatisation programmes, and those 
offered during more volatile market conditions. Overall, our results are consistent with 
those reported in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Jones et al. (1999) and give 
support for the conjectures motivated by underlying political factors within the context 
of transition economies. 
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Chapter 4 
LONG RUN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF PIPOs IN TRANSITION 
ECONOAIIES 
4.1 Summary of conjectures on the long run financial performance of PIPOs 
Following upon the findings of the theoretical and empirical literature summarised in 
chapter one we develop a series of conjectures regarding positive long term returns of 
newly privatised enterprises in transition economies. These positive returns are 
expected as a result of the above-average potential of the enterprises as they change 
ownership and adapt to hard budget constraint and market discipline. This conjecture is 
also consistent with the argument that governments that governments might choose to 
offer the most profitable enterprises in PIPOs and sell them on the cheap in order to 
secure wider support for the privatisation programmes. The governments prefer their 
PIPOs to have positive long term returns in order to attract investors to further issues 
and promote the privatisation programmes (Megginson et a1., 1998a). The managers of 
private sector IPOs are less concerned about whether investors would earned 
abnormally high positive long-term returns by investing in their companies' shares 
(Myers and Majlul 1984). This leads us to expect that PIPOs are likely to outperform 
private sector IPOs in the long run. The following conjectures regarding the long run 
performance of PIPOs in transition economies are tested: 
C: 4.1 PIPOs have positive longterm returns. 
C. 4.2 PIPOs outperform private sector IPOs in the long run. 
4.2 Data and methodology 
We identify PIPOs from various issues of the Privatisation International. Data on 
percentage of shares sold, and foreign participation was obtained from the financial 
press, Privatisation Yearbooks, and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997; unpublished 
appendix A). Daily stock prices, daily values for various national stock indices, daily 
The Financial Performance of Privatised Firms 108 
values for the Global Europe Index, companies industry classification codes, and 
companies market values, are extracted from the Datastream database. For some stocks, 
however, Datastream coverage commences a couple of weeks after their issue dates. In 
such cases we obtain missing price data directly from local stock exchanges and fill in 
the gaps in price data series. 245 Finally, the daily values of IFC Investable Eastern 
European Index are obtained from International Finance Corporation's Emerging 
Markets Database. 
Long-term post-issue performance is examined by analysing cumulative abnormal 
returns and market-adjusted compounded returns from a buy and hold strategy. The 
benchmark used is a relevant local Market Index. The market-adjusted returns are 
calculated for each event month t as, 
arit = rit - rmt equation 4.1 
where r1, is the return of company `i' in event month `t'; rmt is the return on the market 
index in event month `t' and ar;, is the market-adjusted return for company `i' in event 
month T. Each month consists of 21 trading days 246 The average market-adjusted 
return for a sample of n companies in event month `t' is defined as 
AR, =1 ari, equation 4.2 
n ; _, 
The cumulative market-adjusted long-run performance over T months starting from 
month t, is the summation of the average market-adjusted returns: 
T 
CARS T= ARt equation 4.3 
r=w 
245 We were, however, unable to fill in all gaps in price data series and these cases are noted in our tables 
with results. Megginson et al. (1998a) address the same problem by eliminating all issues with the first 
price in Datastream no later than sixty days after the issue date provided in the Privatisation International 
file. They, however, find that Datastream coverage commences within three weeks of the issue date in 
over 80% of all cases in his international sample from 36 different countries. 
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It has been suggested in the literature that cumulative abnormal returns can lead to 
incorrect inferences when used for time periods longer than one year (Barber and Lyon, 
1996). We have, therefore, calculated buy-and-hold compounded abnormal returns as 
an alternative measure for long-run performance: 
TT 
Ru = fl(1+r", )-Vf (1+r., ) equation 4.4 
where R;, is the abnormal return of company i in event month t calculated on a 
compounded basis, r;, is the return for company i in event month t, and rmt is the return 
on market index in event month t. 
The cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns are calculated using the 
second trading day market price. This is a very conservative measure of the long run 
returns earned by investors who acquired shares at the offer price. On the other hand, 
we do not adjust for the fact that in Poland and Hungary investors were allowed to buy 
shares on an instalment plan, which would inflate the long-term return. 247 
We measure long term returns for three different groups of investors: domestic, foreign 
investing in European companies, and foreign investing in emerging Eastern European 
markets. For domestic investors the benchmark returns are local currency returns 
achieved by investing in the national market indices. For foreign investors investing in 
European companies the benchmark is the return achieved by investing an equivalent 
amount of US dollars in the Datastream Europe Index. The Datastream Europe Index is 
a global index in US dollars, which includes most European markets with January 1, 
1973 as the base date. 248 For foreign investors investing in companies in the emerging 
markets of Eastern Europe, the benchmark is the US dollar return that they would have 
206 For example, the first trading month is from day 2 to day 22, the second month comprises trading 
days from day 23 to 43 etc. 
Z" The instalment plans are also available in some other countries (e. g. UK). Megginson et al. (1998a) 
use the Datastream Return Index, which shows a theoretical growth in value of share holding over a 
specified period assuming that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of an equity at the 
closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date, and accounts for the instalment plans. Unfortunately, 
the Datastream Return Index is not available for Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague market indices. 
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earned by investing in a Eastern European market portfolio proxied by the IFC 
Investable Eastern European Index. 24' The IFC Investable Eastern European Index is in 
US dollars and includes markets from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
and Slovakia. '" We compare returns on the international indices with company returns 
calculated using share prices in both local currencies and US dollars. By doing this we 
account for an existence of any `paper profits' due to changes in exchange rates between 
local currencies and US dollars. The international indices provide a benchmark 
consistent across national boundaries and eliminate the inconsistencies caused by the 
differing methodologies used in the construction of locally produced indexes. Finally, 
by using international indices we overcome problems where local firms are included in 
local value-weighted indices, and when index firms are much larger than the sample 
IPO firms (Aussenegg, 1996)251 
If PIPOs and their listings tend to be clustered together in a calendar month after the 
stock market has experienced strong returns, t-statistic may be overstated due to lack of 
independence in the monthly abnormal returns (Ibbotson, 1975). In order to take 
account of the `clustering' problem we follow the approach used in Firth (1997). PIPOs 
are classified into portfolios depending on the calendar month and the year of listing; 
the abnormal returns are then calculated based on the portfolio returns rather than on 
returns for individual companies and the average abnormal returns for the portfolios are 
then averaged for trading months one to thirty-six 252 
" The index's constituents are: United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Turkey. 
249 Due to the late starting point of the IFC index (in January 1996), these calculations were only possible 
for 6 Hungarian and 21 Polish PIPOs which came to the market at the beginning of 1996. 
1 Dates of inclusion in the index are January 1996 for the Czech Republic, April 1994 for Hungary and 
Poland, and November 1997 for Russia and Slovakia. 
u' We were not able to calculate wealth relatives based on a sample of matching firms due to a small 
number of listed companies available for matching, in terms of industry and/or market value, with 
companies from our sample. 
u2 To check for the robustness of our results we also apply an alternative approach where we choose 
randomly only one PIPO for a given month/year and then calculate the average abnormal returns for 
various trading months. 
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4.3 Long run financial performance of Polish PIPOs 
4.3.1 The returns for domestic investors 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for Polish PIPOs up to 3 years 
after the listing are reported in Table 4.1. There are more companies with negative than 
with positive abnormal returns in all but four holding periods. 25' The average abnormal 
returns are predominantly negative (but not statistically significant). The cumulative 
abnormal returns are positive (but not statistically significant) in seven holding periods 
up to one year. In all other holding periods the returns are negative (but not statistically 
significant). 
Table 4.1 about here 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are re-calculated to deal with 
the problem of clustering. The results reported in Table 4.2 confirm our earlier findings 
for negative average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Results on the long-term returns for some privatised companies up to one month after 
the listing were affected by price restrictions imposed by the WSE. For example, stock 
prices of Tonsil, Krosno, Prochnik, and Sokolow were prevented from falling with the 
market for between one week and one month after listing. "" This is similar to tolerated 
intervention by investment bankers in the IPO market in some countries. "' However, 
Polish authorities imposed price limits on both `excessive' downward and `excessive' 
upward movements in aftermarket prices. For example, in the case of Exbud and 
Rafako stock prices were prevented from moving up one month after listing. 
Interestingly, the stock price for Slaski was prevented from moving down one week 
' In three trading months there is an equal number of companies with positive and negative abnormal 
returns. 
u` The list of the companies with price limitations is taken from Dewenter and Malatesta (1997; 
unpublished appendix C). 
us For example, the Security and Exchange Commission in the US allows price stabilisation by 
investment bankers in the case of downward price movements in the IPO aftermarket. Results reported 
in Ruud (1993) provide evidence for the hypothesis that positive average initial returns may result from 
these interventions. 
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after the listing, though one month after the listing its price was prevented from moving 
up. 
Table 4.2 about here 
The private sector IPOs average abnormal returns are predominantly negative. There 
are more companies with negative than with positive abnormal returns in all but two 
trading months. The average abnormal returns are statistically significant at, 5% level 
or better, in months 2,11,20,25, and 36. The cumulative abnormal returns are negative 
and statistically significant, at 5% level or better, in all but seven trading months (Table 
4.3) 256 
Table 4.3 about here 
The cumulative abnormal returns for state and private sector IPOs compared in Figure 
4.1 suggest that PIPOs outperformed private sector IPOs. 
Figure 4.1 about here 
The more rigorous comparison is made in Table 4.4., where the results of a two sample 
t-test and the Mann-Whitney test for difference in average (mean and median) returns 
show a statistically significant difference only in two trading months, 2 and 36. 
Table 4.4. about here 
Table 4.5, shows that buy-and-hold returns for PIPOs are positive in all periods except 
for 3 weeks, 1 month, 18 months and 36 months after the listing. Private sector IPOs 
are predominantly negative and statistically significant in months 3 and 36. Our results 
are consistent with those for 19 Polish PIPOs reported in Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997) who report positive and significant market-adjusted initial returns for seven and 
thirty days after listing (46.7% and 42.9%). Raw returns for seven days after listing are 
'56 The months in which returns are not statistically significant are 1,2,4,5,6,8 and 10. 
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52.7%, which is significant at 1% level (one tail test), while those for thirty days after 
listing are 48.8 %, which is significant at 1% (one tail test). "' 
Table 4.5 about here 
PIPOs outperformed private sector IPOs in all months except in month 18 (Figure 4.2). 
The difference in average (mean and median) buy-and-hold returns, however, is 
statistically significant only in months 2 and 3 (at 10% significance level or better). 
Figure 4.2 about here 
4.3.2 The returns for foreign investors 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated for foreign 
investors using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark (Table 4.6; Panel A). 
There are more companies with positive than negative abnormal returns in 17 months. 
The average abnormal returns are predominantly positive but statistically significant 
only in months 2,10,17,22, and 24.258 The cumulative abnormal returns are positive in 
all months except in month 1. The returns are highly statistically significant in all 
months from month 18 up to month 36 (at 5% level of significance or better). 
Table 4.6 about here 
Re-calculated average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns on private sector 
IPOs' are predominantly negative (Table 4.6; Panel B). The average abnormal returns 
are negative in 24 months and statistically significant (at 5% level of significance or 
better) in months 2,11,12, and 25. The cumulative abnormal returns are negative in all 
I However, the returns reported in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) are not buy-and-hold returns, but are 
end of period returns calculated as: log (stock closing price) - log (stock offer price), while the market- 
adjusted return equals unadjusted return - (log (market index at closing date) - log (market index at 
pricing date)). 
258 The returns were negative in months 1,5,9,11, and 31. 
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months and statistically significant in all but 4 months (at 5% level of significance or 
better). 
The cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in PIPOs are compared 
with cumulative abnormal returns for corresponding private sector IPOs in Table 4.7. 
The returns from PIPOs outperform private sector IPOs returns in all months, and the 
difference in average (mean) cumulative abnormal returns is statistically significant in 
months 2,6,12,24 and 36 (at 10% significance level or better). 
Table 4.7 about here 
The average buy-and-hold returns for international investors are reported in Table 4.8. 
The Polish privatised companies outperform the Europe Index in all periods except 3 
weeks and 1 month after the listing. The average buy-and-hold returns are positive and 
significant in months, 18,24,30 and 36 (at 10% significance level or better). The returns 
are particularly high in months 24,30 and 36 (323%, 402%, and 530%, respectively). 
The private sector IPOs outperformed the Europe Index in months 6,18,24,30 and 36, 
while PIPOs outperformed private sector IPOs in all aftermarket months. The 
difference in the mean buy-and-hold MACRs is statistically significant in months 2,30, 
and 36 (at 10% level of significance or better). The difference in the median buy-and- 
hold MACRs is statistically significant in all months from month 12 up to month 36 (at 
10% level or better). 
Table 4.8 about here 
We also calculated returns for international investors using US$ prices of the shares 
listed on the WSE, and use these in comparisons with the returns achieved by 
international investors investing in European companies. The dollar cumulative 
abnormal and buy-and-hold returns are similar to the local currency returns 259 PIPOs' 
cumulative abnormal returns, for example, outperformed private sector IPOs' 
u' For example, both PIPOs dollar cumulative abnormal and buy-and-hold returns are predominantly 
positive. The dollar buy-and-hold returns are statistically significant (at 10% level or better) from month 
18 up to month 36. The dollar cumulative abnormal returns are statistically positive (at 5% or better) in 
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cumulative abnormal returns in all months 260 These results are consistent with 
Megginson et al. (1998a) who find no evidence that the currency factor contributes to 
significant differences in computation of long-term returns for his international sample 
of PIPOs from 36 different countries. 
4.4 Long run financial performance of Czech privatised enterprises 
4.4.1 The returns for domestic investors 
The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.3, show average abnormal and cumulative 
abnormal returns, excluding first day returns, for Czech privatised companies during the 
period of 36 months after listings. The number of companies with negative abnormal 
returns is bigger than the number of companies with positive abnormal returns in all 
months. The average abnormal returns are positive in 19 out of 36 months. They are, 
however, significant (at 5% significance level or better) in months 6,7,15,18, and 31. 
The cumulative abnormal returns are predominantly negative and are statistically 
significant (at 5% level or better) only in first four months after listing 26' 
Table 4.9 about here 
Figure 4.3 about here 
There is strong clustering due to two privatisation waves in 1993 and 1995. Repeated 
calculations accounting for the clustering show negative cumulative abnormal returns 
all months from month 26 up to month 36. The private sector IPOs dollar returns remained 
predominantly negative. 
260 The difference in mean cumulative abnormal returns is statistically significant in months 2,12,24, 
and 36 (at 10% level or better). The PIPOs dollar buy-and-hold returns outperform dollar private sector 
IPOs returns in all but month 1. 
261 The cumulative abnormal returns are positive, but not statistically significant, in months 7,10, 
18,19,20,21, and 33. 
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between months 25 and 36, none of which are statistically significant at a reasonable 
level of significance (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 about here 
The buy-and-hold returns are negative in all months from month 3 up to month 36 
(Table 4.11 and Figure 4.4) and are statistically significant at 5% or better in all months 
except in months 2 and 12. 
Table 4.11 about here 
Figure 4.4 about here 
4.4.2 The returns for foreign investors 
We have repeated calculations of cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns 
using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark (Table 4.12). The number of 
companies with positive abnormal returns increased resulting in a bigger number of 
companies with positive than negative returns in 10 months, and positive average 
abnormal returns in 17 months Z62 The cumulative abnormal returns remain negative in 
all but month seven, and were statistically significant in months 1,2,3,4,11,36 (at 5% 
level or better). 
Table 4.12 about here 
The buy-and-hold returns calculated against the Europe Index are negative in all months 
except month 18, and were statistically significant (at 5% level or better) in months 
1,2,3,12,30 and 36 (Table 4.13). The results suggest that the Czech companies 
underperform a portfolio of European companies during the 3-year period after listings. 
Table 4.13 about here 
262 The returns are significant in months 6,15, and 31 (at 5% level or better). 
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In order to check for the robustness of the results we repeated calculation of average 
abnormal, cumulative abnormal, and buy-and-hold returns using US$ prices of shares 
listed in the PSE, and use these in comparisons with the returns achieved by 
international investors investing in European companies. The returns remain very 
similar to the local currency returns and confirm our earlier findings of poor long-term 
financial performance of newly privatised companies in the Czech Republic. "' 
4.5 Long run financial performance of Hungarian PIPOs 
4.5.1 The returns for domestic investors 
Results reported in Table 4.14 show the average abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
market-adjusted returns for Hungarian PIPOs. The cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive in all but trading month 4, and are statistically significant in months 15 and 16 
(at 5% level or better). 
Table 4.14 about here 
The private sector cumulative abnormal returns are negative in all trading months, but 
are statistically significant only (at 5% level or better) in months 13,27,28,29, and 30 
(Table 4.15). 
Table 4.15 about here 
The results for cumulative abnormal returns for state and private sector IPOs are 
compared in Table 4.16 and Figure 4.5. The results of the t-test show statistically 
significant differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns in months 12 and 30.21' 
This is confirmed by the results for the Man-Whitney test for the difference in median 
Z63 Overall results do not change except for the level of statistical significance in certain months. The 
dollar returns are not reported in a separate table, and results are available upon request. 
264 The level of significance is 6% for month twelve and 2% for month thirty. 
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cumulative abnormal returns, which show a statistically significant difference in months 
12,24, and 30.265 
Table 4.16 about here 
Figure 4.5 about here 
In Table 4.17 the buy-and-hold returns for PIPOs are compared with those for private 
sector IPOs for up to three years after listing (see also Figure 4.6). Average buy-and- 
hold returns for PIPOs are positive in all trading months except during first month, and 
in month 3, but are not statistically significant at any reasonable level of significance. 
Average buy-and-hold returns for private IPOs are negative in all periods and are 
statistically significant (at 10% level or better) in all periods except between 3 weeks 
and 12 months after listing. PIPOs outperform private IPOs in all periods and the 
difference between median buy-and-hold returns is statistically significant (at 5% or 
better) in months 1,2,12,18,24,30, and 36. 
Table 4.17 about here 
Figure 4.6 about here 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) report positive and significant (at the 5% level) average 
raw and market-adjusted returns seven days after listing for ten Hungarian privatised 
companies. Although average raw initial returns remain positive and significant 30 
days after the listing, market-adjusted initial returns are negative (-5.3%) and not 
significant. 
4.5.2 The returns for foreign investors 
We also measure the cumulative abnormal returns earned by international investors in 
European stocks using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark. Results in Table 
4.18; Panel A) show predominantly positive and statistically significant average 
265 The levels of significance are 10%, 9%, and 7% respectively. 
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abnormal returns for Hungarian PIPOs. These are statistically significant (at 5% level 
or better) in months 15,20,28,30, and 33. 
The cumulative abnormal returns are positive in all months and are statistically 
significant (at 5% level or better) in month 1 and in all months between 13 and 36. 
Hungarian private sector IPOs have positive (but not statistically significant) average 
cumulative abnormal returns in months 1,2,3,4,32,33,34,35, and 36 (Table 4.18; Panel 
B). The returns in all other holding periods, however, are negative and statistically 
significant in months 11 to 18. 
Table 4.18 about here 
The results for differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns between PIPOs and 
private sector IPOs suggest statistically significant difference in months 6 and 30 at a 
10% level of significance of better (Table 4.19). 
Table 4.19 about here 
Holding period average buy-and-hold returns based on the Datastream Europe Index for 
PIPOs and private sector IPOs are presented in Table 4.20. PIPO returns are positive in 
all months and significant in all months from month 3 to month 36 at a 5% level of 
significance or better. The long term returns on private sector IPOs are not persistent, 
being positive in months 1,2,3, and 36 but negative and statistically significant in 
months 12 and 18 (at 10% level or better). PIPOs outperform private sector IPOs in all 
months, with the difference in mean returns statistically significant (at 10% level or 
better) in months 12,18,24,30, and 36266 
Table 4.20 about here 
We also calculated returns for international investors using US$ prices of the shares 
listed on the BSE, and use these in comparisons with the returns achieved by foreign 
z66 The difference in median returns is statistically significant at 5% level or better, in months 12,18,24, 
and 30. 
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investors in European companies. Again, the dollar average abnormal, cumulative 
abnormal, and buy-and-hold returns remain similar to the estimated returns in local 
currency. 26' 
4.6 The returns for foreign investors in emerging markets in Eastern Europe 
In order to check robustness of our results and to allow for a limited access to certain 
shares by foreign investors due to state-holdings and crossownership we repeated 
computations of average abnormal, cumulative abnormal, and buy-and-hold returns up 
to 3 years after listing using IFC Eastern European Index. The IFC Investable Eastern 
European Index is based on a sample of stocks from Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Russia. The data in local currencies is converted into US 
dollars in the calculation of the index, which is capitalisation based (value weighted) 
and incorporates total returns (including dividends). "' It is also adjusted to reflect the 
accessibility of markets and individual shares for foreign investors, so that adjustments 
are made for foreign limits, cross-holdings, and the extent of government ownership. 
Consequently, the market capitalisation for each constituency is considered net of 
government owned portions and cross-holdings, and is adjusted for limits placed upon 
foreign ownership. 26' For this computation both local prices and the IFC index values 
are in US$ dollars. Since the IFC index started in January 1996, the computation was 
possible for 6 Hungarian and 21 Polish PIPOs. 
The results reported in Tables 4.21 confirm our previous findings. There are more 
PIPOs with positive than negative abnormal returns in all months after listing. The 
average abnormal returns are predominantly positive and statistically significant (at 5% 
Z6' Overall results do not change except for the level of statistical significance in certain months. The 
dollar returns are not reported in a separate table, and results are available upon request. 
268 Total cash dividends received by constituents, during the period are added to the adjusted market 
capitalisation of the index at each period; IFC (1998: p. 8). 
26' For example, Polish government owned 40% of Bank Gdanski, and another IFC index constituent 
owned 31% in 1996. Since there was no foreign limit on ownership of this stock, only 29% of the shares 
were available in the market. The IFC, therefore, included 29% of Bank Gdanski's market capitalisation 
in the index. Had, for example, the foreign limit for this stock been in place (e. g. 25%), the Bank 
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level) in months 2,9,11,14,26, and 33. The cumulative abnormal returns are always 
positive and statistically significant (at 5% level) in majority of months 270 Finally, buy- 
and-hold returns for a portfolio of Hungarian and Polish PIPOs outperform the IFC 
Eastern European Index in all months and the returns are significant in all months from 
month two up to month 36 (at 10% significance level or better). 
Table 4.21 about here 
4.7 Determinants of long run financial performance of PIPOs in transition 
economies 
An extensive IPO literature has demonstrated a worldwide negative long-term 
performance of private sector IPOs. As discussed in chapter one, empirical evidence on 
the long-term performance of PIPOs and its determinants is scarce and inconclusive. In 
particular, there has so far been no reported attempt to analyse separately the long run 
financial performance of PIPOs in CEECs. 
Mok and Hui (1998) acknowledge the importance of political support and connections 
for Chinese companies, and conjecture that investors may see high government equity 
retention's as a guarantee which reduces ex ante risk. Furthermore, companies with a 
higher percentage of retained ownership by the government are, therefore, likely to 
receive political backing and to perform better in the long run. The positive relationship 
between government's retained ownership and long-term performance is also consistent 
with Perotti (1995) who suggests that some governments might use gradual 
privatisation to signal their commitment to privatisation programmes and willingness 
to share risk with investors. Higher percentages of government retained ownership 
would, therefore, imply governments intention to make subsequent sales. The 
subsequent sales, however, are more likely to be successful when the aftermarket 
performance of the privatised companies is positive. Governments are, therefore, 
determined to insure a positive long-term performance of partially privatised companies 
Gdanski's capitalisation in the index would have been equivalent to a tighter restriction (i. e. 25%); IFC 
1998: p. 13). 
270 Cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant in 22 out of 36 months. 
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in order to attract investors to further issues. "" The government support to the partially 
privatised companies, however, may not necessarily be linked to subsidies. For 
example, in the absence of other mechanisms for corporate governance in some 
economies in transition, governments may play an important monitoring. We 
conjecture a negative relationship between percentage of shares sold and long-term 
financial performance of PIPOs: 
C: 4.3 The lower the percentage of shares sold the better long-term financial 
performance of newly privatised enterprises. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between blockholdings and financial 
performance in developed market economies is inconclusive. McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) found no relationship between block holdings and financial performance, while 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1988), and Barclay and Holderness (1990) found a positive 
relationship between financial performance and equity acquisitions by outsiders. 
However, the evidence for transitional economies seems to suggest a positive effect of 
block holdings on operating performance (Barberis et al., 1996, Pohl et al., 1997, 
Frydman et al., 1997). The empirical evidence on relationship between block ownership 
and financial performance is scarce and is mostly concentrated on the Czech Republic. 
Hingorani et al. (1997) report that equity value of Czech firms -privatised via the 
voucher scheme is positively and significantly related to the size of insider and foreign 
ownership, while insider and foreign ownership are also positively related. "' Further 
evidence is provided by Claessens et al. (1997), who examine profitability and market 
valuation for 706 Czech privatised firms during 1992-95. They find a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance, which is particularly 
evident in firms with strategic investors and bank-sponsored funds as large stakeholders. 
Anderson et al. (1997) empirically study foreign participation in the Czech mass 
privatisation programme and find that foreigners prefer profitable firms in which they 
can obtain major shareholdings and can have undisputed control. It is suggested that 
this can be explained by lower agency costs and better control of political risks. In 
21 Managers in private sector companies may be less concerned about whether investors would earn 
abnormally high positive returns to new investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
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chapter two we report an average block held by foreigners of 61% for Hungarian 
companies, 62.5% for Polish companies, and 47% for Czech companies. A positive 
relationship between insider and foreign ownership is also documented in chapter three. 
Significant concentration of ownership might avoid the agency costs of managerial 
control, which tend to occur in privatisation without large investors. The large blocks 
typically owned by foreigners signals lower agency costs in the spirit of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986). In CEEC this further implies lower resistance to and better chances for 
restructuring 27 We, therefore, expect a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and the long run performance of privatised companies: 274 
C. 4.4 There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and financial 
performance ofprivatised companies. 
The divergence of opinion hypothesis suggests long run underperformance of IPOs due 
to over-optimism of investors in the presence of great uncertainty. According to the 
hypothesis, the difference between optimists and pessimists would disappear with the 
release of more timely information about the company, which would eventually lead to 
a drop in market price and long run underperformance (Miller, 1977; Levis, 1993). Due 
to political and economic risks in transition economies, the differences in opinion 
among investors may be considerable. Politically driven, high initial returns for PIPOs 
may be followed by negative returns when facing difficulties with restructuring. A 
negative relationship between initial returns and long run returns is conjectured: 
C: 4.5 There is a negative relationship between initial and long run returns of PIPOs 
PIPOs in transition economies are much larger than private sector IPOs. This is 
consistent with findings for privatisation share issues reported for other countries (see 
Megginson , 1998). The 
largest enterprises in transition economies dominate the 
rz The average block held by foreigners in the Czech Republic is 39% (Hingorani et al., 1997: p. 368). 
273 ` For example, some of the most successful privatisation in Russia have been the ones where outside 
investors have accumulated enough shares to either replace or otherwise control the management. ' 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
274 For an example of an increase in agency costs of managerial control in spite of a fall in the costs of 
political control see Wolfram (1995) who describes privatisation of UK water utilities that resulted in 
greater discretion given to managers. Another example is privatisation in the Czech Republic, which 
resulted in the concentration of ownership in the hands of active shareholders. 
The Financial Performance of Privatised Firne 124 
market, and will usually be household names; governments would, therefore, be 
concerned that the shares should yield positive long run returns. According to 
Megginson et al. (1998a) this is in contrast to corporate managers in private sector 
companies who may not be willing to sell shares if that were to lead to excess returns to 
new shareholders. 
C: 4.6 There is a positive relationship between size of companies and long term 
performance. 
Some industries such as banking, telecommunication and utilities may enjoy a 
monopoly position in transition economies for a number of years. Good examples are 
the banking sector in the Czech Republic, and the Polish telecommunication sector, 
where governments have until recently not allowed competition. We conjecture a 
positive relationship between `non-competitive' industries and long run performance: 
C: 4.7 Companies in non-competitive industries will have higher long run returns 
than those in competitive industries. 
Finally, following our results for long run performance in the previous section we 
conjecture a significant difference in the long run performance of Czech privatised 
companies compared with those in Hungary and Poland. In order to test this conjecture 
we created dummy variable to equal 1 if company is from the Czech Republic and 0 
otherwise: 
C: 4.8 Czech newly privatised companies underperform their Polish and Hungarian 
counterparts. 
Conjectures 1 through 6 are tested using the following multiple regression model with 
market-adjusted compounded returns for one, two, and three years as a dependent 
variable: 
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MACRi1,2,3 =a+ QIMVi + Q2INDUSTRYi +, 63SOLDi (equation 4.5) 
+ /Q4FOREIGN1 + ß, 5 MAIRI + /36 CZECHS + E1 
4.8 Results of the regression model for the pooled size samples 
Regression one exhibits a high fit with R2 of 32.1% (Table 4.22). The coefficient of 
determination of 32.1% indicates that we were able to explain as much as 32% of the 
one-year buy-and-hold returns variance, which is much higher than percentages reported 
in literature on private sector IPOs. 275 All of the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs in at least two regressions. Regression variables have exhibited high 
tolerance levels and VIFs do not exceed 2.971 in any of the regressions, which indicates 
that collinearity is not a serious problem and that coefficients can be interpreted in the 
normal way. 
Table 4.22 about here 
The estimated coefficients for variable INDUSTRY are positive in all regressions. The 
effect of industry is, however, statistically significant at a 5% level only in regression 1. 
The estimated coefficients for variables MAIR and FOREIGN have expected, though 
not statistically significant signs in two of the three regressions. Positive and 
statistically significant (at 1% level) coefficients for variable MV indicates that size 
affects PIPO's long run returns. Highly significant (at 1% level) negative coefficients 
are reported for CZECH variable in regressions 1 and 3 confirm our earlier findings that 
Czech newly privatised companies undeperform their Polish and Hungarian 
counterparts. Finally, the effect of percentage SOLD is negative and statistically 
ns Lee et al. (1996), for example, report adjusted R2 for a sample of Australian IPOs which do not exceed 
5.5%. 
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significant at 10% level in regression for first year buy-and-hold returns. Conversely to 
the results in literature on operating performance the state ownership seems to have 
positive impact on long-term financial performance. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.22 suggest that retained state ownership, firm size, and 
firm regulatory status, influence long run financial performance. After controlling for 
other factors, we find lower long-term returns in Czech privatisation than those for 
privatisation in Poland and Hungary. This evidence, therefore, lends support to 
conjectures 3,6,7, and 8. 
4.9 Conclusions 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggest that both domestic and foreign 
investors who invested in Polish and Hungarian PIPOs on the second day after issue 
market price and held those shares for one, two, and three years could earn positive and 
statistically significant returns. The returns are particularly high for foreign investors in 
Polish and Hungarian PIPOs, reaching 530% and 192% respectively three years after 
listing. In addition, buy-and-hold returns for a portfolio of Hungarian and Polish PIPOs 
outperformed the IFC Investable East European Index in all months and the returns are 
significant in all months from month two up to month 36 (at 10% level of significance 
or better). These results are consistent with those reported by Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997b), who find positive and significant abnormal returns (up to 5 years after listings) 
for an international sample of PIPOs, with the majority of the positive returns 
concentrated in the UK, Hungary and Poland. 
Our results for Polish and Hungarian private sector IPOs are consistent with findings for 
long run financial performance of privately owned company IPOs in other countries 
which conclusively show negative long run returns. 27' Polish and Hungarian PIPOs, thus 
considerably outperformed their private sector counterparts. The results remain robust 
n6 The only exception is a positive (but not statistically significant) buy-and-hold return for foreign 
investors in Polish private sector IPOs. 
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after returns were recalculated using the Datastream Europe Index, the IFC Investable 
East European Index, and prices in US dollars. 
The positive long run returns on Hungarian and Polish PIPOs are in sharp contrast to 
those in the Czech Republic. This has also been confirmed by the results of multivariate 
regressions in which strong evidence was found that Czech companies underperformed 
Hungarian and Polish PIPOs in the long run. These result contradict those on operating 
performance of newly privatised firms in transition economies which found little 
difference in performance relative to the privatisation method (Pohl et al., 1997). 
Finally, the results of multivariate regression analysis suggest that state ownership, firm 
size, and regulatory status affect long run performance of PIPOs. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Motivation and contributions 
This thesis analyses the privatisation programmes and the financial performance of 
privatisation and private sector IPOs in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The 
study of these areas is important for several reasons. First, the academic literature 
offers little guidance for countries on the design of privatisation strategies and the 
choice of privatisation methods. Megginson et al. (1996) for example, suggests that 
privatisation programmes in Britain, France, Singapore, Chile, and Mexico, were 
adopted largely on faith. If this was the case in countries with a long-established private 
sector and a wide range of financial institutions, one can imagine the difficulties facing 
policy makers in countries in transition from a command economy towards a market- 
based economy. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary each adopted different 
privatisation programmes, and it is interesting to examine lessons they learned, and to 
identify the underlying factors that influenced the success of their privatisation 
programmes. Their experiences might have valuable implications for policy makers in 
other CEECs as well as for international financial institutions, which generally promote 
rapid privatisation as preferred course of action for transition economies. 
Secondly, the pricing of PIPOs and private sector IPOs remains a controversial issue in 
the corporate finance literature. Although empirical evidence points to a positive short- 
term performance of both PIPOs and private sector IPOs, the evidence on their relative 
performance is scarce and inconclusive. Perotti and Guney (1993), for example, report 
higher initial returns for PIPOs, while Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) find no general 
tendency for privatisations to be underpriced to a greater degree then other IPOs. The 
proposition, that because of their political importance, PIPOs might be underpriced to a 
greater extent than their private sector counterparts has not yet been tested in the context 
of transition economies. 
Thirdly, both the theoretical and the empirical evidence on the relative performance of 
state and private sector companies are inconclusive. Transition economies, in which 
privatisation is seen as a necessary ingredient of market reforms, provide a test case for 
property rights theory, which suggests the supremacy of private ownership over all 
other types of corporate governance. 
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Furthermore, the literature on the choice facing CEECs between the two competing 
systems for corporate governance, namely the Anglo-Saxon outsider system or the 
Continental European insider system, is far from being conclusive (Frydman et al. 
1996). This creates problems for policy makers when it comes to establishing financial 
institutions and regulating capital markets. These problems are complicated by the fact 
that emerging ownership patterns in CEECs appear to be quite distinct from existing 
patterns of corporate governance in other countries. Earle and Estrin (1996), for 
example, categorise emerging ownership patterns in transition economies at four levels: 
state-owned vs. private, privatised vs. de novo private, privatised by insiders vs. 
privatised by outsiders, privatised by managers vs. privatised by workers. Aghion and 
Carlin (1997) see Poland, with its extensive insider-ownership on the one side and a 
highly liquid stock exchange on the other, as an example of the co-existence of Anglo- 
Saxon and Continental corporate governance structures. The Czech financial system, 
with its powerful bank-owned privatisation funds and an extensive but fragmented 
capital market, provides yet another example of the emergence of a hybrid corporate 
governance structure (Coffee, 1996). Finally, Stark (1996) suggests that privatisation in 
Hungary has resulted in inter-enterprise ownership and complex networks of companies 
which is different from pure private ownership. The author makes a case for the 
emergence of a distinctively East European capitalism that is different from either the 
West European or the East Asian variants. It is, therefore, important to investigate 
whether there is any relationship between various ownership patterns and the financial 
performance of newly privatised enterprises in transition economies, in order to guide 
policy makers as to what types of ownership appear to encourage restructuring and an 
improvement in efficiency. 
Finally, privatisation issues worldwide reached US$ 162 billion in 1997, and represent 
an important part of the investment scene. Many of the privatisations are concentrated 
in European markets, particularly in CEECs, especially Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary. It has been argued that PIPOs systematically outperform their private 
sector counterparts because they may initially be sold at large discounts, and because 
they tend to experience improved performance after their change of ownership. This, 
however, was not found to be the case in all European countries (Rosgen and Davidson, 
1996). Furthermore, the empirical literature demonstrates conclusively that country 
selection is the most critical aspect of investing in emerging markets (Errunza, 1999). 
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The analysis of long-term returns for Polish, Czech, and Hungarian companies would, 
therefore, be of interest to investors in emerging markets in general and to investors in 
privatisation stocks in particular. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to compare privatisation strategies in the spirit 
of Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti (1995), and Jones et al. (1999), and to examine the 
financial performance of PIPOs and private sector IPOs in CEECs. Some earlier studies 
examine the financial performance of PIPOs in CEECs, but only as a part of larger 
international sample (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997, Megginson et al. 1998a). We, 
therefore, provide several methodological and empirical contributions to the literature 
on privatisation strategies and the financial performance of PIPOs, both in general and 
in CEECs in particular. 
First, the absence of a reasonably large sample of privatised companies and the 
concentration of privatised companies within highly regulated industries were the main 
reasons why most previous country studies in this field have been preliminary and have 
lacked formal statistical inference. Although some studies have attempted to overcome 
this problem by pooling data into a large international sample this sacrifices institutional 
detail and ignores idiosyncrasies of individual markets. Our empirical analysis of 
privatisation strategies is based upon data for around 211 privatisation transactions in 
Poland, 56 in the Czech Republic, and 123 in Hungary during 1988-1999. In addition, 
our sample of PIPOs and private sector IPOs comprises more than 90% of the number 
of the companies listed on each of the local markets in 1998. The privatisation data for 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary thus provides us with a greater number of 
observations than in previous studies and enables us to compare more fully the financial 
performance of private and state-owned enterprises in these countries. 
Secondly, in the majority of studies into PIPOs returns were calculated only for 
domestic investors using local market indices. 277 This, however, makes cross-country 
comparisons very difficult specially when local market indices are based on differing 
methodologies, when local firms are part of local value-weighted indices, and when 
index firms are much bigger than the sample PIPO firms. Additionally, the 
measurement of returns for foreign portfolio investors is sensitive to the choice of an 
277 One of the rare exceptions is Megginson et al. (1998a). 
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appropriate benchmark for two reasons. First, the PIPOs tend to be skewed towards 
certain industries (e. g. telecommunications and banking), and second, foreign investors 
have limited access to individual shares and markets because of barriers imposed by 
governments, and crossownerships involving PIPOs and government shareholdings. 
We, therefore, calculate average abnormal, cumulative abnormal, and buy-and-hold 
returns for both domestic and foreign investors for up to 3 years after listing, calculated 
using local market indices, the Datastream Europe Index, and the IFC Investable East 
European Index as benchmarks. Finally, returns for foreign investors are calculated 
both in local currencies and US dollars. 
Another factor is that PIPOs tend to be clustered together in certain calendar months or 
years, which may affect the statistical results (Ibbotson, 1975). In order to adjust for the 
`clustering' problem we follow the procedure suggested in Firth (1997), and classify 
PIPOs into portfolios depending on the calendar month and the year of listing. The 
abnormal returns are then re-calculated based on the portfolio returns rather than on 
returns for individual companies. 
Furthermore, Ritter (1991) advocates the `windows of opportunities' hypothesis 
according to which large cycles in volumes, so-called "hot periods, " suggest that 
managers in private companies attempt to time their public offers. To test for such 
market timing attempts on the part of the Polish and Hungarian governments, we 
stratified the PIPO initial returns by years of listing and analysed the persistence of 
returns and numbers of offers, and the correlation between the previous year average 
premium and the number of offers in the current year. A high persistence in returns and 
the numbers of offers measured by first order autocorrelation, and a high and positive 
correlation between the previous year's average premium and the number of PIPOs in 
the current year would suggest an attempt by the Government to time PIPOs. 
Finally, we examine the determinants of both the short and the long-term performance 
of PIPOs and formally test for differences between their financial performance and that 
of their private sector counterparts. We provide a direct test of the Perotti (1995) 
model, by testing for the negative relationship between the percentage of shares sold 
and the underpricing of PIPOs and also examine the relationship between various forms 
of ownership (state, foreign, employees) and the short and long run financial 
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performance. In our multivariate regression analysis we also formally test for the 
importance of other factors such as company size, industry, ex ante risk, and 
companies' order in the privatisation programme. 
Summary of results 
Our results suggest that CEECs prefer direct sales to PIPOs. PIPOs in Poland and 
Hungary, though, have played an important role both in the privatisation programme 
and in the development of a stock exchange. These two countries have relied on PIPOs 
more than any other country in the CEECs. The average percentage of shares sold was 
higher in direct sales than in PIPOs, thought PIPOs achieved higher average proceeds. 
The average percentage of shares sold was the highest in Poland (about 70%) and 
lowest in the Czech Republic (about 43%). In both Poland and Hungary it was found 
that the trend in the increase in the average percentage of shares sold in the early 
nineties was reversed in the mid-nineties due to political strife surrounding 
privatisation in politically sensitive industries (e. g. banking and telecommunications). 
The Polish, Czech and Hungarian governments gave up day-to-day control over the 
great majority of privatised enterprises, and did not even very often retain some form of 
veto power, such as a golden share. The Hungarian government has retained a golden 
share in about 30 cases, and the Czech government in only a dozen cases, while the 
Polish government insisted more on various investment and employment commitments 
by foreign investors than on retaining shares with preferential rights. We have not found 
many examples of a clawback mechanism or performance contingent pricing. This is 
surprising given the long history of state control and the difficulties with valuation of 
companies in transition economies. 278 
All three of these CEEC governments allocated shares in a politically motivated 
manner. The Czech government focused on the allocation of shares to citizens whereas 
the Polish and Hungarian governments preferred to allocate shares to insiders (workers 
and managers). Although the percentages reported in our study exclude management 
278 On the other hand, recommendations for more frequent use of clawback arrangements were made in 
countries with much longer experience in privatisation. For example, the UK Public Accounts 
Committee recommended their use in the UK; Getting Value for Money in Privatisations, 61" Report of 
the PAC Session, 1997-98, The Stationery Office, 1998. 
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ownership they do suggest that insider ownership is important in Poland and Hungary 
and of little importance in the Czech Republic. 279 
The Polish and Hungarian governments often sold stakes in several companies 
simultaneously, motivated by the desire to encourage trading on the stock exchange 
rather than to diversify risk. Our analysis also shows some cross-sectional differences 
in the choice of privatisation methods. For example, companies in the retail and food 
sectors are more likely to be privatised with larger initial sales than companies in other 
industries, while telecommunication companies have always been privatised via PIPOs. 
Foreign investors have played an important role in privatisation programmes in the 
countries under review. They participated in about one half of privatisations in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and in about one-third of those in Poland. Foreign 
investors prefer to hold a significant proportion of shares in privatised companies, and 
the average block shareholdings owned by them is about 60% in Poland and Hungary 
and about 47% in the Czech Republic. The lower percentage in the Czech Republic 
reflects the government's desire to retain control in particular sectors, such as banking. 
Market-adjusted initial returns for Polish and Hungarian PIPOs are positive and 
statistically significant. The average unadjusted and market-adjusted first day returns of 
Polish PIPOs are 1.28% and 1.16%, respectively, and both are significantly positive at 
5% percent level. Average unadjusted and market-adjusted initial returns for Hungarian 
PIPOs are 76% and 44% respectively (both significant at 10% level). Unadjusted and 
market-adjusted initial returns for Czech companies are negative and statistically not 
different from zero . 
280 The results are quite robust, as has been confirmed by the 
calculation of first week returns and of initial returns with adjustments for outliers and 
clustering. 281 We found no evidence, however, for a general tendency for governments 
in transition economies to underprice their IPOs to a greater degree than issues in the 
private sector. Only first week returns for Hungarian PIPOs are significantly higher 
than those for private sector issues. Finally, a high and positive Pearson's correlation 
coefficient between previous year premium and current year volumes suggests that 
279 Polish workers received the biggest allocations in CEEC (about 20%). 
280 The results for the Czech Republic, however, should be treated with caution due to unique 
characteristics of the Czech capital market. 
281 Major outliers are found in Hungarian sample, while evidence of PIPOs clustering is found for Polish 
and Czech privatisation programmes. 
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Polish government may have attempted to time PIPOs. 282 No such evidence was found 
for Hungarian government. 
Various specifications of the multiple regression models with market-adjusted initial 
returns as dependent variable show a moderate to high fit 283 We find evidence that 
privatisation initial returns for larger firms tend to exceed those in smaller firms, and 
that governments tend to underprice more in the early stages of privatisation, under 
more volatile market conditions and in regulated industries. PIPOs with foreign 
participation, on average, tend to be less underpriced than those offered exclusively to 
domestic investors. An expected negative relationship (but not statistically significant) 
was found between the percentage of shares sold and initial returns. We found, 
however, little evidence of a positive relationship between initial returns and insider 
ownership. Overall, the results are consistent with those reported in Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997) and Jones et al. (1999), and support the conjectures which explain 
underpricing by reference to underlying political factors rather than to factors proposed 
by asymmetric information theories. 
Both domestic and foreign investors who invested in Polish and Hungarian PIPOs at the 
second day after issue market price and held those shares for one, two, and Three years 
earned positive and statistically significant returns. The returns are particularly high 
for foreign investors in Polish and Hungarian PIPOs, reaching 530% and 192% 
respectively three years after listing. These results are consistent with the results 
reported in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997b), who find positive and significant 
abnormal returns for an international sample of PIPOs, with the majority of the positive 
returns concentrated in the UK, Hungary and Poland. The positive long-term returns in 
Hungarian and Polish PIPOs are in sharp contrast to those in the Czech Republic which 
produced predominantly negative and statistically significant long-term returns for both 
domestic and foreign investors. 
The negative and statistically significant returns for Polish and Hungarian private sector 
IPOs are consistent with the findings for privately owned company IPOs in other 
282 The coefficient was 0.68. 
283 One of the regressions explains as much as 39.4% of the initial return variance. 
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countries which conclusively show negative long-term returns. 284 Polish and Hungarian 
PIPOs thus considerably outperform their private sector counterparts. The difference in 
average (mean and median) long-term returns is predominantly significant (at 10% level 
or better). The results remain robust after returns were recalculated using the Datastram 
Europe Index, the IFC Investable East European Index, and prices in US dollars. 
Regressions for long-term returns exhibited a moderate to high fit with the coefficient 
of determination of 32.1% in the regression for one-year returns. We found that 
retained state ownership and firm size and regulatory status positively influence long- 
term financial performance. This result is consistent with that popular view that CEEC 
governments retain higher proportions of shares in large and profitable companies in 
regulated industries, and that these companies tend to have political backing. They are 
also consistent with the view that governments are determined to make large 
privatisation successful in order to promote their privatisation programmes. They, 
therefore, might be expected to play an important monitoring role, which could 
ultimately lead to better financial performance. The estimated coefficients for initial 
returns and foreign participation have the expected, though not statistically significant 
signs. After controlling for other factors, we find significantly lower long run returns 
for PIPOs in the Czech Republic than in Hungary or Poland. 
Overall, our results provide support for our conjectures on privatisation polices and are 
consistent with those found in Perotti and Guney (1993), Megginson et al. (1998b), and 
Jones et al. (1999). The results also highlight the importance of the choice of 
privatisation method. The Polish and Hungarian governments have chosen gradual and 
partial privatisation dominated by direct sales and PIPOs, while the Czech government 
emphasised the speed of the privatisation programme, privatising more than 50% of 
state-owned assets in two privatisation waves. In doing so, however, the government 
was dominated by privatisation funds and banks, which obtained the largest blocks of 
holdings in the privatised companies. The Czech capital market was mainly designed to 
facilitate trading in the shares of companies privatised under the voucher privatisation 
programme. The regulatory and supervisory framework was, however, flawed which 
resulted in a number of functional problems, including a fragmented structure, 
284 The only exception is result which suggests a positive (but not statistically significant) buy-and-hold 
returns result for foreign investors in Polish private sector IPOs. 
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inadequate corporate disclosure, and lack of transparency (World Bank, 1999: p. 24). 285 
These deficiencies reduced marketability, leaving minority shareholders with illiquid 
shares and no exit route. 
On the basis of the financial performance of PIPOs for up to three years after listing, 
Hungarian and Polish enterprises were more successful than those in the Czech 
Republic. The long run returns for both domestic and international investors who 
invested in Hungarian and Polish PIPOs are positive and highly significant, while 
Czech companies exhibited very poor performance. Our results are different from those 
relating to the operating performance of newly privatised firms in transition economies, 
which have found little difference in performance relative to the privatisation method. 
We are however aware of at least two limitations of our analysis of the financial 
performance of PIPOs. First, as in any other emerging market there is the question of 
market efficiency, which suffered due to problems with information disclosure, and the 
dominance of uninformed investors. Second, one should be cautious in drawing 
conclusions regarding the positive effects of privatisation upon financial performance 
since at least some of the improvement may be attributable to the increase in 
competition and the creation of market institutions. An alternative measure of the 
success of the privatisation programmes is to check for any cases of re-nationalisation. 
Here again Hungary and Poland perform better than the Czech Republic, for there were 
no cases of re-nationalisation in Poland and Hungary, while the Czech government re- 
nationalised around 30 financially distressed privatised enterprises through debt-equity 
swaps. 286 
Policy implications 
Several policy implications can be inferred from this study and they are highly relevant 
for transition economies, which are in the processes of privatisation and establishment 
of their own capital markets. First, our results highlight the importance of the choice of 
285 Commentators often suggest that the Poles adopted the philosophy that everything that is not allowed 
is forbidden, whereas the Czech followed the line that everything that is not forbidden is allowed, 
reflecting the laissez-faire principles of Vaclav Klaus's government; The Asian Wall Street Journal, 
Thursday, March 6,1997. 
286 A similar method of re-nationalisation has been used in Chile. A more direct method has been applied 
in Jamaica where the government re-nationalised three sugar mills by assuming direct control of them. 
Some of the more direct methods of re-nationalisation have also been advocated for the Russian gas and 
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privatisation strategy and method and contradict the pressure for a rapid privatisation 
programme often imposed by international financial institutions. The gradual and more 
practical approach to privatisation, with case-by-case and PIPO privatisations, produced 
much better results than did a mass and rapid privatisation programme. Six years after 
the first privatisation the Czech government was forced to re-nationalise many of the 
privatised enterprises, thus demonstrating serious failures in the privatisation process. 
Privatisation is thus not a panacea, and even with a government committed to market 
reforms, cannot of itself improve the performance of enterprises. The development of 
financial markets and effective mechanisms for corporate control are of equal 
importance, and these appear to be emerging with fewer problems in countries which 
relied more on standard privatisation methods such as direct sales and PIPOs. 
One implication for investors is that PIPOs pay high initial returns especially if they 
involve large companies, companies in the early stages of a privatisation programme or 
companies from non-competitive industries. Private sector IPOs in transition economies 
also show positive (but not statistically significant) returns. One of the implications of 
our results for foreign investors with a long-term view is that they should invest in large 
Hungarian and Polish PIPOs from non-competitive industries, and in PIPOs with high 
equity stakes retained by the government. Foreign investors are able to reap abnormal 
returns even after controlling for limited accessibility of markets and individual shares 
to foreigners. Finally, the currency factor does not seem to significantly affect long run 
returns of foreign investors investing in CEEC's companies. 
Limitations and further research 
We want to emphasise that many unanswered questions about the design of 
privatisation strategies and financial performance of newly privatised enterprises in 
CEECs remain. For example, our data on ownership and the percentage of shares sold 
in PIPOs is rather limited. This is the main reason why pooled sample sizes were used 
in our analysis of determinants of short and long term returns. Our analysis on insider 
and foreign ownership should be extended to include an analysis of the relationship 
between financial performance and blockholdings by institutional investors. Further 
empirical research needs to shed more light on the link between ownership and financial 
performance in each of CEECs. 
oil sectors by Jeffrey Sachs, one of the most prominent supporters of privatisation who acted as an 
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Furthermore, the problem of defining "privatisation" has not received adequate 
attention in the literature. In fact, we know of no study which has discussed the various 
definitions and types of PIPOs in different countries. There are, however, significant 
differences between privatised companies. For example, the percentage and period of 
government's holdings required for a company to be classified as a PIPO varies across 
countries. In some cases, companies are classified as privatised even when a major 
foreign investor is actually owned by the foreign government. Some companies were 
bought from the government whereas some were directly floated by the government. In 
some countries PIPOs have involved raising of a capital without change in control. 287 
Capital raised in PIPOs is sometimes invested in the company whereas sometimes 
governments keep all the proceeds. 288 It would, therefore, be interesting to examine 
whether these differences might explain some of the cross-sectional and cross-country 
variations in performance of PIPOs. The problem of defining privatisations makes it 
difficult to define an appropriate benchmark for the measurement of the performance of 
specialist international privatisation funds managers. 289 Such a benchmark would help 
in the assessment of fund performance and would shed more light on the financial 
performance of newly privatised companies. 
Finally, since almost all of the PIPOs examined in this study have mixed ownership, our 
results provide additional evidence on the performance of mixed enterprises (MEs). 
They demonstrate that in Hungary and Poland MEs have outperformed privately owned 
enterprises. These results seem to contradict property rights theory and findings for 
developed countries, which report superior performance for privately owned enterprises 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989). Opponents of privatisation may use this result to 
suggest that it is the level of competition and not privatisation per se that improves 
efficiency. On the other hand, proponents of privatisation would argue that even partial 
privatisation bring efficiency gains. Future research in this area should examine 
reasons for the greater efficiency of enterprises with mixed ownership in CEECs and 
reveal whether this is a permanent or a transitory feature. 
adviser of many Eastern European countries; Euromoney, March 1999. 
281 The China Telecom's privatisation in 1997 is the best known example. 
288 For example, CEECs governments have kept all proceeds from privatisation in banking sector, but 
allowed some of the capital raised in privatisation of companies from other industries to be re-invested. 
289 The Guinness Flight Hambro has published the Guinness Flight Privatisation 200 Index on a daily 
basis since August 1997. For this particular index, privatised companies are defined as those in which 
governments have held stakes of 5% within the past 10 years. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 1.1 
Operating performance of privatised companies: recent studies for developing countries 
`+' means an improvement in a certain area after privatisation; `-' means decrease in a certain area after 
privatisation. 
Study/variable Galal et al. Megginson Boubakri and Cosset La Porta and Lopes- 
(1994); 12 Et al. (1994); (1998); de-Silanes 
companies 6 developing 21 developing (1997); Mexico 
from Chile, countries countries 
MY, Mexico, 
UK 
Employment + + - 
Sales + + 
Investments + + 
Productivity + + 
Profitability + + + 
Net welfare + 
Leverage - - 
Dividends + 
Other Greater benefits in The gains in 
countries with higher profitability are linked 
per capita income and to cut in employment, 
where governments higher productivity 
surrender control and removal of price/ 
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Table 1.3 
Summary of studies on short run financial performance of PIPOs 
All reported results measure underpricing. Reported returns in Ma (1997), Paudyal et al. (1998), Menyah 
and Paudyal (1996), Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), are first day market adjusted returns; Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997) and Perotti and Guney (1993), report first day average raw returns; Dewenter and 
Malatesta did not find a general tendency for privatisation to be more underpriced than private 




Study Year Period Country Sample Premium Premium 
PIPO/IPO (PIPO), % (IPO), % 
Menyah& Paudyal 1996 1981-91 UK 40/75 38.7 3.48 
Menyah et al. 1990 1981-87 UK 13 45.10 
Menyah et al. 1995 1981-91 UK 40 23.62 
Jenkinson & Mayer 1988 1979-87 UK 20 22.2 
Paudyal et al. 1998 1984-95 Malaysia 18/77 103.5 52.5 
Perotti & Guney 1993 1984-92 Malaysia 13 99.6 
Jenkinson & Mayer 1988 1986-87 France 11 25.05 
Perotti & Guney 1993 1986-87 France 11 18.7 
Perotti & Guney 1993 1986-89 Spain 7 68.7 
Perotti & Guney 1993 1988-91 Turkey 24 4.8 
Perotti & Guney 1993 - Nigeria 372.5 
Aggarwal et a1. 1993 1982-92 Chile 9 7.6 
Panel B 
International studies 
Study Year Country Sample Premium Premium 
PIPO/IPO PIPO% IPO % 
Dewenter and 1997 Canada 13/100 2.5 9.3 
Malatesta France 10/187 11.4 4.2 
Hungary 10/5 14.9 14.9 
Japan 3/472 16 32.5 
Malaysia 12/132 52.2 80.3 
Thailand 4/32 46.6 58.1 
UK 38/2133 18 12 
Poland 19/0 50 - 
Ma 1998 Malaysia 9.7 8.07 
Taiwan - 7.58 6.5 
Thailand - 4.2 0.73 
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Table 1.4 
The long run financial performance of initial public offerings: summary of previous research 
The time period and methodology vary from study to study, Davidson and Rosgen =1 year buy and hold 
returns Menyah and Paudyal =3 year buy-and-hold abnormal returns; Huan (1997) significant for 
German, Turkish, Singaporean, and British PIPO; Dewenter and Malatesta (1997b) document positive 
and significant abnormal returns (1-5 years) in the TJK, Poland, and Hungary, with private firms 
outperforming state -awned firms; Menyah et al. 1990 report raw returns for 160 days; Aggarwal et al. 
(1993) for Chile report 3 year benchmark adjusted returns, The time period and methodology for South 
East Asian countries is as follows: Dawson for Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia= % change in the 
average market-adjusted price from closing price on day one to 12 months later, Wu =3 year holding 
period adjusted (non-compounded) returns; Kim =2 year buy-and-hold abnormal returns; Mobamad =3 
year cumulative abnormal returns; Sufar =1 year holding period market-adjusted (non-compounded) 
returns; Firth (1998) = mean abnormal returns for 36 months after IPOs- abnormal returns calculated 
using matching firms as a benchmark ; *Siffiific ant at 5% level or better. 
Country Study Period Sample Returns 
IPO/PIPO IPO PIPO 
US 
Ritter (1991) 1975-84 1526 -29.1* 
Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) 1977-87 1598 -13.7* 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) 1970-90 4753 -17.0 
EUROPE 
UK Levis (1993) 1980-88 712 -8.1 Positive* 
UK. Rosgen & Davidson (1996) 1990-96 Positive 
UK Menyah et al. (1995) 1981-91 40 PIPO Positive* 
UK Menyah et eL (1990) 1981-87 13 PIPO 70.2* 
UK Menvah & Paudyal (1996) 1981-91 75/40 4.91 60.97* 
Ger. IJhlir (1989) 1974-89 119 -2.8 
Swit. Kunz & Aggamal (1994) 1983-89 42 -6.1 
Swell Loughran et. al. (1994) 1980-90 162 1.2 
Fin. Keloharju (1993) 1984-89 79 -21.1 
Aus. Rosgen & Davidson (1996) 1990-96 Positive 
Aus. Aussenegg (1996) 1984-95 66 -3.0 
F. Rosgen & Davidson (1996) 1990-96 Negative 
Italy Rosgen & Davidson (1996) 1990-96 Negative 
LAW AMIRICA 
Brawl Aggar al et. aL (1993) 1980-90 62 -47.0* Positive 
Chile Aggarwal etal. (1993) 1982-90 28/9 -23.7 -13.7 
Mexi. Aggarwal et. al. (1993) 1987-90 44 -19.6 
AUSTRALIA & NZ 
Aus. Finn & Higham (1988) 1966-78 93 -6.5* 
Aus. Lee etal. (1996) 1976-89 266 -51.3 
NZ Firth (1997) 1979-87 143 -2.0 
SOUTH EAST ASIA 
HK Dawson (1987) 1978-83 21 -9.3 
Sing. Dawson (1987) 1978-83 39 -2.7 
Sing. Firth (1998) 1979-92 116 -3.26 
Korea Kim et al. (1995) 1985-89 169 59.0 
MY Dawson (1987) 1978-83 21 18.2 
MY Mohamad et aL(1994) 1975-90 65 77.0* 
MY Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-95 18/77 12.85 -7.46 
INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE 
Int. Boardman & Laurin (1996) 87 Positive* 
Jut. Dewenter & Malatesta (1997b) 1975-95 102 (8 countries) Positive* 
Int. Huang (1997) (9 countries) Positive 
Int. Megginon et aL (1998) 1981-97 264 (36 countries) Positive* 
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Table 2.1 
Privatisation methods: differential characteristics 
Some governments decide to retain privatisation proceeds in which case an enterprise does not raise 
new capital. 
Methods Advantage Disadvantage 
Voucher schemes 
Direct sales to 
strat. foreign investor 
PIPOs 
-Fast 
-No problems with pricing 
-No need for developed cap. market 
-Politically popular 
-May bring new capital* 
-New expertise 
-New corporate governance 
-No need for developed cap. market 
-May bring new capital* 





-No need for developed cap. market 
-Transfer of ownership may not 
be followed by transfer of control 
-No new capital raised 
-No new expertise 






-No new expertise 
-May result in a diffuse 
ownership structure 
-Slow 
-No new expertise 
- May result in a diffuse 
ownership structure 
-May prevent restructuring 
Source: Abarbanell (1996), as cited in Meyndorf and Snyder (1997: p15). Own observations in italics. 
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Table 2.2 
Polish privatisation strategy and choice of privatisation methods 
Panel A 
Summary statistics of number of privatisation transactions, average proceeds, and average 
percentage sold stratified by years 
Own calculations; Joint ventures included in sales; PIPOs include domestic and international issues, and 
private placements; Number of companies privatised through voucher method given in brackets; Average 
percentage sold to employees excluding management; All values in million US$; Poland changed the 
value of the zloty on January 1,1994. The 'new' zloty's value is 10,000 times that of the 'old' zloty. 
Data has been adjusted to reflect this change; End of period exchange rates, PZ: US$, from Datastream: 














Number Total Average proceeds Average 
per transaction percentage sold 
(US$ million) per transaction 
PIPOs Sales 
5 8 13 15 91 
7 18 25 51 89 
2 8 10 29 97 
5 21 26 22 78 
7 9 16 28 63 
9 19 28(512) 40 57 
5 38 43 55 n. a. 
9 21 30 58 36 
6 8 14 514(with TPSA) 38 
/ 6 6 n. a. n. a. 
55 156 211 90 69 
Panel B 
Choice of privatisation method 
PIPOs Sales 
Number of privatisations 55 156 
Proportion of PIPOs vs Sales 
Method as % of total 
% of total proceeds 
Average % sold per transaction 
Average proceeds per transaction 
Average % sold to employees 
% of privatisations with foreign participation 















Czech privatisation strategy and choice of privatisation method 
Panel A 
Summary statistics of number of privatisation transactions, average proceeds, and average 
percentage sold stratified by years 
Own calculations; Joint ventures included in sales; PIPOs include completed and planned international 
issues, and private placements; Number of companies privatised through voucher method given in 
brackets; Average percentage sold to employees excluding management; All values in million US$; End 
of year CK: USS exchange rates from Datastream used in calculations: 1993=29.955; 1994=28.049; 
1995=26.602; 1996=27.332; 1997=34.636; 1998= 29.885; For planned privatisation an estimated current 
market value at an exchange rate of 19 April 1999=35.406 was used; When required, an end of year 













Number Total Average proceeds Percentage sold 
per transaction per transaction 
(US$ million) 
PIPOs Sales 
- 1 1 48 40 
- 9 9 60 53 
- 10 10 49 39 
- 2(943) 2 - 42 
- 1 1 17 - 
- 12(676) 12 28 (147 with SPT) 39 
1 4 5 52 62 
2 7 9 44 27 
4 - 4 134 40 
2 4 6 n. a. 47 
9 50 59 69 43 
Panel B 
Choice of privatisation method 
PIPOs Sales 
Number of privatisation 9 50 
Proportion of PIPOs vs Sales 
Method as % of total 15 
% of total proceeds 7 
Average % sold per transaction 32 
Average proceeds per transaction 107 
Average % sold to employees 
% of privatisations with foreign participation 















Hungarian privatisation strategy and choice of privatisation method 
Panel A 
Summary statistics of number of privatisation transactions, average proceeds, and average 
percentage sold stratified by years 
Own calculations; Joint ventures included in sales; PIPOs include completed and planned domestic and 
international issues, and private placements; Average percentage sold to employees excluding 
management; All values in million US$; End of year exchange rates from Datastream used in 
calculations: 1990=61.449; 1991=75.62; 1992=83.97; 1993=100.7; 1994=113.15; 1995=139.47; 
1996=164.93; 1997=203.5. 
Year Number Total Average proceeds per Average percentage 
transaction sold per transaction 
(US$ million) 
PIPOs Sales 
1988 / 1 1 120 80 
1989 J 6 6 81 47 
1990 2 6 8 65 50 
1991 6 21 27 48 56 
1992 2 10 12 57 60 
1993 5 10 15 40 73 
1994 4 1 5 204 (with Matav) 32 
1995 6 12 18 120 52 
1996 2 9 11 85 n. a. 
1997 6 3 9 256 (with Matav) 35 
1998 1 1 2 n. a. n. a. 
Planned 7 2 9 188 n. a. 
Total 41 82 123 116 54 
Panel B 
Choice of Privatisation Method 
PIPOs Sales 
Number of privatisations 41 82 
Proportion of PIPOs vs sales 
Method as % of total 
% of total proceeds 
Average % sold per transaction 
Average proceeds per transaction 
Average % sold to employees 
% of privatisations with foreign participation 
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Table 2.6 
Summary of results for tested conjectures 
Results for mass privatisation programmes in brackets. 
Poland Czech Republic Hungary 
I Conjectures on privatisation programmes 
C: 2.1 Partial sales yes(yes) yes(yes) yes 
C: 2.2 Increase in proceeds yes yes yes 
Increase in percentage sold reversed no reversed 
C: 23 Larger initial sales in manu£ yes yes yes 
C: 2.4 Employees favoured yes(yes) yes(no) yes 
C: 2.5 Governments give up control yes/no yes/yes yes/yes 
but retain veto power (golden shares) 
C: 2.6 Simultaneous sales yes(yes) no(yes) yes 
12 Conjectures on the choice of privatisation methods 
C: 2.7 Direct sales favoured yes yes yes 
C: 2.8 Percentage sold higher in d. sales yes yes yes 
C: 2.9 PIPO are larger transactions yes yes no 
C: 2.10 PIPO favoured by 
telecommunications yes yes yes 
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Table 3.1 
Development of the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
End of year values; Number of companies traded on German exchanges as percentage of companies 
traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Companies 9 16 
INLCapJGDP(%) n. a. n. a. 
Turnover (Sm) n. a. n. a. 
% of companies on 
German exchanges n. a. n. a. 
22 44 48 80 121 165 
n. a. n. a. 3.9 6.6 9.6 n. a. 
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 812.9 
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 6 
Source: Number of companies from IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, Euromoney, and The 1999 
Guide to Poland; Data for M. Cap/GDP ratio, turnover, and number of companies traded on German 
exchanges from Pistor (1999). 
Table 3.2 
Development of the Prague Stock Exchange 
Number of listed companies without investment and unit trusts; Others: OTC/unlisted/parallel 
quoted/RM-S; End of year market capitalisation and turnover, Number of companies traded on German 
exchanges as percentage of companies traded on the Prague Stock Exchange; * more than 1,300 
companies were de-listed during 1997. 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Main board 8 15 23 n. a. n. a. 10 
Second board n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 92 
Others 499 497 528 n. a. n. a. 221 
Total listed companies 507 512 551 n. a. 1,700 233* 
M. CapJGDP (%) n. a. 14.6 31.2 32.1 26.9 n. a. 
Turnover (Sm) n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 605.3 
% of companies on n. a. n. a. na. n. a. n. a. 13 
German exchanges 
Source: Number of companies from Burza Ceennych Papiru Praha website; Data for M. Cap/GDP ratio, 
turnover, and number of companies traded on German exchanges from Pistor (1999). 
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Table 33 
Development of the Budapest Stock Exchange 
End of year values; Number of companies traded on German exchanges as percentage of companies 
traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange; Market capitalisation and turnover translated into US$ using end 
of period, $: HF, exchange rates from Darastream as follows: 1990=61.45; 1991=75.62; 1992=83.97; 
1993=100.7; 1994=113.15; 1995=139.47; 1996=164.93; 1997=203.5. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Companies 6 20 23 28 40 42 45 49 55 
?L cap. (Sbn) 0.27 0.50 0.56 0.81 1.60 2.35 5.17 15.03 aa. 
Turnover (Sbn) 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.50 0.63 2.97 14.12 1.54 
Turnover/Cap. (%) n. a. na. n. a. 22.4 31.5 26.6. 57.7 493 n. a. 
CapJGDP (%) na. n. a. na. 2.3 4.1 6.1 12.7 16.0 na. 
Av. daily. no. na. na. na. 94 293 286 652 1,488 na. 
of transactions 
Brokerage firms n. a. na. na. 46 50 55 56 56 n. a. 
% of companies n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 53 
on German 
exchanges 
Source: BSE reports, as cited in The 1997 Guide to Hungary, Euromoney, September 1997; The 1998 
Guide to Central and Eastern European Equities, Euromoney, February 1998; Data for turnover in 1998, 




Stock exchanges in CEECs 
Panel A 
Summary of price index performance for CEEC markets 
Annual percentage change in US$. 
1993 1994 
, 
1995 1996 1997 
Poland 717.9 -42.6 -9.2 71.8 -18.5 
Czech Republic n. a. -19.8 -25.2 16.9 -22.0 
Hungary 66.6 -8.9 -35.1 99.9 60.0 
Source: IFC (1998). 
Panel B 
Correlation of countries' price indices 
Pearson correlation based on monthly % change during the period from 1 993 to January 1998. 
Pearson correlation 
i) Hungary vs. Poland 0.43 
ii') Hungary vs. Czech Republic 0.32 
iii) Poland vs. Czech Republic 0.46 
Source: IFC (1998). 
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Table 3S 
Descriptive statistics of Polish companies 
Ex ante risk is the standard deviation of daily returns of the offerings during the first year of trading; 
Market volatility is measured by the standard deviation of returns on WSE Index two trading months 
prior to the listing; Gross proceeds in million US$ (current year exchange rate). Poland changed the 
value of the Zloty on January 1,1994. The 'new' Zloty's value is 10,000 times that of the 'old' zloty. 
Data has been adjusted to reflect this change; Market values are end of listing year market capitalisation 
in US$ million (end of 1998 exchange rate, PZ: US$ = 3.51); Time to listing is number of days between 
issued date and listing date; Percentage sold is equity share divested in PIPOs. 
Panel A 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
All IPOs (n=165) 
Market volatility (%) 1.99 1.82 0.86 0.009 0.047 159 
Ex ante risk (%) 4.81 3.53 12.71 0.021 1.640 163 
Market value ($m) 112.4 17.0 572.2 0.68 6,668.9 165 
Panel B 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
PIPOs (n= 55) 
Market vol. (%) 2.26 1.97 1.05 0.91 4.69 49 
Ex ante risk (°'o) 3.58 3.32 1.05 2.26 7.26 54 
% sold 64.94 72.50 31.37 14 100 34 
Gross proceeds ($m) 61.72 10.80 178.90 1.6 1,002 43 
Time to listing 95.53 100.00 39.51 36 139 15 
Market value (3m) 243.6 29.6 939.3 0.68 6,668.9 55 
Panel C 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
Other IPOs (n=110) 
Market volatility (%) 1.87 1.78 0.73 0.19 4.67 110 
Ex ante risk (%) 5.42 3.61 15.51 2.12 163.96 109 
Market value (Sm) 46.8 14.4 206.1 2.2 2,136.8 110 
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Table 3.6 
Descriptive statistics of Czech companies 
Ex ante risk is the standard deviation of daily returns of the offerings during the first year of trading. 
Market values are end of listing year market capitalisation in US$ million (end of 1998 exchange rate, 
CK: USS = 29.885). 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
All (n=98) 
Market value (Sm) 144.4 54.6 333.3 2.4 2,716.0 98 
Ex ante risk (%) 3.73 3.45 1.44 0.01 0.107 98 
Table 3.7 
Descriptive statistics of Hungarian companies 
Ex ante risk is the standard deviation of daily returns of the offerings during the first year of trading. 
Market volatility is measured by the standard deviation of returns on BSE Index two trading months prior 
to the listing. Gross proceeds in million Hungarian Forints. Market values are end of listing year market 
capitalisation in million Hungarian Forints. Time to listing is number of days between issued date and 
listing date. Capital raised is offer price times number of shares issued. 
Panel A 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
All IPOs (n=49) 
Market volatility (%) 0.35 0.78 0.93 0.00 4.93 43 
Ex ante risk (%) 3.46 3.21 1.81 0.49 10.28 39 
Gross proceeds (HFm) 30,022.42 3,037.69 122,869.59 16.10 756,178.29 38 
Time to listing 62.24 30.00 101.23 0.00 467 42 
Market value (1 Fm) 4,1032.41 2,544.00 183,671.23 109.89 1,124,412.00 37 
Panel B 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
PIPOs (n=25) 
Percentage sold (%) 41.70 30.45 23.04 18.20 100.00 16 
Market volatility (%) 0.91 0.74 1.04 0 4.93 22 
Ex ante risk (%) 2.60 2.71 0.85 0.49 4.22 19 
Gross proceeds (HFm) 49,876.2 5,345.62 160,029.9 16.10 756,178.3 22 
Time to listing 62.54 31 107.38 0 467 22 
Market value (HFm) 60,177.52 5,744 222,617.6 109.89 1,124,412.00 25 
Panel C 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
Other IPOs (n=24) 
Market volatility (%) 0.78 0.80 0.83 0 2.59 21 
Ex ante risk (%) 4.28 3.64 2.09 1.30 10.28 20 
Gross proceeds (HFm) 2,723.47 1,475.08 3,559.55 91.80 14,419.19 16 
Time to listing 61.9 27.00 96.79 0 365 20 
Market value (HFm) 4,652.72 1,670.72 9,254.98 243 41,215.20 24 
155 
Table 3.3 
Short run financial performance of Polish companies: PIPOs vs. private sector IPOs 
Panel A 
Distribution of Polish Raw (IR) and Market-Adjusted Initial Returns (MAIR) by Number of Firms 
PIPOs Other IPOs All IPOs 
Returns (%) IR MAIR IR EIAIR IR MAIIt 
Less than 0 14 14 53 43 67 62 
0-5 30 31 37 44 67 75 
5-10 97 20 14 29 21 
Over 10 23 04 27 
Total firms 55 55 110 110 165 165 
Panel B 
Average (mean and median) returns for Polish PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
P value for the one tail t-test of Mean =0 vs. Mean 2 0; P value for the Wilcoxon test of Median =0 vs. 
Median 2 0; (Results of the two tail tests Mean/Median =0 vs. Mean/Median -- 0 in brackets). 
PIPOs Other IPOs All POs 
Returns (%) IR MAJR IR INIAIR IR HAIR 
Mean 1.28 1.16 -0.02 0.22 0.41 0.53 
Median 0 0 0 0.12 0 0 
Standard deviation 5.03 4.21 5.55 5.10 5.40 4.83 
T-stat. p-value 0.03 0.02 0.52 0.32 0.17 0.08 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.96) (0.65) (0.33) (0.16) 
Wilcoxon Test p-value 0.03 0.02 0.55 0.34 0.19 0.07 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.90) (0.68) (0.38) (0.15) 
Panel C 
Test of differences in the return from PIPOs and private sector IPOs in Poland 
The level of significance of differences is indicated by P values 
Test method IR MAIR 
Statistics P- value Statistics P- value 
Parametric test. - 
One-way analysis of variance F= 2.14 0.145 F=1.37 0.24 
Non parametric test. - 
Alan n-Whitney test W= 5013 0.12 W= 4859 0.31 
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Table 3.9 
Raw initial returns for Polish PIPOs stratified by year of listing 
First order autocorrelation for the mean returns is - 0.18; First order autocorrelation for the number of 
companies is -0.58; Pearson correlation for this year mean and the following year count is 0.691. 
Year Mean (%) Median (%) Standard 
Dev. (%) 
Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
1991 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 9 
1992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5 
1993 0.0251 0.0000 0.0502 0.0000 0.1003 4 
1994 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0738 -0.0984 0.0867 7 
1995 0.0138 0.0000 0.0556 -0.0725 0.1000 9 
1996 0.0773 0.0963 0.0358 0.0360 0.0996 3 
1997 0.0089 0.0136 0.0484 -0.0789 0.1000 14 




Raw initial returns for Polish PIPOs stratified by industry 
Industry Mean 
(%) 
Median (%) Standard 
Dev. (%) 
Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
Banks 3.37 1.98 4.29 -0.71 10.00 9 
Chemicals 2.94 01.29 4.95 -0.87 10.04 4 
Clothing -1.81 0.00 3.62 -7.25 0.00 4 
Construction 1.64 0.00 4.74 -1.79 10.00 5 
Electrical 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 
Engineering 4.33 433 6.13 0.00 8.67 2 
Food and Drink -0.91 0.00 4.35 -9.84 4.62 7 
Health care 7.14 7.14 n. a. 7.14 7.14 1 
Household 0.19 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.74 4 
Telecommunications 11.20 11.20 n. a. 11.20 11.20 1 
Media -2.20 -2.20 n. a. -2.20 -2.20 1 
Metallurgy 4.54 4.54 7.21 -0.56 9.63 2 




First week returns for Polish PIPOs 
Panel -: Market-adjusted returns 




Max. (%) Count 
All issues -0.44 0.00 13.12 -97.7 44.6 151 
PRO 1.45 0.00 8.83 -17.2 31.1 50 
IPO -1.38 -0.27 14.75 -97.7 44.6 101 
Panel B: Raw returns 







All issues -1.10 0.00 1439 -100.00 43.4 163 
PIPO 0.74 0.00 11.65 -21.00 31.8 54 
IPO -2.03 -1.1 15.54 -100.00 43.4 109 
Panel C: Test of differences in the return from PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
The level of significance of differences is indicated by P values. To check for the robustness of the results 
we also performed two-sample t-test for difference in means. P values for IR and ; MIR were 0.20 and 
0.14 respectively. 
Test method IR MAIR 
Statistics P- value Statistics P- value 
Parametric test: 
F=1.56 0.21 
One way analysis of variance F=1.35 0.25 
Non parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney test 
W= 4648.5 0.44 W= 4071 0.28 
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Table 3.12 
Initial returns for Czech privatised companies 
P values for the two tail t-test of Mean =0 vs. Mean * 0; P values for the Wilcoxon test of Median =0 vs. 
Median # 0. 
IR (%) MAIR (%) 
Less than 0 20 16 
Equal 0 56 1 
Greater than 0 22 22 
Total Firms 98 39 
Mean Return -0.39 -0.45 
Median Return 0.00 1.80 
Standard Deviation 6.00 5.00 
Minimum -50.00 -7.00 
Maximum 9.70 6.00 
T-stat. p-value 0.530 0.540 
Wilcoaon test p-value 0.608 0.417 
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Table 3.13 
Initial returns for Czech privatised companies stratified by year of listing 
Year Mean Median Standard Dev. Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
1993 -1.19 0.00 7.72 -50.00 0.00 43 
1994 -1.01 0.00 4.40 -9.87 9.68 19 
1995 0.86 4.39 4.55 -5.00 5.00 36 
Total 98 
Table 3.14 







Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
Banks -1.05 0.00 4.23 -5.26 4.98 5 
Food and Drink -0.50 0.00 5.77 -8.50 9.68 8 
Construction and Building -0.12 0.00 3.28 -5.45 4.81 14 
Chemicals 1.21 0.00 3.10 -4.00 4.95 8 
Electricity 0.96 0.00 3.74 -4.88 5.00 15 
Electrical Equipment 0.77 0.00 1.89 0.00 4.62 6 
Engineering -1.65 0.00 3.50 -9.87 0.00 9 
Energy -0.88 0.00 4.02 -4.99 4.96 5 
Mining -0.71 0.00 1.89 -4.99 0.00 7 
Paper and Packaging 2.50 2.50 3.54 0.00 5.00 2 
Telecommunications 2.43 2.43 3.44 0.00 4.87 2 
Pharmaceuticals -1.25 -1.25 n. a. -1.25 -1.25 1 
Other Business/Diversified 
Groups 




Short run financial performance of Hungarian companies: PIP Os vs. private sector IPOs 
Panel A 
Distribution of Hungarian raw (IR) and market-adjusted returns (MAIR) by number of companies 
PIPOs Other IPOs All IPOs 
Returns (%) IR MAIR IR MAIR IR MAIR 
Less than 0 35 76 10 11 
0- 24.99 15 10 11 8 26 18 
25 - 49.99 35 33 68 
50-100 11 00 11 
Over 100 32 34 66 
Total firms 25 23 24 21 49 44 
Panel B 
Average (mean and median) returns for Hungarian PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
Returns are estimated on an equally weighted basis. P value for the one tail t-test of Mean =0 vs. Mean 
>_ 0; P value for the Wilcoxon test of Median =0 vs. Median Z 0; Results without outliers are given in 
brackets. 
PIP Os Other IPOs All IPOs 
Returns (%) 
Mean 76 44 28 40 53 11 
(9) (13) (-5) (3) (3) (8) 
Median 10 9 1 5 4 0 
(7) (5) (2) (3) (3) (4) 
Standard deviation 225 132 100 102 175 58 
(22) (23) (33) (26) (28) (24) 
T-stat. p-value 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.00 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.74) (0.33) (0.28) (0.02) 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.00 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.63) (0.24) (0.08) (0.01) 
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Panel C 
Test of differences in the return form PIPOs and private sector IPOs in Hungary 
The level of significance of differences is indicated by P values. P values for the tests after exclusion of 
the outliers are given in the brackets. In order to examine the robustness of the results we tested the 
hypothesis of equality of mean returns using the two-sample t-test. P values for IR and MAIR are 0.28 
and 0.67 respectively. 
Test method IR MAIR 
Statistics p- value Statistics P- value 
Parametric test. - 
One-way analysis of F= 0.94 (2.68) 0.34 (0.11) F= 0.20 (1.57) 0.66 (0.22) 
variance 




Raw initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs stratified by year of listing 
First order autocorrelation of the mean returns is -0.32; First order of the number of companies is -0.36; 







Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
1991 159.00 8.00 397.00 -43.00 969.00 6 
1992 -6.00 0.00 17.00 -25.00 7.00 3 
1993 42.00 38.00 26.00 18.00 70.00 3 
1994 19.00 20.00 13.00 2.00 32.00 4 
1995 0.00 1.00 3.00 -4.00 2.00 3 
1996 10.00 10.00 14.00 0.00 19.00 2 
1997 251.00 102.00 335.00 16.00 635.00 3 




Raw initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs stratified by industry 




Min. (%) Max. (%) Count 
Banks -4.17 -4.17 n. a. -4.17 -4.167 1 
Chemicals 12.46 5.68 17.89 0.00 38.462 4 
Clothing and Textiles -13.97 -13.97 41.03 -42.98 15.049 2 
Construction 2.77 2.77 n. a. 2.77 2.767 1 
Energy 1.00 1.00 n. a. 1.00 1.000 1 
Food and Drink 23.98 12.22 31.11 1.91 69.56 4 
Pharmaceuticals 19.63 22.22 13.05 1.73 32.33 4 
Property 15.56 15.56 n. a. 15.56 15.56 1 
Retail and Distribution 317.82 9.60 564.23 -25.16 969.03 3 
Telecommunication 635.00 635.00 n. a. 635.00 635.00 1 




First week returns for Hungarian PIPOs 
Panel A 
Market-adjusted returns 
Due to some gaps in data during the first week we were not able to calculate returns for 8 companies. 
Mean 
(%) 
Median (°/a) Standard 
dev. 
Min. (%) Max. Count 
All issues 4.68 -0.52 25.94 -33.27 109.31 36 
PIPO 7.02 0.38 19.11 -13.86 76.80 22 












All issues -5.32 -0.12 40.80 -100 110 47 
PIPO -1.82 0.00 35.26 -100 79.85 24 
IPO -3.97 -3.33 46.40 -100 110 23 
Panel C 
Test of differences in the return from PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
The level of significance of differences is indicated by P-values. To check for the robustness of the results 
we also performed two-sample t- test for difference in means. P values for IR and MAIR are 0.56 and 
0.56 respectively. 
Test method JR MAIR 
Statistics P- value Statistics P- value 
Parametric test: 
One way analysis of variance F=036 0.55 F=0.45 0.50 
Non parametric test: 
. 'Kann-Whitney test W= 649 0.12 W=470 0.04 
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Table 3.19 
Results of bivariate analysis for HAIR and explanatory variables 
Market-adjusted initial returns are regressed on the logarithm of market value (MV), a dummy variable 
distinguishing regulated industries (INDUSTRY), a variable indicating the order of the offer within the 
country's privatisation programme (ORDER), ex ante uncertainty proxied by standard deviation of prices 
during first twelve months after listing (EX ANTE), market volatility proxied by percentage change in 
market index two trading months prior to the offer (MVOL), percentage of shares sold in privatisation 
(SOLD), a dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with participation of insiders (INSIDERS), a 
dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with foreign participation (FOREIGN); Results for 
Pearson's `r'; *** indicates significance at the 1% level (2-tailed t-test) 
MV INDUSTRY ORDER EX ANTE MVOL SOLD FOREIGN INSIDERS 
1VLAIR 0.286*** 0.074 0.129 -0.100 -0.228 -0.139 -0.068 -0.031 
Table 3.20 
Correlation matrix for variables used in OLS estimation of the models for the pooled size samples 
using HAIR as dependent variable 
Market adjusted initial returns are regressed on the logarithm of market value (MV), a dummy variable 
distinguishing regulated industries (INDUSTRY), a variable indicating the order of the offer within the 
country's privatisation programme (ORDER), ex ante uncertainty proxied by standard deviation of prices 
during first twelve months after listing (EX ANTE), market volatility proxied by percentage change in 
market index two trading months prior to the offer (MVOL), percentage of shares sold in privatisation 
(SOLD), a dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with participation of insiders (INSIDERS), a 
dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with foreign participation (FOREIGN); 
MV INDUSTRY ORDER EX-ANTE MVOL SOLD FOREIGN 
INDUSTRY 0.122 
ORDER 0.454 0.182 
EX-ANTE -0.167 -0.037 -0.328 
11VOL 0.216 0.064 0.028 0.419 
SOLD -0.479 0.006 -0.436 0.492 0.316 
FOREIGN 0.031 0.105 -0.222 0.035 0.290 0.575 
INSIDER -0.233 0.043 -0.468 0.013 0.233 0.553 0.402 
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Table 3.21 
Results from the OLS estimation of the models for the pooled size samples using Mai as 
dependent variable based on White's heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors 
Market-adjusted initial returns are regressed on the logarithm of market value (MV), a dummy variable 
distinguishing regulated industries (INDUSTRY), a variable indicating the order of the offer within the 
country's privatisation programme (ORDER), ex ante uncertainty proxied by standard deviation of prices 
during first twelve months after listing (EX ANTE), market volatility proxied by percentage change in 
market index two trading months prior to the offer (MVOL), percentage of shares sold in privatisation 
(SOLD), a dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with participation of insiders (INSIDERS), a 
dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with foreign participation (FOREIGN); Missing values 
eliminated listwise; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant -0.249 -0.282 -0.378 -0.502 -0.393 -0.247 -0.111 
jWV 0.113 0.171 0.224* 0.255* 0.274* 0.18* 0.180* 
INDUSTRY 0.062 0.195 0.317 0.327 0.384 0.211* 0.241* 
ORDER -0.001 -0.001* -0.002 -0.003* -0.005* -0.003* -0.004* 
EX-ANTE -0.034* -0.206* -0.283* -0.278* -0.292* -0.186* -0.203* 
INIVOL 0.231 0.318 0.347* 0.357* 0.255* 0.273* 
SOLD -0.001 0.003 0.004 
FOREIGN -0.523* -0.351 -0.324* 
INSIDERS -0.425* -0.334* 
F statistics 3.10** 4.1*** 3.06** 2.93** 2.60** 3.68*** 3.27*** 
RZ 8.8% 25.5% 35.1% 38.3% 39.4% 27.2% 28.3% 
Adjusted RZ 6.0% 19.2% 23.6% 25.2% 24.2% 19.8% 19.6% 
N 132 66 41 41 41 66 66 
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Table 4.1 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for Polish PIPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The average 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the WIG Index as a benchmark; The t- 
statistic for AR4 is computed for each month as AR4'1(nt)/SD,. where AP, is the average adjusted return for 
month t, n, is the number of observations in month t, and SD, is the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is 
computed as CAR4 I(nJ/CSDt where n1 is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD, is 
computed as CSD1 = q[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) 
cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARS series. (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of 
firms 
Negative AR1s Positive AR(s Average AR, 
(%) 
t-Stat CAR, (%) t-Stat 
1 54 28 26 -1.427 -0.708 -1.427 -0.612 
2 53 22 31 3.921 1.962 2.494 0.765 
3 53 28 25 -0.092 -0.060 2.402 0.606 
4 52 29 23 -0.707 -0.415 1.696 0.368 
5 52 32 20 -2.102 -0.985 -0.407 -0.079 
6 52 27 25 1.324 0.650 0.917 0.163 
7 52 26 26 0.895 0.373 1.812 0.299 
8 52 29 23 -0.794 -0.378 1.018 0.157 
9 48 29 19 -2.912 -1.448 -1.893 -0.265 
10 47 25 22 2.954 1.026 1.061 0.139 
11 45 24 21 -3.129 -0.545 -2.068 -0.253 
12 45 24 21 -0.092 -0.047 -2.160 -0.254 
13 44 28 16 0.748 0.273 -1.412 -0.157 
14 43 26 17 -1.483 -0.689 -2.895 -0.308 
15 42 19 23 0.080 0.036 -2.815 -0.286 
16 40 25 15 -4.492 -1.976 -7.307 -0.701 
17 39 21 18 1.785 0.745 -5.522 -0.508 
18 39 21 18 1.383 0.508 -4.139 -0.370 
19 38 23 15 -0.550 -0.239 -4.689 -0.402 
20 38 18 20 -0.324 -0.090 -5.013 -0.419 
21 37 23 14 -0.020 -0.006 -5.033 -0.406 
22 37 19 18 1.812 0.841 -3.221 -0.254 
23 37 23 14 -0.717 -0.332 -3.937 -0.303 
24 37 19 18 -0.123 -0.068 -4.060 -0.306 
25 37 21 16 0.565 0.236 -3.496 -0.258 
26 37 21 16 -3.097 -1.085 -6.593 -0.478 
27 36 22 14 -2.541 -1.057 -9.134 -0.641 
28 36 23 13 2.457 0.666 -6.677 -0.460 
29 36 21 15 -0.791 -0.246 -7.468 -0.505 
30 36 20 16 0.600 0.336 -6.868 -0.457 
31 36 20 16 -0.840 -0.395 -7.708 -0.505 
32 34 18 16 1.732 0.665 -5.976 -0.374 
33 34 17 17 0.296 0.122 -5.680 -0.350 
34 32 16 16 2.938 0.673 -2.742 -0.162 
35 32 19 13 2.100 0.617 -0.642 -0.037 
36 31 15 16 -1.200 -0.437 -1.842 -0.104 
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Table 4.2 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for Polish PIPOs taking clustering into 
account 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; PIPOs are 
classified into portfolios depending on the calendar month and the year of listing. The abnormal returns 
are then calculated, using the WIG Index as a benchmark, based on the portfolio returns rather than on 
returns for individual companies. The average abnormal returns for the portfolios are then averaged for 
trading months one to thirty six; The t-statistic for AR, is computed for each month as ARS4(rk)/SD,. ae,, 
AR, is the average adjusted return for month t, n1 is the number of portfolios in month t, and SD1 is the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative 
average adjusted return in month t is computed as CARL'(n3/CSDr, where n, is the number of portfolios in 
each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSD1 = 'l[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the 
average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR1 
series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of 
portfolios 
Negative ARts Positive ARjs Average ARt 
(%) 
t-Stat CARL (%) t-Stat 
1 37 20 17 -0.861 -0.433 -0.861 -0.360 
2 36 14 22 2.629 1.454 1.769 0.459 
3 36 20 16 -1.074 -0.605 0.694 0.142 
4 35 20 15 -2.123 -1.124 -1.429 -0.246 
5 35 21 14 -2.289 -1.077 -3.717 -0.568 
6 35 16 19 1.895 0.844 -1.822 -0.253 
7 35 20 15 0.691 0.308 -1.131 -0.145 
8 35 18 17 0.446 0.245 -0.686 -0.082 
9 33 19 14 -3.172 -1.255 -3.858 -0.420 
10 32 15 17 2.831 0.720 -1.026 -0.104 
11 31 17 14 -2.859 -0.535 -3.885 -0.369 
12 31 17 14 -1.029 -0.450 -4.915 -0.447 
13 30 18 12 2.679 0.721 -2.235 -0.192 
14 30 19 11 -0.362 -0.136 -2.597 -0.214 
15 29 13 16 1.493 0.628 -1.104 -0.087 
16 28 18 10 -5.290 -1.821 -6.394 -0.476 
17 27 15 12 2.150 0.669 -4.244 -0.301 
18 27 13 14 2.605 0.729 -1.640 -0.113 
19 27 16 11 -0.060 -0.028 -1.699 -0.114 
20 27 13 14 -3.079 -1.088 -4.778 -0.312 
21 26 15 11 -1.981 -0.978 -6.759 -0.423 
22 26 15 11 0.570 0.248 -6.190 -0.378 
23 26 16 10 -0.353 -0.160 -6.543 -0.391 
24 26 13 13 0.670 0.341 -5.873 -0.343 
25 26 15 11 -0.795 -0.271 -6.667 -0.382 
26 26 14 12 0.272 0.102 -6.395 -0.359 
27 25 16 9 -4.485 -1.890 -10.880 -0.587 
28 25 17 8 -1.759 -0.668 -12.639 -0.670 
29 25 13 12 -0.308 -0.094 -12.947 -0.674 
30 25 12 13 -0.185 -0.100 -13.132 -0.672 
31 25 12 13 -0.100 -0.039 -13.232 -0.666 
32 23 11 12 4.621 1.417 -8.611 -0.409 
33 23 14 9 -0.617 -0.194 -9.228 -0.432 
34 22 12 10 -0.121 -0.047 -9.349 -0.421 
35 22 13 9 1.779 0.489 -7.569 -0.336 
36 21 11 10 -0.668 -0.269 -8.238 -0.352 
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Table 43 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for Polish private sector IPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The average 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the WIG Index as a benchmark; The t- 
statistic for AR4 is computed for each month as ARt /(n, )/SD,. where ARS is the average adjusted return 
for month t, n, is the number of observations in month t, and SD, is the cross-sectional standard deviation 
of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t 
is computed as CAP, 'I(nJ/CSD1, where n, is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD, is 
computed as CSDt = t[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) 
cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the Alt series. (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number 
of firms 
Negative AR, s Positive ABCs AR, (%) t-Stat CAR, (%) t-Stat 
1 108 60 48 -2.228 -1.163 -2.228 -1.195 
2 104 63 41 -2.813 -2.004 -5.041 -1.915 
3 92 61 31 -2.087 -1.239 -7.128 -2.094 
4 91 47 44 -0.178 -0.121 -7.306 -1.855 
5 85 54 31 0.717 0.325 -6.589 -1.449 
6 77 45 32 -1.243 -0.689 -7.832 -1.499 
7 72 48 24 -4.043 -1.838 -11.875 -2.037 
8 71 38 33 -0.410 -0.174 -12.285 -1.959 
9 69 49 20 -0.031 -0.005 -12.316 -1.826 
10 62 39 23 -1.974 -1.365 -14.290 -1.907 
11 59 44 15 -22.923 -3.799 -37.213 -4.620 
12 59 34 25 -2.429 -1.541 -39.642 -4.713 
13 59 38 21 -2.203 -1.027 -41.845 -4.782 
14 55 36 19 -0.971 -0.246 -42.817 -4.553 
15 52 39 13 -2.689 -1.262 -45.506 -4.547 
16 43 25 18 -0.185 -0.075 -45.690 -4.020 
17 43 24 19 1.177 0.455 -44.513 -3.800 
18 43 25 18 -1.821 -0.895 -46.334 -3.845 
19 41 27 14 -4.320 -1.762 -50.654 -3.995 
20 39 30 9 -5.523 -3.027 -56.177 -4.213 
21 38 22 16 0.906 0.268 -55.271 -3.993 
22 34 21 13 0.130 0.054 -55.141 -3.682 
23 33 23 10 -3.415 -1.808 -58.556 -3.768 
24 31 17 14 -1.409 -0.752 -59.965 -3.661 
25 31 20 11 -5.252 -2.492 -65.217 -3.902 
26 25 14 11 4.048 0.987 -61.169 -3.223 
27 25 15 10 -1.977 -0.609 -63.146 -3.265 
28 25 14 11 0.659 0.320 -62.486 -3.173 
29 25 14 11 1.325 0.600 -61.161 -3.051 
30 25 12 13 3.513 0.940 -57.648 -2.828 
31 25 18 7 -2.895 -0.880 -60.543 -2.922 
32 24 12 12 1.558 0.572 -58.985 -2.745 
33 23 14 9 -0.291 -0.116 -59.276 -2.660 
34 22 13 9 -1.204 -0.412 -60.480 -2.615 
35 19 8 11 -0.914 -0.342 -61.394 -2.431 
36 19 14 5 -5.409 -2.282 -66.802 -2.609 
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Table 4.4 
Test of differences in the cumulative abnormal returns from PIPOs and private sector IPOs in 
Poland 
P values indicate the level of significance of two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney test for difference in 
average (mean and median) returns. 
Test method 
1 2 3 6 
Month 
12 18 24 30 36 
T-test 
Statistics 0.29 2.76 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.49 -0.70 1.16 P-value 0.77 0.01 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.62 0.49 0.25 
Mann-Whitney test 
P-value 0.81 0.02 0.15 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.52 0.84 0.09 
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Table 4.5 
Comparison of different holding period market-adjusted returns for Polish PIPOs and private 
sector IPOs 
ýMACRs are computed as buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the WIG Index as a 
benchmark; P values for two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney median tests, indicate the level of 
significance for the difference in the average (mean and median) MACRs for a given holding period; 
Average MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The two-tail t-test 
of mean =0 vs. mean #0 suggests statistical significance of 3-month and 36-month private sector IPOs 
returns; The two-tail t-test of mean =0 vs. mean x0 suggests no statistical significance for PIPOs returns; 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




1 week 0.45 n=54 -0.99 n=109 0.42 0.47 
2 weeks 0.20 n7--54 -032 n=109 0.83 0.99 
3 weeks -1.45 n=54 -1.70 n=109 0.92 0.81 
1 month -1.40 n=54 - 2.72 n=109 0.63 0.59 
2 months 2.00 n=53 -3.95 n=105 0.10 0.06 
3 months 2.21 n7--53 - 6.00** n=93 0.06 0.02 
6 months 0.11 n=52 0.68 n7--78 0.94 0.60 
12 months 1.96 n=45 -10.46 n=60 0.48 0.31 
18 months - 9.40 n=39 8.23 n=42 0.70 0.39 
24 months 66.46 n=37 10.81 n=32 0.61 0.57 
30 months 29.45 n=36 - 6.06 n=26 0.65 0.96 
36 months -11.47 n=31 -50.93*** n=19 0.72 0.89 
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Table 4.6 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors 
Panel A: Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in 
Polish PIPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Share prices for 
PIPOs in local currency; The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the 
Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; The t-statistic for ARt is computed for each month as AR1 
'I(n, )/SD1. where AR, is the average adjusted return for month t, n, is the number of observations in month 
t, and SD, is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for 
the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as CAR, ß(n1)/CSD, where n, is the 
number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSDI = 'I[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is 
the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the AR1 series. (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative Ants Positive AR; s ARS (%) t-Stat CARE (%) t-Stat 
1 55 37 18 -2.868 -0.983 -2.868 -0.930 
2 55 26 29 5.765 2.514 2.897 0.678 
3 55 30 25 0.304 0.138 3.201 0.616 
4 55 30 25 0.407 0.142 3.609 0.603 
5 55 35 20 -1.805 -0.684 1.803 0.270 
6 55 28 27 3.080 1.226 4.883 0.669 
7 55 25 30 4.359 1.412 9.242 1.173 
8 55 24 31 0.668 0.295 9.910 1.178 
9 55 33 22 -2.315 -0.988 7.595 0.852 
10 55 24 31 6.475 2.100 14.070 1.497 
11 54 29 25 -6.881 -1.059 7.189 0.723 
12 52 30 22 0.811 0.302 8.001 0.756 
13 51 27 24 0.326 0.093 8.326 0.749 
14 50 28 22 2.602 0.776 10.928 0.938 
15 50 21 29 3.162 1.084 14.090 1.169 
16 50 24 26 3.358 1.312 17.448 1.402 
17 50 18 32 5.383 2.380 22.832 1.780 
18 48 25 23 4.076 1.319 26.908 1.998 
19 42 17 25 3.660 1.512 30.568 2.067 
20 41 22 19 3.726 1.095 34.295 2.233 
21 38 18 20 6.447 1.340 40.741 2.493 
22 38 17 21 7.365 2.174 48.106 2.876 
23 37 20 17 0.062 0.019 48.169 2.779 
24 35 11 24 12.150 2.967 60.318 3.314 
25 34 19 15 5.582 1.211 65.901 3.497 
26 32 18 14 4.112 0.970 70.013 3.534 
27 32 17 15 3.431 0.960 73.444 3.638 
28 32 16 16 8.091 1.384 81.536 3.967 
29 32 13 19 7.219 1.683 88.754 4.243 
30 31 15 16 1.058 0.381 89.812 4.155 
31 31 17 14 -0.159 -0.050 89.653 4.081 
32 31 20 11 0.874 0.229 90.528 4.056 
33 31 14 17 4.109 1.193 94.636 4.175 
34 31 18 13 5.432 0.928 100.068 4.350 
35 31 13 18 4.886 1.156 104.954 4.496 
36 30 13 17 3.480 1.167 108.434 4.506 
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Panel B 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in Polish 
private sector IPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Share prices for 
private sector IPOs in local currency; The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are 
computed using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; The t-statistic for AR, is computed for 
each month as AR1 I(nJ/SD1, where AR, is the average adjusted return for month t, nt is the number of 
observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for 
month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as CAR, 
q(n3/CSD1, where n1 is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSD1= 4[t 
var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, 
and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative ARCS Positive ARts ARt (%) t-Stat CARE (%) t-Stat 
1 110 60 50 -1.752 -0.835 -1.752 -0.850 
2 106 64 42 -3.284 -2.217 -5.036 -1.731 
3 94 55 39 -0.133 -0.063 -5.169 -1.376 
4 92 60 32 -3.097 -1.622 -8.266 -1.891 
5 85 53 32 1.253 0.501 -7.013 -1.383 
6 77 46 31 -2.275 -1.232 -9.289 -1.593 
7 72 50 22 -4.350 -1.651 -13.639 -2.097 
8 71 41 30 -1.819 -0.771 -15.458 -2.209 
9 69 43 26 3.909 0.627 -11.549 -1.535 
10 62 39 23 -0.537 -0.267 -12.086 -1.445 
11 59 46 13 -24.411 -4.090 -36.496 -4.060 
12 59 38 21 -4.641 -2.469 -41.137 -4.383 
13 58 36 22 -1.793 -0.657 -42.930 -4.359 
14 54 30 24 1.823 0.395 -41.107 -3.882 
15 51 37 14 -2.496 -0.941 -43.603 -3.866 
16 43 23 20 0.871 0.346 -42.732 -3.369 
17 43 24 19 0.371 0.118 -42.361 -3.241 
18 43 27 16 -0.711 -0.298 -43.072 -3.203 
19 41 22 19 -0.873 -0.300 -43.945 -3.106 
20 38 24 14 -1.109 -0.495 -45.055 -2.989 
21 37 26 11 -1.650 -0.407 -46.705 -2.984 
22 34 18 16 -0.329 -0.100 -47.033 -2.814 
23 32 21 11 -4.631 -1.863 -51.664 -2.934 
24 30 16 14 0.359 0.185 -51.305 -2.761 
25 30 19 11 -6.082 -2.465 -57.387 -3.027 
26 24 12 12 4.390 0.815 -52.998 -2.452 
27 24 12 12 0.125 0.032 -52.873 -2.400 
28 24 16 8 -0.504 -0.193 -53.377 -2.380 
29 24 12 12 0.792 0.233 -52.586 -2.304 
30 24 13 11 2.712 0.614 -49.874 -2.148 
31 24 14 10 -3.178 -0.753 -53.051 -2.248 
32 23 12 11 1.588 0.441 -51.463 -2.101 
33 22 11 11 -0.367 -0.149 -51.830 -2.038 
34 21 14 7 -3.273 -1.042 -55.103 -2.086 
35 19 7 12 1.124 0.327 -53.979 -1.916 
36 19 13 6 -3.556 -1.524 -57.535 -2.013 
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Table 4.7 
Test of differences in cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in Polish PIPOs 
and private sector IPOs 
P values indicate the level of significance of two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney test for difference in 
average (mean and median) returns. Unreported P values for t-tests in months 7,10,11, and 25 show 
significantly higher average returns for PIPOs at 10% level or better, Unreported P values for Mann- 
Whitney tests in months 7,10,11,15,17, and 21 show significant differences in average returns at 10% 
level or better. 
Test method 
1 2 3 
Month 
6 12 18 24 30 36 
T-test 
Statistics -0.31. 3.31 0.14 1.72 1.66 1.23 2.60 -0.32 1.86 
P-value 0.76 0.00 0.89 0.09 0.10 0.22 0.01 0.75 0.07 
Mann-Whitney test 
P-value 0.47 0.00 0.62 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.05 0.98 0.11 
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Table 4.8 
Comparison of average buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for foreign investors in Polish 
PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
Share prices for PIPOs and private sector IPOs in local currency; The average MACRs are computed as 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; 
Average MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; P value for t-test 
and Mann-Whitney median test, indicate the level of significance for the difference in the average (mean 
and median) MACRs for a given holding period; MACR do not include first day returns; Significance 
levels for the two-tail t-test of mean =O vs. mean #0 indicated as: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 




1 week 1.43 n=55 -1.03 n=110 0.29 0.81 
2 weeks 0.23 n=55 -0.07 n=110 0.92 0.61 
3 weeks -3.04 n=55 -1.21 n=110 0.55 0.39 
1 month -2.60 n=55 -2.63 n=110 0.99 0.82 
2 months 2.41 n=55 -4.61* n=106 0.10 0.12 
3 months 3.65 n=55 -4.90 n=94 0.15 0.14 
6 months 6.51 n=55 0.71 n=78 0.64 0.29 
12 months 21.43 n7-52 -8.13 n=60 0.18 0.01 
18 months 88.35** n=48 47.73 n=42 0.47 0.08 
24 months 323.28* n=35 72.02 n=32 0.17 0.07 
30 months 402.68*** n=31 69.53 n=26 0.04 0.02 
36 months 530.18*** n=30 47.45 n7-19 0.00 0.03 
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Table 4.9 
Czech companies average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the PSE Index as a 
benchmark; We were unable to calculate returns for all companies in first 18 months due to gaps in price 
data series. For example, during 1996-98 several companies were taken-over and consequently delisted; 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The t-statistic for 
AR, is computed for each month as AR1 I(ns)/SD,, where AR1 is the average adjusted return for month t, n1 
is the number of observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted 
returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as 
CAR, I(n, )/CSD1, where n, is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSD, = 
q[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional 
variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative ARts Positive ARts AR, (%) t-Stat CARL (%) t-Stat 
1 39 33 6 -15.294 -5.409 -15.294 -6.904 
2 46 22 24 1.094 0.583 -14.200 -4.922 
3 46 23 23 2.452 0.663 -11.748 -3.325 
4 46 18 28 3.063 1.582 -8.685 -2.129 
5 46 21 25 2.097 1.337 -6.588 -1.444 
6 46 22 24 4.508 2.417 -2.079 -0.416 
7 46 15 31 6.371 3.334 4.292 0.795 
8 46 32 14 -6.664 -3.826 -2.372 -0.411 
9 46 22 24 1.812 1.046 -0.560 -0.091 
10 46 24 22 1.043 0.535 0.483 0.075 
11 46 27 19 -3.343 -1.125 -2.860 -0.423 
12 46 25 21 -0.442 -0.256 -3.302 -0.467 
13 46 25 21 -0.088 -0.053 -3.389 -0.461 
14 46 28 18 -3.652 -2.404 -7.041 -0.923 
15 46 18 28 4.831 2.519 -2.210 -0.280 
16 46 26 20 0.637 0.509 -1.573 -0.193 
17 46 30 16 0.076 0.057 -1.497 -0.178 
18 46 19 27 3.498 2.122 2.001 0.231 
19 47 24 23 1.350 0.852 3.351 0.381 
20 47 25 22 -2.234 -1.940 1.117 0.124 
21 47 22 25 1.158 0.568 2.276 0.246 
22 47 35 12 -4.497 -3.488 -2.221 -0.235 
23 47 27 20 -0.573 -0.506 -2.795 -0.289 
24 47 34 13 -3.916 -1.999 -6.710 -0.679 
25 47 19 28 2.952 1.478 -3.758 -0.372 
26 47 22 25 -1.755 -1.139 -5.513 -0.536 
27 47 24 23 -0.539 -0.295 -6.052 -0.577 
28 47 27 20 -1.949 -0.906 -8.001 -0.749 
29 47 25 22 -0.388 -0.200 -8.389 -0.772 
30 47 37 10 -2.756 -1.066 -11.145 -1.008 
31 47 14 33 5.600 2.574 -5.545 -0.494 
32 47 26 21 2.753 0.720 -2.792 -0.245 
33 47 17 30 2.886 1.277 0.094 0.008 
34 47 26 21 -1.262 -0.900 -1.168 -0.099 
35 47 32 15 -2.876 -1.899 -4.044 -0.339 
36 47 17 30 1.465 0.717 -2.579 -0.213 
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Table 4.10 
Czech companies average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns taking clustering into 
account 
PIPOs are classified into portfolios depending on the calendar month and the year of listing. The 
abnormal returns are then calculated, using the PSE Index as a benchmark, based on the portfolio returns 
rather than on returns for individual companies. The average abnormal returns for the portfolios are then 
averaged for trading months one to thirty six; Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis 
without initial premiums; The t-statistic for AR, is computed for each month as AR, 4(nJ/SDt. where AR, 
is the average adjusted return for month t, n1 is the number of portfolios in month t, and SDt is the cross- 
sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average 
adjusted return in month t is computed as CARL 4(nß)/CSD, where n, is the number of portfolios in each 
month, and CSD1 is computed as CSD1 = I[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the 
average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR1 
series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of 
portfolios 
Negative AR1s Positive AREs ARt (%) t-Stat CARL (%) t-Stat 
1 5 3 2 -3.715 -0.457 -3.715 -0.894 
2 6 1 5 7.008 2.897 3.293 0.611 
3 6 1 5 6.822 1.639 10.115 1.529 
4 6 3 3 -1.430 -0.606 8.686 1.136 
5 6 3 3 -1.227 -0.394 7.458 0.872 
6 6 2 4 2.028 0.810 9.487 1.012 
7 6 2 4 2.101 0.975 11.588 1.145 
8 6 3 3 2.031 0.514 13.619 1.258 
9 6 2 4 1.451 0.539 15.070 1.312 
10 6 2 4 -0.220 -0.072 14.850 1.227 
11 6 4 2 1.748 0.298 16.598 1.307 
12 6 3 3 -6.945 -1.659 9.653 0.728 
13 6 3 3 -0.945 -0.408 8.708 0.631 
14 6 4 2 -3.079 -1.169 5.630 0.393 
15 6 2 4 8.019 1.267 13.649 0.920 
16 6 4 2 -3.240 -1.472 10.409 0.680 
17 6 5 1 -3.903 -2.948 6.506 0.412 
18 6 1 5 1.440 0.656 7.946 0.489 
19 6 3 3 0.072 0.020 8.018 0.480 
20 6 3 3 -0.293 -0.120 7.725 0.451 
21 6 1 5 4.090 1.977 11.815 0.673 
22 6 6 0 -4.289 -3.701 7.526 0.419 
23 6 3 3 -0.395 -0.435 7.131 0.388 
24 6 4 2 -6.576 -1.022 0.555 0.030 
25 6 5 1 -6.423 -1.170 -5.867 -0.306 
26 6 3 3 3.852 0.972 -2.016 -0.103 
27 6 4 2 -5.061 -1.797 -7.076 -0.356 
28 6 4 2 -9.492 -1.097 -16.568 -0.817 
29 6 5 1 -5.519 -1.329 -22.087 -1.071 
30 6 3 3 1.647 0.443 -20.440 -0.974 
31 6 0 6 8.003 4.708 -12.437 -0.583 
32 6 4 2 -1.079 -0.533 -13.516 -0.624 
33 6 3 3 -2.987 -0.729 -16.503 -0.750 
34 6 5 1 -2.160 -1.539 -18.663 -0.836 
35 6 3 3 -0.678 -0.402 -19.342 -0.854 
36 6 4 2 -4.695 -1.412 -24.037 -1.046 
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Table 4.11 
Average buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns for Czech companies 
MACRs are computed as buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the PSE Index as a 
benchmark; Average MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; 
Significance levels for the two-tail t-test of meaner vs. mean #0 indicated as: *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Holding period N Mean (%) 
1 Week 49 1.36*** 
2 Weeks 49 -0.22 
3 Weeks 49 1.06*** 
1 Month 49 1.94** 
2 Months 49 0.67 
3 Months 49 -1.08** 
6 Months 49 -0.96*** 
12 Months 49 -0.66 
18 Months 49 -1.12*** 
24 Months 49 -0.10*** 
30 Months 48 -3.15*** 
36 Months 48 -3.32*** 
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Table 4.12 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors in Czech companies 
First trading day returns are excluded; Share prices for privatised companies in local currency; The 
average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the Datastream Europe Index as 
a benchmark; Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The 
t-statistic for AR1 is computed for each month as AR, s(nJ/SDt where ARt is the average adjusted return 
for month t, nn is the number of observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation 
of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t 
is computed as CAR, 'I(nJ/CSD1, where n1 is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is 
computed as CSD1 = 'i[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) 
cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative AR, s Positive ARts AR, (%) t-Stat CAR, (%) t-Stat 
1 34 28 6 -9.526 -2.198 -9.526 -3.433 
2 34 25 9 -6.440 -2.682 -15.966 -4.069 
3 34 20 14 0.535 0.131 -15.431 -3.211 
4 34 23 11 0.171 0.053 -15.260 -2.750 
5 34 13 21 3.360 1.560 -11.900 -1.918 
6 34 12 22 10.696 2.481 -1.204 -0.177 
7 34 17 17 6.149 1.752 4.945 0.674 
8 34 20 14 -5.152 -1.679 -0.208 -0.026 
9 34 20 14 -1.914 -0.809 -2.122 -0.255 
10 34 20 14 -0.818 -0.366 -2.939 -0.335 
11 34 24 10 -15.491 -3.099 -18.431 -2.003 
12 34 17 17 0.862 0.430 -17.568 -1.828 
13 34 13 21 2.943 1.306 -14.625 -1.462 
14 34 19 15 -1.840 -0.879 -16.466 -1.586 
15 34 12 22 6.273 2.433 -10.193 -0.948 
16 34 20 14 -1.979 -1.046 -12.172 -1.097 
17 34 18 16 0.196 0.094 -11.976 -1.047 
18 34 13 21 5.264 1.787 -6.712 -0.570 
19 34 18 16 3.198 1.091 -3.515 -0.291 
20 34 26 8 -3.731 -1.702 -7.246 -0.584 
21 34 20 14 -2.557 -1.118 -9.803 -0.771 
22 34 16 18 -2.100 -1.150 -11.903 -0.915 
23 34 20 14 0.338 0.184 -11.564 -0.869 
24 34 17 17 0.519 0.277 -11.046 -0.813 
25 34 19 15 -1.478 -0.934 -12.524 -0.903 
26 34 18 16 1.117 0.506 -11.407 -0.806 
27 34 21 13 -6.073 -2.963 -17.480 -1.212 
28 34 24 10 -4.419 -1.657 -21.900 -1.491 
29 34 23 11 -3.738 -1.879 -25.638 -1.716 
30 34 19 15 1.117 0.613 -24.521 -1.613 
31 34 10 24 6.820 3.101 -17.701 -1.146 
32 34 23 11 -0.130 -0.027 -17.831 -1.136 
33 34 15 19 2.632 1.039 -15.198 -0.953 
34 34 27 7 -9.821 -4.190 -25.019 -1.546 
35 34 23 11 -4.945 -2.282 -29.965 -1.825 
36 34 19 15 -3.241 -1.183 -33.206 -1.994 
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Table 4.13 
Average buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for foreign investors investing in Czech companies 
Share prices for privatised companies in local currency; The average MACRs are computed as buy-and- 
hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; Average 
MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; MACR do not include first 
day returns; Significance levels for the two-tail t-test of mean =O vs. mean #0 indicated as: *significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Holding Period N Mean (%) 
1 Week 34 0.66 
2 Weeks 34 -8.53*** 
3 Weeks 34 -10.76* 
1 Month 34 -9.95** 
2 Months 34 "16.34*** 
3 Months 34 -15.28*** 
6 Months 34 -8.37 
12 Months 34 -17.45** 
18 Months 34 3.15 
24 Months 34 -8.59 
30 Months 34 -29.12** 
36 Months 34 -40.99** 
182 
Table 4.14 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for Hungarian PIPOs 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the BSE Index as a 
benchmark; We were unable to calculate returns for some companies in months 12-36 due to gaps in 
price data series and due to the fact that 5 companies were delisted; Average returns are calculated on an 
equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The t-statistic for AR4 is computed for each month as 
ARt V(n, )/SD,, where ARi is the average adjusted return for month t, nt is the number of observations in 
month t, and SD, is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t; The t- 
statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as CARL'I(Q/CSD1, where ný 
is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSDt is computed as CSDt = I[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , 
where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the 
first-order autocovariance of the ARt series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative AR1's Positive AR's ARt (%) t-Star CAR, (%) t-Star 
1 23 9 14 2.604 0.982 2.604 1.135 
2 23 9 14 -0.729 -0.403 1.875 0.580 
3 23 11 12 -1.263 -0.826 0.612 0.155 
4 23 9 14 -0.707 -0.389 -0.096 -0.021 
5 22 8 14 2.905 1.355 2.809 0.540 
6 22 12 10 1.221 0.505 4.030 0.707 
7 22 13 9 -3.423 -1.880 0.607 0.099 
8 22 9 13 0.132 0.044 0.739 0.112 
9 22 5 17 7.215 2.631 7.954 1.140 
10 19 8 11 -0.354 -0.187 7.600 0.960 
11 19 5 14 1.191 0.303 8.791 1.059 
12 19 7 12 1.880 0.994 10.671 1.231 
13 19 5 14 3.047 1.275 13.718 1.521 
14 19 8 11 3.574 1.113 17.293 1.847 
15 19 7 12 3.962 2.311 21.255 2.194 
16 19 11 8 -1.693 -1.015 19.562 1.955 
17 21 11 10 -2.506 -1.792 17.055 1.739 
18 21 11 10 -1.407 -0.951 15.648 1.550 
19 21 13 8 -4.581 -2.784 11.067 1.067 
20 21 7 14 3.853 1.927 14.920 1.402 
21 21 10 11 -0.672 -0.265 14.248 1.307 
22 21 8 13 0.692 0.429 14.940 1.339 
23 21 10 11 -0.034 -0.024 14.906 1.307 
24 21 13 8 -0.324 -0.147 14.583 1.251 
25 21 9 12 -0.335 -0.149 14.248 1.198 
26 20 10 10 -0.122 -0.043 14.126 1.137 
- 27 20 12 8 -3.678 -1.446 10.447 0.823 
28 20 9 11 3.251 1.125 13.699 1.062 
29 20 10 10 -0.058 -0.015 13.640 1.039 
30 20 10 10 1.158 0.494 14.798 1.108 
31 19 10 9 -5.348 -1.026 9.450 0.679 
32 19 9 10 1.172 0.470 10.622 0.751 
33 19 12 7 -3.783 -1.457 6.838 0.476 
34 19 7 12 0.953 0.597 7.792 0.534 
35 18 9 9 -0.812 -0.322 6.980 0.459 
36 18 6 12 0.108 0.100 7.088 0.460 
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Table 4.15 
Average and cumulative abnormal returns for Hungarian private sector IPOs 
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the BSE Index as a 
benchmark; We were unable to calculate returns for some companies in early months following listings; 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; The t-statistic for 
ARt is computed for each month as ARt J(nJ/SD1where AR, is the average adjusted return for month t, n1 
is the number of observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted 
returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as 
CAR, I(nJ/CSD,, where n1 is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSD, = 
q[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional 
variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative Ants Positive ARss ARS (%) t-Stat CARS (%) t-Stat 
1 20 8 12 -2.566 -0.669 -2.566 -0.533 
2 23 11 12 -3.685 -1.479 -6.250 -0.990 
3 23 10 13 -2.396 -1.046 -8.646 -1.120 
4 24 10 14 1.026 0.419 -7.620 -0.874 
5 23 8 15 -3.531 -0.914 -11.151 -1.121 
6 23 10 13 -0.117 -0.069 -11.268 -1.034 
7 21 11 10 -4.698 -2.006 -15.966 -1.297 
8 21 8 13 2.971 0.386 -12.994 -0.987 
9 21 7 14 -2.252 -0.951 -15.246 -1.092 
10 22 10 12 -2.922 -1.461 -18.169 -1.264 
11 21 10 11 -7.766 -0.741 -25.935 -1.681 
12 21 10 11 -3.588 -1.645 -29.523 -1.832 
13 22 9 13 -4.533 -1.669 -34.056 -2.079 
14 21 7 14 2.158 0.391 -31.898 -1.833 
15 21 6 15 0.642 0.179 -31.255 -1.735 
16 21 8 13 0.015 0.005 -31.241 -1.679 
17 18 9 9 -3.114 -1.652 -34.355 -1.659 
18 18 6 12 0.380 0.116 -33.975 -1.594 
19 17 8 9 -0.094 -0.042 -34.069 -1.512 
20 17 7 10 -4.890 -1.648 -38.959 -1.686 
21 17 9 8 -4.775 -2.018 -43.734 -1.847 
22 16 6 10 -0.760 -0.272 -44.494 -1.781 
23 15 6 9 -3.071 -1.462 -47.565 -1.803 
24 15 2 13 3.347 1.270 -44.218 -1.641 
25 15 8 7 -4.549 -1.868 -48.767 -1.773 
26 14 6 8 -6.235 -1.726 -55.002 -1.894 
27 14 5 9 -3.318 -1.019 -58.319 -1.971 
28 14 5 9 -1.220 -0.629 -59.539 -1.976 
29 14 6 8 -3.852 -2.288 -63.391 -2.067 
30 14 7 7 -6.628 -2.931 -70.019 -2.245 
31 14 5 9 21.063 0.930 -48.956 -1.544 
32 14 4 10 6.442 0.871 -42.514 -1.30 
33 14 7 7 -4.596 -1.163 -47.110 -1.440 
34 14 4 10 -1.783 -0.308 -48.893 -1.473 
35 14 5 9 -5.605 -1.675 -54.499 -1.618 
36 14 5 9 -1.172 -0.453 -55.671 -1.630 
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Table 4.16 
Test of differences in the cumulative abnormal returns for PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
P values indicate the level of significance of two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney test for difference in 
average (mean and median) returns. 
Test method 
1 2 3 
Month 
6 12 18 24 30 36 
T-test 
Statistics 0 1.11 0.96 0.41 0.45 1.89 -0.50 -1.07 2.39 0.46 
P-value 0.28 0.34 0.68 0.65 0.06 0.62 0.29 0.02 0.65 
Mann-Whitney test 
P-value 0.07 0.19 0.61 0.97 0.10 0.77 0.09 0.07 0.19 
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Table 4.17 
Comparison of different holding period market-adjusted returns for Hungarian PIPOs and private 
sector IPOs 
MACRs are computed as buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the BSE Index as a 
benchmark; P values for two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney median tests, indicate the level of 
significance for the difference in the average (mean and median) MACRs for a given holding period; 
Average MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Two privatised 
companies Skala Coop S and Skala Coop T delisted in month 12; Some gaps in data for Human (IPO) 
during the first week. ; Significance levels for the two-tail t-test of meaner vs. mean #0 indicated as: 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; For private IPOs two tail t-test of 
meaner vs. mean r0 indicate statistical significance of returns in months 18,24,30, and 36; For PIPOs 
two tail t-test of mean =O vs. mean not =O indicate no statistical significance. 




1 week -1.54 n=23 -3.27* n=21 0.51 0.83 
2 weeks -0.06 n=23 -4.46 * n=21 0.34 0.23 
3 weeks -0.23 n=23 -1.20 n=21 0.85 0.04 
1 month 2.48 n=23 -4.51 n=21 0.14 0.02 
2 months 1.24 n=23 -5.63 n=22 0.14 0.04 
3 months -1.31 n=23 -5.52 n=21 0.85 0.62 
6 months 2.00 n=22 -10.11 n=20 0.16 0.12 
12 months 13.44 n=19 -20.76 n=19 0.16 0.01 
18 months 2453 n7--21 -39.69*** n=15 0.14 0.00 
24 months 40.71 n=21 -54.78 ** n=11 0.13 0.02 
30 months 48.58 n=20 -109.59*** n=11 0.11 0.00 
36 months 85.05 n=18 -143.16 ** n=11 0.16 0.01 
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Table 4.18 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors 
Panel A: Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in 
Hungarian PIPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Share prices for 
PIPOs in local currency; The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the 
Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; The t-statistic for ARS is computed for each month as AR, 
\(nj/SD, where ARt is the average adjusted return for month t, n, is the number of observations in month 
t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t; The t-statistics for 
the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as CARL'/(nt)/CSD, where n1 is the 
number of firms trading in each month, and CSD1 is computed as CSDI = /[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is 
the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the ARS series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative AR1s Positive AR1s ARS (%) t-Stat CARL (%) t-Stat 
1 24 15 9 6.186 1.581 6.186 1.979 
2 24 15 9 0.650 0.309 6.836 1.547 
3 24 14 10 -1.080 -0.529 5.755 1.063 
4 24 16 8 -3.359 -1.756 2.396 0.383 
5 24 13 11 1.463 0.635 3.859 0.552 
6 24 10 14 3.590 1.055 7.449 0.973 
7 24 17 7 -2.026 -0.590 5.424 0.656 
8 24 7 17 3.948 1.609 9.372 1.060 
9 24 10 14 5.180 1.153 14.552 1.552 
10 24 12 12 3.280 1.238 17.832 1.804 
11 24 12 12 0.972 0.159 18.803 1.814 
12 24 11 13 0.593 0.256 19.396 1.792 
13 24 9 15 3.100 1.169 22.496 1.996 
14 24 10 14 5.250 0.934 27.746 2.373 
15 23 7 16 6.281 2.054 34.027 2.752 
16 23 15 8 -2.742 -1.307 31.285 2.450 
17 25 15 10 -0.109 -0.043 31.176 2.469 
18 25 14 11 1.115 0.590 32.290 2.486 
19 23 12 11 -2.401 -0.895 29.889 2.148 
20 22 10 12 4.887 2.021 34.776 2.382 
21 22 11 11 2.018 0.650 36.794 2.460 
22 22 12 10 0.480 0.194 37.274 2.435 
23 22 15 7 -1.296 -0.808 35.978 2.298 
24 22 12 10 1.878 0.778 37.856 2.367 
25 22 10 12 1.348 0.436 39.203 2.402 
26 22 13 9 1.733 0.401 40.936 2.460 
27 22 14 8 -2.630 -1.075 38.306 2.258 
28 22 8 14 6.649 2.138 44.956 2.603 
29 22 14 8 -2.161 -0.528 42.795 2.435 
30 22 6 16 7.117 2.425 49.912 2.792 
31 22 13 9 -3.072 -0.545 46.840 2.577 
32 22 9 13 5.505 1.565 52.344 2.835 
33 22 8 14 6.062 2.103 58.406 3.115 
34 22 9 13 3.309 1.686 61.715 3.243 
35 22 14 8 -3.158 -1.171 58.557 3.032 
36 21 14 7 -0.132 -0.116 58.425 2.915 
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Panel B 
Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in Hungarian 
private sector IPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Share prices for 
private sector IPOs in local currency; The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are 
computed using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; The t-statistic for AR, is computed for 
each month as AR, 4(n3/SD,. where AR, is the average adjusted return for month t, nt is the number of 
observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for 
month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as CAR, 
I(ns)/CSD1, where nt is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSD, is computed as CSD1= 4[t 
var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, 
and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the Alt, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative ARs Positive AR1s AR, (%) t-Stat CARE (%) t-Stat 
1 20 11 9 2.700 0.483 2.700 0.460 
2 20 12 8 -0.369 -0.167 2.330 0.281 
3 20 10 10 -0.762 -0.299 1.569 0.154 
4 20 12 8 -0.231 -0.057 1.338 0.114 
5 20 16 4 -7.367 -1.600 -6.029 -0.460 
6 20 11 9 -2.917 -1.619 -8.946 -0.623 
7 18 16 2 -8.343 -4.856 -17.290 -1.057 
8 17 12 5 6.733 0.635 -10.557 -0.586 
9 17 11 6 -4.153 -1.463 -14.710 -0.771 
10 17 13 4 -6.781 -2.351 -21.491 -1.068 
11 16 14 2 -25.711 -2.619 -47.202 -2.170 
12 16 11 5 -5.064 -1.581 -52.266 -2.300 
13 16 11 5 -5.133 -1.570 -57.399 -2.427 
14 15 8 7 -0.290 -0.068 -57.689 -2.276 
15 15 7 8 0.053 0.015 -57.636 -2.197 
16 14 9 5 -3.450 -0.969 -61.086 -2.178 
17 13 10 3 -4.405 -1.786 -65.491 -2.183 
18 13 6 7 3.260 1.160 -62.231 -2.016 
19 12 7 5 2.946 0.849 -59.285 -1.796 
20 12 4 8 5.093 0.879 -54.192 -1.600 
21 12 4 8 0.709 0.262 -53.482 -1.541 
22 12 2 10 3.957 0.856 -49.525 -1.394 
23 11 5 6 3.266 1.092 -46.259 -1.219 
24 11 5 6 -0.031 -0.013 -46.290 -1.194 
25 11 6 5 0.496 0.204 -45.794 -1.158 
26 11 7 4 -4.192 -1.616 -49.985 -1.239 
27 11 6 5 1.519 0.445 -48.467 -1.179 
28 11 6 5 -0.935 -0.623 -49.402 -1.180 
29 11 7 4 -0.066 -0.030 -49.468 -1.161 
30 11 5 6 0.564 0.295 -48.904 -1.129 
31 11 3 8 40.948 1.093 -7.956 -0.181 
32 11 3 8 12.599 2.488 4.642 0.104 
33 11 6 5 -1.910 -0.551 2.732 0.060 
34 11 3 8 2.149 0.279 4.882 0.106 
35 11 6 5 3.452 0.888 8.334 0.178 
36 7 3 4 -0.493 -0.146 7.842 0.132 
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Table 4.19 
Test of differences in cumulative abnormal returns for foreign investors investing in Hungarian 
PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
P values indicate the level of significance of two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney test for difference in 
average (mean and median) returns; PIPOs outperform private sector IPOs measured by mean returns in 
all months except month 3. Unreported P values for t-tests in months 5,9,10,11,13,28 and 33 show 
significantly higher average returns for PIPOs at 10% or better, PIPOs outperform private sector IPOs 
measured by median returns in all months except months 3,24, and 36. Unreported P values for Mann- 
Whitney tests in months 7,8,9,10,11,13, and 22 show significant differences in average returns at 10% or 
better. 
Test method Month 
1236 12 18 24 30 36 
T-test 
Statistics 0.51 0.33 -0.10 1.69 1.43 -0.63 0.57 1.87 0.10 
P-value 0.61 0.74 0.92 0.10 0.16 0.53 0.57 0.07 0.92 
Mann-Whitney test 
P-value 0.56 0.80 0.71 0.22 0.24 0.46 0.83 0.23 0.91 
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Table 4.20 
Comparison of average buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for foreign investors investing in 
Hungarian PIPOs and private sector IPOs 
Share prices for PIPOs and private sector IPOs in local currency; The average MACRs are computed as 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns using the Datastream Europe Index as a benchmark; 
Average MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Two privatised 
companies Skala Coop S and Skala Coop T delisted in month 12; Some gaps in data for Human (IPO) 
during the first week; P value for t-test and Mann-Whitney median test, indicate the level of significance 
for the difference in the average (mean and median) MACRs for a given holding period; Significance 
levels for the two-tail t-test of me= =O vs. mean *0 indicated as: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 




1 week -1.06 n=24 -1.11 n=20 0.97 0.50 
2 weeks 1.18 n=24 -1.80 n=20 0.26 0.52 
3 weeks 2.70 n=24 4.00 n=20 0.83 0.75 
1 month 6.40 n=24 4.00 n7--20 0.73 0.99 
2 months 7.30 n=24 330 n=20 0.59 0.88 
3 months 5.50*** n=24 4.50 n=20 0.89 0.93 
6 months 7.50*** n7--24 -5.30 n=20 0.30 0.19 
12 months 31.40*** n=22 -22.70* n=16 0.00 0.00 
18 months 71.00*** n7--21 -40.40*** n7--13 0.00 0.00 
24 months 113.00*** n7--20 -16.80 n=11 0.00 0.03 
30 months 142.00*** n7--20 -15.00 n=11 0.01 0.01 
36 months 192.00 *** n=19 32.00 n=11 0.07 0.34 
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Table 4.21 
Returns for foreign investors investing in emerging markets in Eastern Europe 
Panel A: Cross-enterprise and state-ownership adjusted average abnormal and cumulative 
abnormal returns for foreign investors in Eastern European PIPOs 
Average returns are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; Share prices for 
private sector IPOs in local currency; The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are 
computed using the IFC Investable East European Index as a benchmark; The t-statistic for AR, is 
computed for each month as ARt'(nJ/SD,, where ARS is the average adjusted return for month t, n, is the 
number of observations in month t, and SD1 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted 
returns for month t; The t-statistics for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t is computed as 
CAR, 'I(n, )/CSD,, where n1 is the number of firms trading in each month, and CSDI is computed as CSD, = 
q[t var + 2(t-1)cov] , where t is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional 
variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the AR, series (Ritter, 1991). 
Month Number of firms Negative AR4s Positive ARts AR, (%) t-Stat CARL (%) t-Star 
1 27 12 15 0.261 0.093 0.261 0.080 
2 27 10 17 7.130 2.593 7.391 1.603 
3 27 12 15 -0.251 -0.090 7.140 1.264 
4 27 10 17 2.572 1.133 9.712 1.489 
5 27 14 13 -1.083 -0.466 8.628 1.184 
6 27 11 16 2.563 1.098 11.191 1.401 
7 27 11 16 3.421 1.153 14.612 1.694 
8 27 8 19 4.530 1.730 19.143 2.076 
9 27 10 17 6.297 2.047 25.439 2.601 
10 26 10 16 3.637 1.365 29.077 2.768 
11 26 7 19 28.242 2.750 57.318 5.202 
12 25 14 11 0.402 0.125 57.721 4.918 
13 24 13 11 -1.465 -0.455 56.255 4.512 
14 23 6 17 8.409 2.642 64.664 4.893 
15 23 10 13 0.187 0.054 64.851 4.740 
16 23 14 9 -3.949 -1.463 60.902 4.310 
17 22 11 11 3.006 0.831 63.907 4.292 
18 21 14 7 -4.664 -1.222 59.244 3.778 
19 14 6 8 2.247 0.642 61.491 3.116 
20 13 10 3 -4.493 -1.660 56.998 2.713 
21 12 7 5 -2.396 -0.521 54.602 2.437 
22 12 3 9 11.258 1.821 65.860 2.871 
23 11 6 5 -2.253 -0.807 63.607 2.597 
24 8 4 4 0.194 0.067 63.802 2.175 
25 6 3 3 2.374 0.865 66.175 1.914 
26 6 0 6 14.267 4.472 80.442 2.281 
27 6 4 2 -6.247 -1.981 74.195 2.065 
28 6 2 4 8.447 0.987 82.642 2.258 
29 6 3 3 -2.844 -0.721 79.798 2.143 
30 5 3 2 0.417 0.040 80.215 1.933 
31 5 2 3 -6.252 -0.704 73.963 1.753 
32 5 2 3 0.294 0.038 74.256 1.733 
33 5 0 5 16.322 3.602 90.579 2.081 
34 5 5 0 -13.509 -1.516 77.069 1.745 
35 3 1 2 11.655 1.246 88.724 1.533 
36 3 2 1 -0.470 -0.095 88.254 1.504 
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Panel B 
Cross-enterprise and state-ownership adjusted average buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for 
foreign investors investing in Eastern European PIPOs 
Share prices for PIPOs in local currency; The average MACRs are computed as buy-and-hold market- 
adjusted compounded returns using the IFC Investable East European Index as a benchmark; Average 
MACRs are calculated on an equally weighted basis without initial premiums; P value for t-test and 
Mann-Whitney median test, indicate the level of significance for the difference in the average (mean and 
median) v1ACRs for a given holding period 
Holding Period N Mean (%) 
1 Week 27 -0.27 
2 Weeks 27 -0.29 
3 Weeks 27 -1.90 
1 Month 27 0.59 
2 Months 27 8.73** 
3 Months 1 27 8.64** 
6 Months 27 14.46** 
12 Months 25 44.48*** 
18 Months 21 50.04*** 
24 Months 8 73.55* 
30 Months 5 114.79* 
36 Months 3 113.88* 
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Table 4.22 
Results of the OLS estimation of the model for the pooled size samples using MACR for one, two, 
and three years as dependent variables based on White's heteroscedasticity adjusted standard 
errors 
One, two and three years market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns are regressed on market-adjusted initial 
returns (MAIR), the logarithm of market value (InMV), a dummy variable distinguishing regulated 
industries (INDUSTRY), a variable indicating the order of the offer within the country's privatisation 
programme (ORDER), ex-ante uncertainty proxied by standard deviation of prices during first twelve 
months after listing (EX-ANTE), market volatility proxied by percentage change in market index two 
trading months prior to the offer (MVOLATI ITY), percentage of shares sold in privatisation (SOLD), 
a dummy variable distinguishing privatisation with foreign participation (FOREIGN), a dummy variable 
distinguishing privatisation from the Czech Republic; P values in brackets for one tail t test; Missing 
values deleted listwise; We were able to obtain data for percentage sold for 54 offers in our sample, 
which resulted in relatively low sample size in regression 1. The sample size declines in regressions 2 
and 3 due to absence observations for 2 and 3-year buy-and-hold returns for more recent offers; ; *** 
significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. 
Regression Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Constant 0.675 -0.173 6.867 
MIAIR -0.115 0.042 -0.189 
INDUSTRY 0.530** 2.133 1.842 
LiLNIV -0.070 0.290 1.532*** 
FOREIGN 0.330 1.776 -2.008 
SOLD -0.011* -0.025 0.026 
CZECH -2.548*** -2.806 -13.225*** 
F statistics 2.915** 0.265 1.636 
R2 32.1% 4.6% 24.1% 
Adjusted R2 21.1% -12.7% 9.4% 
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Comparison of market adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MACR) for Hungarian PIPOs and private 
sector IPOs 
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Appendix 3 Privatisation Sales and PIPOs in Poland, 1990-99 
200 
End of period exchange rates, PZ: US$, from Datastream used in calculations: 1991=1.05; 1992=1.5; 
1993=2.04; 1994=2.44; 1995=2.47; 1996=2.87; 1997=3.51; 1998=3.51; 19 April 1999=3.99** domestic 
and international issues; n. a. means that data have not been disclosed and not available from public 
sources, or we were not able to collect data; proceeds in million $ (end of year exchange rate). 
Enterprise Industry Date Sold Proceeds Acquirer 
°/a (million S) 
Huta Warszawa Steel 1990 n. a. 35 Lucchini 
(joint venture) 
Exbud Constructions 1990 45 5.3 PIPO 
(17.5) 2.1 Foreign 
(17.5) 2.1 Managers 
(20) 2.4 Employees 
Wizamet 1990 80 1.5 Foreign 
20 0.4 Employees 
Malta 1990 80 1.3 Foreign 
20 0.3 Employees 
Porcelana 1990 70 0.8 Foreign 
30 0.3 Employees 
Techma 1990 60 0.3 Foreign 
20 0.1 Employees 
20 0.1 Others 
Dolmel Z. Power eng. 1992 n. a. 70 Asea Brown 
(joint venture) 
Kable Electric 1990 90 3.1 PIPO 
(20) Employees 
Kroshno Household 1990 90 1.6 PIPO 
(20) Employees 
1995 n. a. 6 PIPO 
Prochnilc Clothing 1990 100 3.2 PIPO 
(20) Employees 
Tonsil Electronics 1990 90 3.2 PIPO 
(20) Employees 
1998 majority n. a. Pioneer 
HSO Sandomierz *Glass 1990 40 140 Pilkinton 
Polkolor TV sets 1991 n. a. 35 Thompson 
(joint venture) 
Fampa* Paper 1991 80 5.8 Beloit Corp 
20 1.4 Employees 
Mieso 1991 55 4 Foreign 
25 2 Domestic 
4 0.3 Employees 
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16 1.2 Others 
Sanitariaty 1991 80 5 Foreign 
20 1.25 Employees 
Romeo 1991 80 4 Foreign 
20 1 Employees 
Mefta 1991 51 2 Foreign 
10 0.4 Domestic 
23 1 Employees 
16 0.7 Others 
Chifa 1991 80 3 Foreign 
20 0.8 Employees 
Pol-Fab 1991 80 2.5 Foreign 
20 0.6 Employees 
Pomorskie 1991 80 2.5 Foreign 
20 0.6 Employees 
Fakop 1991 80 2.2 Foreign 
20 0.6 Employees 
FTM S* Vehicles 1991 51 800 FIAT (joint 
venture) 
Alima* Food 1991 60 11.3 Gerber Prod. 
19 3 Employees 
21 3.5 Others 
Wedel* Food 1991 40 14.5 PepsiCo 
(65% voting 
power) 
20 7.3 PIPO 
20 7.3 Managers 
20 7.3 Employees 
Polam-Pila Lighting 1991 51 16 Philips 
20 4.5 Employees 
Bydgoszcs* Detergent 1991 80 20 Uniliver 
Bolmar Food 1991 n. a. n. a. White Eagle 
Prema Milmer Ball-bearing 1991 n. a. n. a. Tinken 
Zywiec Brewery 1991 100 4.9 PIPO 
(22) Employees 
Sit. able Electricity 1991 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Swarzedz Furniture 1991 70 6.1 PIPO** 
5 0.4 Foreign. 
20 1.7 Employees 
Wolczanka Clothing 1991 100 2.2 PIPO 
(35) Employees 
WSN Krotosyn Cylinder liners 25 n. a. EBRD 
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Mostostal Construction 1992 n. a. 36 Epstein 
Teletra 1992 80 20 Foreign 
20 5 Employees 
Elta 1992 51 11.6 Foreign 
20 4.6 Employees 
25 5.8 Others 
Szklo Bid. 1992 51 5.2 Foreign 
29 2.8 Dom. strat. 
20 2 Employees 
OUnex 1992 70 S. 5 Foreign 
20 1.6 Employees 
10 0.8 Others 
Kwidzyn 1992 80 120 Sale 
Telkom Telfa Telecomun. 1992 80 30 Foreign 
20 7.5 Employees 
Koszalin Brewery 1992 30 0. S PIPO 
(foreign 
st. partner) 
20 0.3 Managers 
20 0.3 Employees 
Mostalexp Constructions 1992 100 4.1 PIPO 
(35) Employees 
Celluloza Swiecie Paper 1993 n. a. 157.6 Foreign & 
Employees. 
1997 15 49.6 PIPO 
Gorazdze Cement 1993 30 136 Belgium group 
1995 majority n. a. Foreign 
24 PIPO 
Warta Insurance 1993 23.08 5 Sale 
1995 75 7 PIPO 
Pollena Ra. 1993 72 10 Foreign 
20 2.8 Employees 
8 1 Others 
Pollena Nd 1993 80 6 Foreign 
20 1.5 Employees 
Pollena By. 1993 95 23 Foreign 
5 1.2 Employees 
Pollens W. 1993 80 4.2 Foreign 
20 1 Employees 
N 
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S1upsk Kobylnica 1994 n. a. 13 Sale 
Polam-Szc. 1994 80 16 Sale 
Hydrobudowa 1994 n. a. na. Sale 
1998 80 8 PIPO 
CenQa 1994 75 11 Sale 
Rolimpex S. A. Other 1994 50 11 PIPO 
1998 24.5 n. a. PIPO 
Goplana Food 1994 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Debica Tyres 1994 48.7 56 PIPO 
1995 n. a. 113 Sale 
Polifarb Wroclaw 1994 75 30 PIPO 
Baltic Food na. n. a. Foreign 
Stalezrort Metal trade 1994 60 74 PIPO 
CC-, ne iro nia Ozarow 1995 n. a. 58 Sale 
Przedsiebiorstwo Wyrobow 1995 n. a. 88 Sale 
Tytoniowych 
Zaklady Przemsylu Tytoniowego 1995 na. 64 Sale 
(ZPT Radom) 
ZNM Kery 1995 na. 14 PIPO 
nU. fiery 2 1995 n. a. 25 PIPO 
Budimex Construction 1995 na. n. a. PIPO 
Hma Olawa Steel 1995 aa. 5 PIPO 
Jelcz 1995 n. a. 5 Sale 
Pollen Uroda 1995 n. a. 8 Sale 
KZWP Paper 1995 na. 15 Sale 
Kujawy Cement 1995 n. a. 46 Sale 
W iniary Food 1995 45 75 Nestle 
FLT 1995 n. a. 6 Sale 
Korgaz 1995 na. 8 Sale 
Ozarow Cement 1995 na. 58 Sale 
Z. athdy Metali Metalurgy 1995 na. 22 Sale 
gym 1995 na. 65 Sale 
Augustow 1995 na. 88 Sale 
Stomil Chemical 1995 ma. 112(53) Sale 
0 














Browary Dolnoslaskie PIAST 1996 n. a. 10 Sale 
Wieabica cement 1996 n. a. 30 Sale 
Witwornia Wyrobow 1996 n. a. 130 Sale 
Tytoniowych (WWI) 
Zaklady Paemyslu Tytoniowego 1996 n. a. 227 Sale 
(ZPT Krakow) 
Bytom 1996 n. a. 4 PIPO 
Hula Szkla Jaroslaw(HSJ) 1996 n. a. 3 Sale 
Polfa Kutno 1996 n. a. 7 PIPO 
Kruszwica Food 1996 n. a. 11 PIPO 
Konstal Energy 1996 n. a. n. a. Alston 
Azoty Fertiliser 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Pulawy Fertiliser 1996 n. a. na. Sale 
Malogoszcz Cement 1996 n. a. 54 Sale 
Browary Dot Brewery 1996 na. 10 Sale 
ZPT Krakow 1996 n. a. 227 Sale 
WWT 1996 na. 130 Sale 
Polara P. 1996 na. 10 Sale 
Nowiny cement 1996 n. a. 64 Sale 
Nowa Hats Cement 1996 n. a. 41 Sale 
Wierzbica Cement 1996 na. 30 Sale 
Malogoszcz Cement 1996 n. a. 35 Sale 
Elbrewery Brewery 1996 n. a. 20 Foreign 
F. aEL 1996 n. a. 32 Sale 
BrowaryTyske Brewery 1996 n. a. 75 Sale 
Kedzierzyn Koz. Soda 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Janikosoda Soda 1996 na. n. a. Sale 
Soda Matwy Soda 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
DT Centrum Retail 1996 n. a. na. Sale 
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Pewex Retail 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Baltona Retail 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Cegielski Engineering 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
ZTWL-Lublin Tobacco 1996 n. a. na. Sale 
Polski Tyton Tobacco 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Pawafag Machinery 1996 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Ruch Retail 1996 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Winiary Food 1996 na. n. a. Foreign 
Glubczyce Brewery 1996 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Tychy Brewery 1996 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Zabrze Brewery 1996 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Stocznia Szcec. Shipyard 1996 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Agnella Garment 1996 na. n. a. PIPO 
Lech Brewery 1996 minority na. Sale 
Elektrobudowa Other 1996 na. 13 PIPO 
Mostosal Building 1997 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
KGHM 
(Polska Miedz) Copper 1997 25 410 PIPO 
Orbis Travel/Hotel 1997 n. a. 26.1 PIPO 
Chelm S. A. Cement 1997 34.3 n. a. Rugby Group 
Domy Towarowe Retail planned 1997 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Prospan 1997 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Syrena Warsaw 1997 n. a. 24 Sale 
Gdansk Rafinery planned 1997n. a. n. a. Sale 
Bogdanka Coal mining planned 1997n. a. n. a. Sale 
Sendzimir Steel planned 1997n. a. n. a. Sale 
Polska Nafta Oil planned 1997n. a. n. a. Sale 
Iskra Ball-bearing planned 1997n. a. n. a. Sale 
Celina Maszyny Elktryczne 1997 n. a. 8 Sale 
Dromex 1997 n. a. 12.6 Sale 
Huturen Metalurgy 1997 na. 19 PIPO 
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Impexmetal Steel 1997 68.5 34 PIPO 
Krakownie Glinojeck Sugar Refinery 1997 n. a. 16 Sale 
Kruswica 1997 n. a. 33.9 Sale 
n. a. 11 PIPO 
Leg Krakow 1997 n. a. 79.5 Sale 
Ozarow Kables 1997 n. a. 54 Sale 
Polfa Krakowie 1997 n. a. 113.3 Sale 
Polfa Rzeszowie 1997 n. a. 33.7 Sale 
Polimex Cekop 1997 n. a. 14.9 Sale 
Polski Handel Spozywcy (PHS) 1997 n. a. 35.7 Sale 
ZPC Ursus 1997 n. a. 164.7 Sale 
Polski Tyton 1997 n. a. 4.3 Sale 
Polar Home appliances 1997 n. a. 23.4 PIPO 
TPSA Telekom 1998 15 1.02bn PIPO** 
1999 35 n. a. Sale 
(7) Employees 
(5) State Rest. F. 
PZU Insurance planned 1998 50 n. a. Private 
placement 
HTS Steel planned 1998 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Plock Rafinery planned 1998 30 n. a. PIPO 
Popkarma Pharmac. offered 1998 10 n. a. Sale 
Warka Brewery planned 1998 n. a. n. a. Ringnes 
CIECH Chemical 1998 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Elektr. Krakow ELPower 1998 55 n. a. Sale 
(25) Municipal 
(15) Employees 
(5) State Rest. F. 
Huta Sedzimra Steel 1998 n. a. n. a. Voest Alpin 
Bedzin Energy 1998 25 n. a. Steag 
Huta Katowice Steel 1998 n. a. n. a. British Steel 
Lot Airline planned 1998 n. a. n. a. Sale 
Gdynia Shipyard planned 1999 n. a. n. a. Sale 
PHS Wholesale planned 1999 n. a. n. a. Interkontakt 
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Agora Publishing planned 1999 n. a. n. a. Foreign 
Employees 
Elektr. W. ELPower planned 1999 at least 10% n. a. Sale 
Source: The Financial Times and Euromoney, various issues; * Data from Euromoney, 1992, as cited in 
Perotti and Guney, 1993; Privatisation Yearbooks, various issues; Dow Jones Newswires. Data on 
proceeds and percentage of shares sold for following PIPOs was taken from Dewenter and Malatesta, 
1997, unpublished appendix B: Kable, Prochnik, Tonsil, Wolczanka, Zwarzedz, Okocim, Electrim, 
Mostalexp, BRE, Sokolow, Vistula, Rafako; Entries in italics from Dynamika Prywatyzacji, various 
issues; Zobowiazania, various issues as cited in Jermakowic W. Privatisation and Foreign Investment 
in Poland, 1990-93: Results, Problems, and Lessons, published in Zloch-Christy (ed) 1995, p. 74-75; 
Entries in italics in brackets are percentages of employee tranches and the maximum of the company's 
share equity available for foreign investors during the share sale, obtained fom Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997) unpublished appendix B; 
APPENDIX 4 
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Appendix 4 Privatisation Sales and PIPOs in the Czech Republic 
209 
Proceeds in million $ (end of year exchange rate) except when stated otherwise. End of year CK: US$ 
exchange rates from Datastream used in calculations: 1993=29.955; 1994=28.049; 1995=26.602; 
1996=27.332; 1997=34.636; 1998= 29.885; For planned privatisation an estimated current market value 
at an exchange rate of 19 April 1999=35.406 was used, When required, the end of year DM: US$ 
exchange rate from Datastream used in calculations. 
Panel A: Companies privatised by direct sales and/or PIPO, 1990-99 
Enterprise Industry Year Sold Proceeds Acquirer 
(%) (million $) 
Sklo Union* Glass 1990 40 48 Graverbel 
Zavody Solokov* Chemicals 1991 51 53 Dow Europe 
Pragnocement* Cement 1991 40 10.8 Heidelberger 
Zement 
Ceva Kraluv Dvur* Cement 1991 40 20 Heidelberger 
Zement 
Prachovice* Cement 1991 30 63 Holderbank 
Jihoceska Keramiika*Ceramics 1991 majority n. a. Laufen 
VCS* Limestone 1991 49 33 Lhoist 
Technoplyn* Gases 1991 majority 106 Linde 
Rakona* Detergents 1991 100 24 Procter & Gamble 
Skoda Pilsen* Energy 1991 67 170 Siemens 
Tatra* Vehicles 1992 51 20 Iveco 
Mlada Fronts Media 1992 48 22 Sale 
Chemicke Zav. 
Sokolov Chemicals 1992 36 20 Sale 
Maj & Prior 1992 n. a. 25 K. Mart 
Tabak Tobaco 1992 30 104 Philip Morris 
Chemlon 1992 52 92 Rhone-Poulenc 
CSA Aviation 1992 40 60 Air France 
Avia* Vehicles 1992 31 n. a. Mercedes Benz 
Trucks 1995 34 6.77 Daewoo/Steyr 
Liaz* Vehicles 1992 20 n. a. Mecedes Benz 
1995 52.5 18.80 Sale 
Kralupy Refineries 1992 49 n. a Agip/Conoco/ 
Royal Dutch Shell 
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Prague Breweries Brewery 1993 34 n. a. Bass (UK)-through 
underwritten right 
issue 
Krpaco Packaging 1993 50 n. a. Cofinec; shares 
bought 
Plzenske Prazdroj Brewery 1994 n. a. 17 Sale 
Severocecke Vodovody 
a Kanalizace (SCVK)Utilities 1995 35.8 7 Hyder (Wales) 
SPT Telecom Telecom 1995 27 1.45bn PTT Telecom 
Netherlands/Swiss 
Telecom 
planned 1998 n. a. n. a. International PIPO 
Litvinov Refineries 1995 49 17 Agip/Conoco/ 
Royal Dutch Shell 
TOS Machinery 1995 na. 14.89 Sale 
Strojirny Kolin Machinery 1995 n. a. 12.03 Sale 
Litomericke 
mrazimy Food 1995 n. a. 11.24 Sale 
Kablo Velke Power 1995 n. a. 28.19 Sale 
Mezirici cable 
Tesla Electric 1995 35 24.66 MBO 
appl. 
JAWA Motorcycles pl. 1995 n. a. 9.59 Sale 
Hotel Panorama Hotel planned 1995 n. a. 6.43 Sale 
Aero holding 1996 38 n. a. Sale 
planned 1999 62 n. a. Sale 
IPS Construction 1996 35 80 Int. PIPO 
Cesky Rozhlas Media 1996 100 n. a. Sale 
Olsanske Papirny A. S. Paper 1996 73 24.44 Sale (domestic) 
Trinecke Z. Steel 1996 65 n. a. Moravia Steel 
Chrystalex Glass 1997 73 8.66 Porcela Plus 
Unipetrol Petrol 1997 37 n. a. Foreign 
planned 1999 63 n. a. Sale 
CEZ Power 33 n. a. Sale 
planned 2002 67 n. a. Sale 
Nova Hut Steel 33 - Voucher priv. 
planned 1999 18 n. a. PIPO 
until 2001 15 Employees 
Vitkovice Steel 33 - Voucher priv. 
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planned 2000 18 n. a. PIPO 
until 2001 15 Employees 
Becherovka Spirit 1997 89 60 Value Bill 
Ceske Radiokom. Media 1997 - 11.5 Sale 
(CRK) 1998 - 134 Int. PIPO 
total 49 
planned 2001 51 n. a. Sale 
Bonton Media 1997 30-40 n. a. Priv. placement 
planned 1998 P1PO 
Interkontakt Retail 1997 46 n. a. Priv. placement 
CKD Engineerin g plannedl998 40 n. a. Int. PIPO 
Source: The Financial Times and Euromoney, various issues; Data for 1990-92 from Financial Times as 
cited in Perroti and Guney, 1993; Privatisation International Yearbook, various issues. 
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The following companies are mostly privatised by voucher scheme and majority of them are traded on the 
Prague secondary market. The government is implicitly admitting failure of the voucher privatisation 
method to create strong majority owners who could bring new capital and encourage restructuring. By 
recent attempts to change ownership of privatised companies by: allowing investment funds to pool their 
interests in a company and market them ('derivative privatisation') , by selling state owned shares in the 
companies favouring strategic partners and aiming to create a strong majority owners, and by taking-over 
privatised companies (`re-nationalisation') before selling them on to strategic investors. 
1. Derivative privatisation 
Enterprise Industry 
Electrarny Opatovice Power 
Prvni Sev. TepL Power 
Deza Chemicals 
Vertex Fibre optics 
Date Sold Acquirer/Method 
1997 48 Nat. Power UK; derivative priv. 
planned 1998 n. a. Derivative privatisation 
planned 1998 n. a. Derivative privatisation 
planned 1998 n. a. Derivative privatisation 
2. Privatisation favouring strategic investors 




Unipetrol Petrol 1997 37 n. a. Foreign 
planned 1999 63 283.90 Sale 
CEZ Power 33 n. a. Sale 
planned 2002 67 788.54 Sale 
Ceska Pojistovna 64 
(19) Inv. Post. Banka 
(12) PPF Inv-fand 
1999 30 35.13 Sale 
Aero holding 1996 38 
planned 1999 62 7.5 Sale 
Sevac 1995 21 
planned 1999 79 0.6 Sale 
Jomoravska energetika 53 
(13) Cedel bank 
(15) Salzburg bank 
planned 2000 47 55.2 Sale 
Jihomoravska plynarenska 42 
(14) Salzburg bank 
planned 2000 48 55.2 Sale 
Jioceska energetika 42 
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(14) Salzburg bank 
planned 2000 48 7.26 Sale 
Jihoceska plynarenska 43 
(14) Salzburg bank 
planned 2000 47 12.95 Sale 
Prazska energetika 52 
(25) Geso AG 
planned 2000 48 94.96 Sale 
Prazska plynarenska 80 
(18) RWE Energie AG 
planned 2000 20 40 Sale 
Severomoravska energetika 53 
(25) Eastern Group 
Eu. Inv. 
planned 2000 47 125.64 Sale 
Severomoravska plynarenska 53 




planned 2000 47 42 Sale 
Severoceska energeti3ca 42 
(16) Mittledeutche 
planned 2000 48 101.41 Sale 
Severoceska plynarenska 51 
planned 2000 49 28.66 Sale 
Stredoceska energetika 41 
(16) RWE Energie AG 
planned 2000 59 80.11 Sale 
Stredoceska plynarenska 51 
(24) Wintershall Erdgas 
planned 2000 49 14.81 Sale 
Vychodoceska energetilca 52 
(12) VattenfallActiebolag 
(11) DEOP 
planned 2000 48 59.75 Sale 
Vychodoceska plynarenska 53 
(15) Slovensky 
Plynarensky 
planned 2000 47 15.88 Sale 
Zapadoceska energetilca 52 
(13) Salzburg Bank 
(10) Bayerische H. Bank 
planned 2000 48 41.40 Sale 
Zapadoceska plynarenska 54 
(13) Salzburgh Bank 
(12) Bayerische H. Bank 







planned 2000 46 21.48 
29 










planned 1999 46 5637 
54 
(13) 
planned 1999 46 61.66 
51 
(41) 
planned 1999 49 150.8 
54 
(28) 
















Budejovicky Budvar planned 1999 34.42 Sale 
Cepro planned 2002 100 117.38 Sale 
Mero CR planned 2002 100 238.12 Sale 
3. Re-nationalisation 
30 struggling, privatised companies (e. g. Chemapol, Skoda Plzen, CKD) are to be re-acquired by state via 
debt-equity swaps. The new state owned development agency will take over bank loans of this 
companies. The programme was announced in April 1999 (See FT, Bail-out of Czech Groups Agreed, 
14/4/99). 
Source: Data on derivative privatisation from Financial Times various issues; Ownership data from Burza 
Ceennych Papiru Praha, various publications; Data on proceeds and percentage sold from The Czech 
Ministry of Finance homepage; Proceeds CZK million, book values; Data on re-nationalisation from FT, 
Bail-out of Czech Groups Agreed, 1414199. 
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Appendix 5 Privatisation Sales and PIPOs in Hungary, 1988-99 
Data in million US$ except if stated otherwise; End of period, $: BF, exchange rates from Datastream 
used in calculations : 1990=61.45; 1991=75.62; 1992=83.97; 1993=100.7; 1994=113.15; 1995=139.47; 
1996=164.93; 1997=203.5; ** Matav is listed in Budapest and New York, Mol is listed in Budapest and 
Luxembourg; n. a. means that data has not been disclosed and not available from public sources, or we 















Biztosito* Insurance 1989 49 120 Allianz 
Ibusz Tourism 1989 40 10 Girozentrale Cons. 
1990 33 32 PIPO 
(5) Employees 
Tungsram* Lighting 1989 50 150 General Electric 
1991 25 n. a. General Electric 
Raba* Vehicles 1989 n. a. 150 General Motors 
1997 n. a. 53.5 Sale 
n. a. 24.6 PIPO 
Ganz-Unslet* Vehicles 1989 51 4 Telfos 
Scala-Coop, Kozert Retail 1989 n. a. 50 Tengelmann 
1991 n. a. 0.2 PIPO 
Ganz-Ansaldo Electrical 1990 75 130 Arisaldo 
Engineering 
Chinoin* Pharmaceuticals 1990 51 100 Sanofi 
Dunapack* Paper 1990 40 82 Prinzhorn Group 
GM Hungary* Vehicles 1990 67 66 General Motors 
Szabadeqyhazi* Food 1990 49 35 Agrana 
Hungalu Sugar, starch 1990 53 70 Agrana 
Muszi 1990 24 1.4 PIPO 
Oxygen & Dissolvedlndustrial Gases 1991 97 70 Hoechst Messer 
Acetylene Griesheim 
Budapest Soft drinks 1991 100 100 Coca-Cola Amatil 
Liikoripart V 
Nestle IntercsokoladaConfectionery 1991 97 94 Nestle 
Telefongyar Telecoms 1991 100 94 Siemens 
equipment 
Budapest 
Confectionery Confectionery 1991 70 80 Stollwerck 
Lehel* Appliances 1991 100 65 Electrolux 
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Compack* Food 1991 51 60 Sara Lee 
Interesokol* Food 1991 97 38 Nestle 
Magyar Suzuki* Vehicles 1991 40 30 Suzuki Motors 
Czemege* Retail 1991 51 69 Julius Meint 
1992 5 1.6 Sale 
Ilcarus* Vehicles 1991 30 50 Atex 
1997 53 Dom. private 
invest. 
10 Employees 
Egri Dohangy* Tobacco 1991 20 n. a. Austria Tabak 
30 60 Philip Morris 
Szolnok Szer. * Sugar 1991 40 40 Beghin-Say 
Komaromi* Beer 1991 50.3 n. a. Heineken 
Hajdusagi* Sugar 1991 30 20 Tate & Lyle 
Gyori Keksz* Food 1991 84 n. a. United Biscuits 
Revai Obuda* Printing 1991 57 5 Watamoughs 
Matravidek, Szerencs, Sugar 1991 40 70 Ferruzzi-Beghin-Say 
Szolnok sugar factories 
Pecsi Dohangyar Cigarettes 1991 51 60 British-American 
Tobacco 
Szabadegyhazi Distilling 1991 99 80 Amylum 
Nitroil Chemicals 1991 18.2 0.8 PIPO 
Bonbon-Hemingway Retail 1991 49.8 1.9 PIPO 
Styl Clothing 1991 31.9 21.4 PIPO 
Garagent Diversify ind. 1991 26 0.9 PIPO 
(0.7) Employees 
Zalakeramia Building mat. 1991 28 4.5 PIPO 
Danubius Hotels 1992 30 19 PIPO 
(5) Employees 
Debrenceni 
Dohanygyar Cigarettes 1992 85 68 Reemtsma 
Allami Bizt. * Insurance 1992 75 50 Aegon 
Hungalu Aluminium 1992 n. a. n. a. Alcoa 
N'T'vN Food and 1992 90 160 Ferruzzi, Unilever 
Detergents 
Duna Inter- 
continental Hotel 1992 90 77 Marriott, GiroCredit, 
Malev Hungarian Airline 1992 35 100 Alitalia, Sirrest 
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Airlines 
Dunal Vasmu Steelmaking 1992 50 70 Voest - Alpine 
Primagaz Rt Gas 1992 51 50 Calor Gas 
1993 n. a. 19 PIPO 
Pick Szeged Food 1992 80 44 PIPO 
(11) Employees 
Dunaujvaros 1992 31 29 Voest Alpine 
Kner 1992 85 20 Confinec 
Dorog Refuse Pharmaceutical 
Incinerator Waste treatment 1993 52 60 Sarp Industries 
Zwack Unicum Spirits 1993 25 11 PIPO 
25 n. a. Sale 
Globus Food 1993 100 6 PIPO 
PB Gaz Gas 1993 100 n. a. Sale 
Fau 1993 79 n. a. Sale 
Nyidofer 1993 76 n. a Sale 
Pannonia S. 1993 50.1 n. a. Sale 
Bajai Hutoipari 1993 96.3 4 Sale 
Pannonia Hotels Hotels 1993 51 52 Accor 
n. a. n. a. n. a. PIPO 
FAU Soft drinks 1993 79 115 PepsiCo 
International 
Graboplast Textile 1993 n. a. 54 Private placement 
Gedeon Richter Chemicals 1994 33.4 68 PIPO (international) 
1995 n. a. 49 PIPO 
1997 2 17 PIPO 
13 201 Private placement 
(dom. &int. ) 
Matav** Telecom 1994 30 875 Ameritech (US) and 
Deutche Telekom 
(67% in 1995) 
1997 25 1.2bn PIPO (dom. &int. ) 
planned 1999 5.4 332 PIPO 
Soproni S. Brewery 1994 38.39 18 PIPO 
Pannonplast Pharmaceuticals 1994 28.46 17 PIPO 
EGIS Pharmaceuticals 1994 29 42 PIPO 
Dedasz Electricity 1995 majority 108 Sale 
Edasz Electricity 1995 majority 197 Sale 
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planned 1999 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Ebnu Electricity 1995 majority 358 Sale 
Demasz Electricity 1995 majority 155 Sale 
1998 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Emasz Electricity 1995 majority 164 Sale 
Titasz Electricity 1995 majority 132 Sale 
planned 1999 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Westel Telecom 1995. 45 n. a. US West 
Budapest Sew. Utilities 1995 n. a. n. a. Compagnie 
Generale 
des Eaux and Ber- 
liner Wasserbetrebe 
Pannonia Brewery 1995 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Borsodi Brewery 1995 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Hungaria Hotels 1995 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Global Investment & Trade 1995 n. a. na. PIPO 
Hajdutej Dairy Food 1995. n. a. 4.3 PIPO (international) 
MOL** Oil/Gas 1995 64.4 180 Int. and dom. PIPO 
1997 10.6 302 secondary 
1998 n. a. n. a. secondary 
Kogaz Gas 1995 n. a. 67 Sale 
Csepeli Eromu 1995 n. a. 13 Sale 
Degaz Gas 1995 n. a. 23 
_ 
Sale 
1996 n. a. 85 Sale 
MVM Electricity 1995 n. a. 74 Sale 
planned 1997 PIPO 
BorsodChem Pharmaceuticals 1996 n. a. 97 PIPO and 
p. placement 
TVK Chemicals 1996 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Ddgaz(Del-Dun) Gas 1996 n. a. 52 Sale 
Fogaz Gas 1996 n. a. 129 Sale 
Tigaz Gas 1996 n. a. 172 Sale 
Egaz Gas 1996 n. a. 84 Sale 
Alcoa K. 1996 n. a. 26 Sale 
Taurus G. 1996 n. a. 66 Sale 
Tiszai Power 1996 na. 88 Sale 
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Forum Hotel 1996 n. a. 49 Sale 
Diosgynor (DAM)Steel 1997 







Magyar Posta Press distribution 1998 n. a. n. a. Sale 
MXB Rt. planned 1999 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Antenna Hun. Broadcasting planned 1999 n. a. 100 PIPO 
Synergen Inf technology planned 1999 n. a. 132 PIPO 
Five regional electricity planned 
distribution companies 1999 n. a. n. a. PIPO 
Malev Airline planned n. a. n. a. Sale 
Babolna Farm planned n. a. n. a. Sale 
Source: The Financial Times and Euromoney, various issues; BSE, various publications; * as cited in 
Perroti and Guney, 1993; Privatisation Yearbooks, various issues; Dow Jones Newswires; Data on the 
following PIPOs is from Dewenter and Malatesta (1997): Ibusz, Muszi, Nitroil, Bonbon-Hemingway, 
Styl, Garagent, Zalakeramia, Pick, Csemege, Danubius. 
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Appendix 6 List of initial public offerings in Poland 
AMERBANK HUTA OLAWA SA 
AMICA HUTZ4 EN SA 
AMPLI HYDROBUDOWA 
AMS HYDROTOR SA 
ANIMEX IMPEXMETAL 
APATOR INDYKPOL 
APEXIM SA INSTAL 
ARIEL IRENA HUTA-SZKLA 
ATLANTIS IZOLACJA 
BIG JELFA 
BAKOMA SA J TRZENKA 
BANK HANDLOWY KABELBFK 




BETON STAL KOMPAP 
BIELBAW KOPEX 
BIUROSYSTEM SA KPBP BICK 
BORYSZEW KRAK CHEMIA 




BUDIMEX POZNAN SA LODZKA DRUKARNIA 
BUDOPOL-WROCLAW SA LUBAWA 
BWR LUKBUT S. A 
BYTOM LZPS 
CELULOZA MALOPOLSKI BROWAR STRZELEC SA 
CENSTALGD MANONETR 
CERSANIT MEDICINES SA 
CHEvIISKOR SA MENNICA PANSTWOWA SA 
COMPUTERLAND POLAND MIESZKO 




ECHO PRESS SA MOSTALWAR 
EFEKT MOSTALZAB 
EKODEROB SA MOSTOSTAL SIEDLCE 
ELEKTRLM MUZA SA 
ELEKTROBUDOWA SA NOVITA 
ELEKTROEX OCEAN SA 
ELMONTWAR ODLEWNIE POLSKIE SA 
ELPO OKOCIM 
ELZAB SA OPTIMUS 
ENERGOAPARATURA ORBIS SA 
ENERGOMONTAZ POLUDNIE SA PAGED 
ESPEBEPE PBK 
EXBUD PBR 
FAMOT PEK POL SA 
FARM FOOD PEKAO 
FERRUM PEPEES 
FORTE SA PEI IEDIA 
GPRD PETROBANK 
GARBANIA PIASECKI 
GORAZDZE POLAR SA 
GRAJEWO POLFKUTNO 
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Appendix 7 
List of Initial public offerings 
in the Czech Republic 
AERO 
AGROBANKA OKD 
BIOCEL PASKOV PARAMO 
BW BRNO PIVOVAR RADEGAST 
CESKA POJISTOVNA PLZEN TEPLARENSKA 
CESKA SPORITELNA PLZENSKY PRAZDROJ 
CESKA ZBROJOVKA PODNIK VYPOCETNI 
CESKOMOR DOLY PRAZSKA ENERGETIKA 
CEVA PRACHOVICE PRAZSKA TEPLARENSK 
CEZ 2 PRAZSKE PIVOVARY 
CHEMOPETROL GROUP DEAD - MERGER PRECHEZA 
892392 PREROVSKE STROJ 
CHLUMCANSKE KERAM PRVNI SEVER TEPLAR 
CIZKOVICKA CEMENTA RADIOKOMUNIKACE C 
CKD PRAHA RAKOV KER ZAVODY 
COKOLADOVNY SELIKO 
CS NAMORNI PLAVBA SELLIER & BELLOT 
CVM MOKRA SEMOR PLYNARENSKA 
CZ STRAKONICE SEPAP STETI 
DEZA SERVEROC DOLY 
ELEKTRARNY OPATOVICE SETUZA 
ELEKTRO PRAGA SEVEROC ENERGET 
ELEKTROMONTAZ ZAV SEVEROC TEPLA LY 
FAB SEVEROMORAV ENERGETIKA 
FATRA SKLARNY KAVALIER 
GALENA SKLO UNION TEPLICE 
IPB SKODA PLZEN 
IPS PRAHA SOKOLOVSKA UHELNA 
JIHOCESKE ENERGETIKA SPOL CHEM HUT, I 
JIHOCESKE MLEKARN Y SPOLANA 
JIHOMOR ENERGET SPT TELECOM 
JIHOMOR PLYNAREN STAVBY SILNIC 
JIP VETRNI STREDOCESKA ENERGETICKA 
JITEX PISEK SYNTHESIA 
KABLO KLADNO TABAK 
KAUCUK GROUP DEAD - MERGER TEPLARNY BRNO 
KOMERCNI BANKA TEPLARNY KARVINA 
KOTVA TMP-TEL MONTAZE 
LACHEMA TRINECKE ZELEZAILN Y 
LECIVA PRAHA VERTEX 
LOVOCHEMIE VITKOVICKE 
METROSTAV VODNI STAVBY PRAHA 
MILO OLOMOUC VOJEN STAVBY PHA 
MORAY CHEMIC ZAV VSB 
MORAVSKE NAFT DOLY VYCHC ENERGETIKA 
MORAVSKE TEPL VYCHC PLYNARENSKA 
MOSTECKA UH SPOL XAVEROV AS 
MSA ZAPC ENERGETIKA 
NOVA HUT ZAPC PLYNARENSKA 
OBCHOD SLADOVNI ZC KAOLIN ZAVODY 
ZDAS 
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BRAU UNION HUNGARIA 
COFINEC 
CSOPAK B' DEAD - DELIST 10/95 
CSOPAK N 






FIRST HUNG. ENERGY PRTF. 






GOLDSUN DEAD - DELIST. 31/7/97 
GRABOPLAST 






INTER EUROPA BANK 
KEKKUTI 
KONZUM 
MARTFU SORGYAR DEAD - 
DELIST. 06/05/97 
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